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SUMMARY
In the presence of operational uncertainty, one of the greatest challenges in systems
engineering is to ensure system effectiveness, mission capability and survivability for
large scale, complex system architectures. Historic events such as the 2003 Northeast-
ern Blackout, and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, have underlined the great importance
of system safety, and survivability. With safety management currently applied on a
reactive basis to emerging incidents and risk challenges, there is a paradigm shift from
passive, reactive and diagnosis-based approaches to the development of architectures
that will autonomously manage safety and survivability through active, proactive and
prognosis-based engineering solutions. The shift aims to bring safety considerations
early in the engineering design process, in order to reduce retrofitting and additional
safety certification costs, increase flexibility in risk management, and essentially make
safety be ”built-in” the design.
As a possible enabling research direction, resilience engineering is an emerging
discipline, pertinent to safety management, which offers alternative insights on the
design of more safe and survivable system architectures. Conceptually, resilience
engineering brings new perspectives on the understanding of system safety, accidents,
failures, performance degradations and risk. A resilient system can ”absorb” the
impact of change due to unexpected disturbances, while it ”adapts” to change, in
order to maintain the system’s physical integrity and capability to carry on with its
mission. The leading hypothesis advocates that if a complex dynamic system is more
resilient, then it would be more survivable, thus more effective, despite the unexpected
disturbances that could affect its normal operating conditions.
xxiii
For investigating the impact of more resilient systems on survivability and safety,
a framework for theoretical resilience estimations has been formulated. It constitutes
the basis for quantitative techniques for total system resilience evaluation, based on
scenario-based, dynamic system simulations. Physics-based Modeling and Simulation
(M&S) is applied for dynamical system behavior analysis, which includes system
performance, health monitoring, damage propagation and overall mission capability.
For the development of the assessment framework and testing of a resilience as-
sessment technique, a small-scale canonical problem has been formulated, involving a
computational model of a degradable and reconfigurable spring-mass-damper SDOF
system, in a multiple main and redundant spring configuration. A rule-based feedback
controller is responsible for system performance recovery, through the application of
different reconfiguration strategies and strategic activation of the necessary main or
redundant springs. Uncertainty effects on system operation are introduced through
disturbance factors, such as external forces with varying magnitude, input frequency,
event duration and occurrence time. Such factors are the basis for scenario formu-
lation, in support of a Monte Carlo simulation analysis. Case studies with varying
levels of damping and different reconfiguration strategies, involve the investigation of
operational uncertainty effects on system performance, mission capability, and sys-
tem survivability. These studies furthermore explore uncertainty effects on resilience
functions that describe the system’s capacities on ”restoring” mission capability, on
”absorbing” the effects of changing conditions, and on ”adapting” to the occurring
change.
The proposed resilience assessment technique or the Topological Investigation for
Resilient and Effective Systems, through Increased Architecture Survivability (TIRE-
SIAS) is then applied and demonstrated for a naval system application, in the form
of a reduced scale, reconfigurable cooling network of a naval combatant. Uncertainty
effects are modeled through combinations of different number of network fluid leaks.
xxiv
The TIRESIAS approach on the system baseline (32-control valve configuration) has
allowed for the investigation of leak effects on survival times, mission capability degra-
dations, as well as the resilience function capacities. As part of the technique demon-
stration, case studies were conducted for different architecture configurations, which





1.1 The need for effective military systems
Throughout most of the history of humanity, warfare has been the traditional means
for a nation to ensure national security and internal social stability [222]. However, the
model of warfare has evolved from raw military force projection to a multidimensional
approach, with science, technology, tactics, and intelligence playing an important
strategic role [157]. In this paradigm shift, science and technology [208] have been
the essential drivers for military system development and acquisition, also leading to
significant advances in military capability.
Advancement in overall system capability has been raising concerns over safety
and security, both at regional and national scales. If utilized and operated by the
inappropriate entities, in different applications, the same technologies can become
severe threats against the nation’s security. For instance, nuclear reactors are built
as industrial power plants for energy generation and distribution. At the same time
however, nuclear technology is the basis of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nu-
clear or chemical [23], that could enable acts of terrorism. The possibility of improper
implementation and use of technology, in accordance to national security concerns,
brings attention in investments for better safety and survivability.
The risk of emerging threats, when system capability and advanced technology
are utilized with malicious intent is not the sole driver for increased safety and sur-
vivability. Increased capability itself results in larger scale complex systems [11] with
more interconnections and modes of operation. A natural consequence is that a com-





















Figure 1: Motivation thought path towards the need for effective systems
that could result in higher risk of local failures, or eventually to total system collapse
[51]. Thus, capability results in more complex systems with possibly higher sus-
ceptibilities/vulnerabilities, that eventually contribute to an increased uncertainty in
mission performance and degrade system survivability and safety. This thought path
drives the motivation for this research, as illustrated in Figure 1, and is the basis of
establishing a general need for more effective military systems.
1.1.1 National security interests
In a globalized framework of socio-economical growth, nations have shifted towards
new means of pursuing political and economic affluence. For ensuring national secu-
rity and local/global socio-economical stability, practice of diplomacy and political
alliance through collaboration [116] have become the main substitute of traditional
forms of warfare-based resolution of conflict. In support of the previous statement,
it has been observed that, since the end of World War II, humanity has been experi-
encing a time period with the most peace agreements, compared to any other period
in world human history, and as Wallensteen [255] indicates, there have been more
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conflicts than ever, which have either been prevented or entirely avoided.
The role of National Security is crucial for allowing nations to mitigate conflict
and contribute towards global peacekeeping. For the U.S. Government, the Nation’s
security is a top priority [60]. The original national security initiative has been intro-
duced by President Truman through the National Act of 1947, and is defined as ”the
foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define U.S. goals or
purposes” [59]. In particular, National Security interests include preserving the U.S.
political identity, framework, and institutions, fostering economic well-being, and bol-
stering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its
allies [242].
Observation 1.1: National Security interests are crucial for political, social and
economical stability, either at national or international levels.
1.1.2 Increased system capability requirements
As part of the U.S. National Security Strategy, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) is responsible for monitoring the application of technologies for good civilian
purposes. Most DHS mandates require more capable systems in support of security,
in the form of military and defense systems, infrastructures or other advanced tech-
nological equipment [201]. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is also advocating
for more capable systems [123], through development of their DoDAF standard [55].
DoDAF is a standard framework for defense systems acquisition, with capability as
the main driving objective, leading the way for capability-based design and acquisition
[24], as an emerging branch of systems engineering.
The U.S. Armed Forces have based their military goals on system capability, as
it is expressed through their doctrine [240]. Military doctrine describes how to best
make use of military power in support of military operations, and strategy in order
to accomplish national political objectives [202]. It is a form of ”constitution” that
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guides actions toward well-defined goals and provides the basis for mutual under-
standing within and among the services and the national policymakers [163].
The US Air Force maintains a three tier (basic, operational, tactical) capability-
driven doctrine [237] that requires advanced, highly effective, lethal and non lethal
systems with unique capabilities [213] across the range of military operations [202].
The U.S. Navy doctrine is aligned to the objective of attaining national policy objec-
tives through capacity to wage war successfully [163]. With the recognition of diversity
and multi-dimensionality of modern warfare, the importance of readiness, flexibility,
sustainability, and mobility in military operations is underlined, thus suggesting re-
quirements for multi-terrain capability, in support of survival and combat effectiveness
[247] of Navy forces [163]. The U.S. Marine Corps doctrine brings focus on the force
of human to resolve and utilize technology to leverage the chaos and complexity of the
battlefield [244]. For adapting available resources in chaotic and austere operating
environments, capability is a key enabler [243]. The U.S. Coast Guard is protecting
the nation’s borders and territories, through missions that require the right assets
and capabilities at the right place and time [239], while expecting demonstration of
fighting flexibility, properly managing risk and being restraint based on long term
mission goals. Last, the US Army’s primary focus is land warfighting, underscoring
the need for capability and credibility in full spectrum operations [238]. Concluding,
the literature search has collectively revealed that doctrine implies that military sys-
tems must be designed and tested for being able to provide advanced capabilities,
multi-domain superiority and improved system and mission effectiveness.
Observation 1.2: National Security interests drive the need for increased capability,
as resulting from strategic and doctrine-based reasoning.
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1.1.3 Increase of system complexity & mission uncertainty
There are several options on how systems are designed for increased capability. Com-
mon approaches include the addition of redundant subsystems [16] or technology in-
fusion [24]. In all cases, the expected benefits concentrate on increased functionality
and extended frames of operation. For the former approach, the system boundaries
are extended, with an increased number of subsystems and interconnections, which
result in increasing the overall system complexity [38]. While there has been some
diversity on how system complexity is understood, defined [88] and measured [7], [51],
[49], it is commonly accepted that increased system complexity increases uncertainty
in mission performance. Thus, complexity is responsible for higher risks of faults
that may lead to larger scale failures, total system shutdowns [122], performance
degradations or other forms of emerging behavior [20]. Technology infusion may also
be responsible of different forms of complexity, that could be additionally attributed
to technology readiness levels (TRL) or other factors associated to the particular
technology implementation.
In all cases, the higher uncertainty in normal system operation and mission effec-
tiveness due to system complexity, results in risks on the levels of system safety and
survivability. From a safety standpoint, complexity effectively introduces additional
modes of failure, or brings more opportunities for performance degradation. If safety,
reliability and availability requirements are not met throughout a system’s mission,
then overall system survivability is reduced, thus significantly impacting total sys-
tem effectiveness. In an alternative formulation of the earlier assertion, a complex
structure is more fragile, or equivalently less resilient, as fragility is complementary
to resilience [146].
Observation 1.3: Increased system capability is often achievable at the cost of
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Figure 2: Advanced capability requirements lead to increased safety requirements
1.1.4 Increased survivability requirements
Advancement of technology has lead to more capable systems with multiple mission
abilities. The enhanced functionality extends the envelope of system operation, thus
introducing forms of uncontrolled uncertainty, either related to human-system inter-
actions or incompatibility with existing SoA systems. Other emerging challenges,
such as technology immaturity, or how these are integrated to existing system ar-
chitectures, introduce additional layers of uncertainty, thus contributing to increased
risks or additional safety hazards. Consequently, increased technological ability has
brought exposure to additional hazards and increased risk levels.
To compensate for increasing risk in complex system operations, the responsi-
ble government parties have been continuously reworking certification and quality
requirements for hazard and risk mitigation in military or commercial system acqui-
sition. Operations and system design requirements are constantly revised to address
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the additional risks and hazards, in order to ensure that system and human safety are
maintained. In many cases, advanced technologies are necessary to satisfy more de-
manding certification requirements, which target system safety, security, survivability,
and overall risk mitigation [217].
At this stage, there is a strong possibility that system capability may be ulti-
mately degraded, as a consequence of performance degradations due to either weight
addition, or further complexity increase. Technology infusion that is dedicated to
safety management, may itself be at a low Technology Readiness Level (TRL) [148],
thus leading to further safety requirements. Within the engineering requirements
definition phase, there is an overall cyclical process driving both the capability and
safety requirements at an alternating iterative fashion, until satisfactory compromise
is achieved and is visually explained in Figure 2.
Observation 1.4.1: System capability implies increasing safety, security and surviv-
ability requirements, which may need to be iteratively revised and expanded, under
the presence of technology uncertainty, if desired capability levels cannot be reached.
From an economic perspective, traditional design approaches for safety can rarely
be justified as the most cost-effective [41]. In most cases, improved safety implies
increased weight and cost, thus inversely affecting affordability. According to the
current State-of-the-Practice (SoP), system architectures are optimized for perfor-
mance and capability at the conceptual and preliminary design phase, while system
certification and other safety concerns are addressed at the latter design phases. As
explained earlier, this practice often results in selecting additional technologies for
enhancing system safety and reliability, that designers then need to retrofit in the
architecture at latter design stages. Late or post-design retrofitting approaches for




















Figure 3: Safety early in the design process [41]
in Figure 3, Christensen has suggested that by incorporating design considerations
for safety objectives in the conceptual design phase, architectures will be capable of
seamlessly accommodating safety enhancements and equipment, thus avoiding any
necessary costs for late-stage retrofitting [206].
The importance of early investment [218] in system safety and survivability for
military system acquisition, has been emphasized by several aerospace and naval
authorities, agencies and domain experts. The JTCG/AS Survivability Handbook
Series states that ”survival of our forces is a crucial aspect of full-spectrum dominance
of our enemy - an aspect that increases in complexity as the battlefield arena becomes
more complex” [209]. The DoD through their DOD Regulation 5000.2-R indicates
that ”mission-critical systems, including crew, shall be survivable to the threat levels
anticipated in their operating environment” [58].
Observation 1.4.2: Investing on safety management at early stages of the system
design and acquisition process, implies benefits program affordability, seamless inte-
gration of subsystems and technologies, as well as fewer iterations until compromise
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of capability, safety and survivability is achieved, while minimizing risk due to tech-
nology infusion and operational uncertainty.
1.1.5 Closing the loop: Need for more effective systems
Given the importance of system capability and safety management in military system
design and acquisition, an opportunity is becoming apparent for the research inves-
tigation towards more effective systems. In its short definition, system effectiveness
is a measure of the ability of the system to accomplish its objective [97]. However,
under a quantitative format, system effectiveness is a cumulative representation of a
system’s capability, survivability and overall safety and availability [97]. Following on
the previous statement and observations, Figure 4 summarizes the reasoning process
towards the need for more effective systems. This opportunity is of event greater
importance, given that there haven’t been any globally established standard design
methods for designing military systems that can be always fully capable, available
and survivable at any time during their mission.
Observation 1.5: Driven by the guidance of National Security interests, the need for
more capable, safe/survivable systems under affordable system design and acquisition
processes, investigation of the concept of system effectiveness is the leading research
objective.
1.2 The vision for more survivable and affordable naval
combatants
The U.S. Navy is interested on new design approaches for improving mission effective-
ness of their assets during combat operations. As outlined by Habayeb [97], system
effectiveness depends on system capability, availability and survivability. The excep-
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Figure 4: From National security to more effective military systems
recognized by the naval engineering community. As Rains points out, system effec-
tiveness and survivability should be treated as attributes early in the design process
[182]:
”Combatant ship design is a series of tradeoffs often made with little knowledge of the
impact of the decisions, except on ship size or displacement. However, many other
considerations, such as combat effectiveness, survivability, and initial cost may be
equally important in the design process”.
1.2.1 System survivability
System effectiveness however is by no means exclusively system-centric. It does de-
pend on the various modes of change that occur around or within the system. These
modes range from the threat environment that the system needs to operate in, the
evolution of its mission portfolio, as well as its own natural evolution, regarding
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its operational health and military worth and capability. In a threat or accident-
free environment, system effectiveness is primarily driven by mission capability and
availability. However, under increased threat levels, survivability is what practically
determines the overall effectiveness.
Figure 5 presents some historical incidents, involving significant attacks or acci-
dents on naval ships. All ships have been designed with certain performance criteria,
as well as advanced capability considerations, which they demonstrated under nor-
mal operating conditions. The historic incidents of Figure 5 are representative of the
typical challenges during a destroyer’s mission. These range from tactical attacks
through missile or torpedo, or accidental incidents, such as malfunction or human
error. The high uncertainty around incident occurrence and progression, does not
allow to easily identify the design solutions that would almost guarantee the same
levels or performance and capability, as in under normal conditions. Thus, an op-
portunity is arisen to investigate how well would the vessel maintain its by-design
performance and capability in operating circumstances under high vulnerability and
degraded system health.
Observation 1.6.1: In order to design more effective systems, not only the designer
must have expected performance and capability levels in mind, but also consider
survivability and investigate how the system performs in high threat intensity envi-
ronments under degraded figures of merit.
1.2.2 System affordability
Change of fiscal nature significantly affects the resources committed for R&D, testing
and the overall system acquisition costs. With the expected budget constraints that
aim for lower acquisition costs, yet with no discount on required performance and
capability, the problem of viability becomes very challenging [152]. Combined to the
11
1967
USS Forrestal (CVA 59)
•Incident: ZUNI rocket fired accidentally
•Damage: Extensive structural damage, loss of equipment
•Casualties: 161 Injured, 134 Killed
•Cost: $72 Million
1987
USS Stark (FFG 31)
•Incident: Struck by 2 Exocet missiles
•Damage: Extensive structural damage, almost sank
•Casualties: 5 Injured, 37 Killed
•Cost: $142 Million
1988 
USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58)
•Incident: Struck an M08 mine
•Damage: DIW, almost sunk
•Casualties: 69 Injured, 0 Killed
•Cost: $32 Million
1989
USS White Plains (AFS 4)
•Incident: Human error, fuel ejection valve
•Damage: DIW
•Casualties: 161 Injured, 6 Killed
•Cost: $33 Million
2000
USS Cole (DDG 67)
•Incident: Terrorist attack
•Damage: DIW
•Casualties: 36 Injured, 17 Killed
•Cost: ~$200 Million
Figure 5: Historical naval attack incidents and accidents
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additional requirements on increased survivability for maximizing overall effective-
ness, the problem of affordability while maintaining effectiveness becomes another
opportunity for investigating revolutionary configurations, technologies or total de-
sign methods that could identify a viable compromise on all fronts.
Budget constraints are critical for determining the mission portfolio of a military
system, based on operating, maintenance and disposal costs. It could put limitation
on system capability and if a good balance between cost and effectiveness cannot
be kept, there is risk in returning a solution that is affordable, yet very limited
against its expected mission effectiveness. Up to recent, the Navy has discovered the
major contributions to increasing development and maintenance costs for its naval
fleets. Figure 6 shows the Navy budget breakdown over the years, including navy
personnel compensations, ship operations and maintenance, as well as shipbuilding
and conversion costs. In Figure 7, a yearly analysis (FY03) of the cost per hull is
presented for a DDG-51 naval destroyer. In both studies, the need for crew right-
sizing is underlined, as personnel costs (shown in red) represent more than half of the
Navy’s budget for a given year.
Observation 1.6.2: As system effectiveness is directly linked to operational figures
of merit (e.g. performance, capability and survivability), one must consider additional
indirect factors, in the form of budget constraints, cost reduction and affordability
initiatives. System effectiveness must come without compromise, yet at the lowest
possible acquisition and operation costs.
Connecting with earlier thoughts, modern naval ships comprise of many interde-
pendent subsystems, as other large scale engineering systems. Critical issues around
large scale systems, is robustness and surviving external disturbances or full scale at-
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Figure 8: The need for more survivable and affordable naval systems
human-in-the-loop communications and decision making, resulting increased owner-
ship cost.
Doerry has underlined that ”for maximum effectiveness at lowest costs, surviv-
ability should be an important consideration for the design of the system architecture
of each mission and distributed system as well as the physical arrangements of system
elements on the ship” [65]. In other words, with survivability design considerations in
the early conceptual design phase, enabled by system reconfigurability and automa-
tion, the naval combatants of the future are expected to have right-sized crews, thus
reducing total ownership costs. In conclusion, as Figure 8 demonstrates, the rapidly
changing fiscal and threat environment regarding the development and operation of
naval vessels, demands for a shift towards design for system effectiveness, that is
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Figure 9: Efforts to improve naval system effectiveness, survivability and automation
Observation 1.7: Naval system design must bring more emphasis on reducing op-
erating costs and manning workload, while increasing survivability, reliability and
fight-through capability, for most of the system’s lifecycle [5].
1.2.3 Recent efforts towards effective and efficient naval systems
Today’s conventional ships have independent shipboard propulsion and electrical
power plants with centralized systems associated with the rest of the shipboard en-
gineering plant and machinery infrastructure [144]. Under their vision for increased
survivability and affordability, the U.S. Navy is investigating alternative system inte-
gration strategies. Several efforts have been initiated, in order to address the Navy’s
direction towards crew right-sizing, increased levels of automation and operational
flexibility, with a time line of these efforts presented in Figure 9.
1.2.3.1 The Integrated Power System (IPS) architecture
A first attempt was recorded under the proposal for transitioning to the Integrated
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Figure 10: Zumwalt class with right-sized crew and integrated power plants
power plants that generate the total amount of power that the ship needs for perform-
ing its basic functions and operations. Power to all loads is dynamically distributed,
according to mission expectations, strategic planning and availability of resources [66].
As Figure 10, suggests, IPS-based architectures are expected to bring more flexibility
in resource management, along with the reduced crew sizing requirements [44].
1.2.3.2 The SmartShip program
The Smart Ship program was initiated by is the US Navy and Coast Guard and
demonstrated what a small amount of automation can produce in terms of added
capabilities and reduced costs [224]. The USS Yorktown (CG-48) was modified and
automated to reduce the workload, manpower requirements and cost while enhancing
the combat readiness and quality of life of the crew [67]. It incorporated damage
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control [103] and engineering systems which automated many of the routine daily
tasks [135].
1.2.3.3 The Integrated Engineering Plant (IEP)
The next-generation multi-mission destroyer, the DDG-1000 has been envisioned to
be operated by a crew of 150, in a more than 50% reduction when compared to
DDG-51 and subsequent Arleigh Burke class destroyers [246]. As a possible enabling
strategy, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) proposed the Integrated Engineering
Plant (IEP) concept in 2001 [70]. The IEP is a vision for a notional ship architecture
that is removing traditional system-level barriers [229], between various ship plants,
while integrating the ships engineering and resource allocation systems, including
the electrical, propulsion and auxiliary systems [268]. The resulting architecture
consists of a highly dynamic, decentralized and interdependent set of distribution
networks, in which plant components are organized in layers and can perform the
predefined or self controlled tasks [144], as explained in Figure 11 [226]. With the
modular IEP architecture and optimal maintenance procedures, total ownership costs
are expected to be reduced. The IEP builds upon knowledge acquired through the
IPS initiative, and has inspired further initiatives, such as the Reduced Ship Crew
by Virtual Presence (RSVP)[210] and the Damage Control - Automation to Reduce
Manning (DC-ARMS) concepts [263].
Besides flexible architectures [144], resource management [268] and crew right-
sizing [68], through the IEP, the U.S. Navy is addressing the fact that naval ships are
becoming more complex, as they are comprised by an increasing number of heteroge-
neous interdependent subsystems. This increased complexity requires new methods
for the design and operation of these naval systems [115]. The Integrated Reconfig-
urable Intelligent Systems (IRIS) initiative by the Aerospace Systems Design Labo-
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Figure 11: The IEP concept [253]
Navy’s IEP vision for the future naval combatant. Following the IEP vision, an IRIS
ship should be capable of:
Provide continuous communication, mobility, power, and thermal management for all
shipboard systems, even during major disruptions involving cascading failures, thereby
reducing manning requirements and increasing overall ship effectiveness. [5]
As a design exercise, under the IRIS initiative, a systems engineering framework
[205] is formulated for investigation of naval system design solutions with increased
automation and reconfigurability [68], and implemented through distributed, intel-
ligent control architecture [115]. As a result, these intelligent platforms must be
capable of autonomously executing a trio of basic functions, as explained in Figure
12. Aligned with the U.S. Navy’s outlook, the overarching objective of IRIS is to pro-
pose solutions for more survivable, reconfigurable and affordable naval ships, in an

















Figure 12: IRIS functionality [115]
1.3 Enabling directions: Safety Management
The vision for more effective systems has initiated the inspiration for this research.
But as a requirement at the higher level of abstraction, one may wonder how can this
vision be interpreted at a lower, more technical level. It is thus necessary to investigate
how system effectiveness is further broken down into contributing concepts, that
could potentially become major research thrusts. Based on literature search, an
overview of system effectiveness and its components is presented in Appendix A,
mainly as suggested through the work of the Military Operations Research Society
(MORS).According to this framework, system effectiveness is dependent upon three
contributors, system availability, dependability and capability [97]. In a mathematical
form, system effectiveness is a probability and is the product of the probabilities for
the three contributions, as given by Equation 1.
PSE = pAvailability · pDependability · pCapability (1)
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1.3.1 ”Change” as a determining factor of system effectiveness
With the broad nature of the concept of system effectiveness, one would wonder which
component should receive most attention, as part of the research objectives. These
three ”-ilities” are not static design attributes, they are dynamic figures of merit that
depend on the change that the system and its environment is experiencing. The world
evolves due to a number of changes that occur and that can be the result of other
pre-occurring changes. Many distinguished philosophers have attempted to interpret
change. Heraclitus of Ephesus (535 B.C. - 475 B.C.) was one of the first to mark the
significance of change in the real world, summarizing it through this simple, yet so
powerful expression:
”τ ά πάντα ρει̃” (”Everything flows”)
Change refers to actions that result in altering one or more state properties that
describe the condition, in which a system finds itself. Change happens over the lapse
of time, implies transition of system location, system composition (e.g. natural aging)
or operating status. Change does not always have to cause adversity, thus change
is often part of the system’s overall evolution, in terms of its physical composition,
mission capability and total environmental conditions (physical or fiscal).
In many cases however, change can trigger non-favorable, adversary, single or
multiple disturbance events. Depending on the system, the mission and the typical
operating conditions, adversary change leads to increasing threat levels that further
result in increasing safety risks, survivability reduction, mission capability and system
health degradation, with an overall impact in system effectiveness [198].
In larger scale complex systems, describing change is a challenging task. Attributes
of change with respect to the mission and health of the system must be defined. For
instance, change in terms of origin can be endogenous or exogenous. The 2005 Hurri-
cane Katrina and the 2003 Northeastern Power Blackout are representative historical
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events for exogenous and endogenous change respectively. The 2005 Hurricane Kat-
rina was the sixth strongest overall, as well as one of the five deadliest in the history
of the United States [132]. When the levee system catastrophically failed, most of
the city of New Orleans had flooded, with at least 1,836 people having lost their
lives in the actual hurricane and the subsequent floods [169]. The 2003 Northeast-
ern Power Blackout was initiated by a local power substation failure, resulting in a
massive propagation of malfunctions in power generation and delivery, water supply
and communications. A generating plant in Eastlake, Ohio went offline amid high
electrical demand, followed by the high-voltage power lines later going out of service.
More than 508 generating units at 265 power plants during the 4-day outage were shut
down, affecting an area with an estimated 50 million people and 61,800 megawatts
(MW) of electric load in 8 US States, and the Canadian province of Ontario [84]. At
least eleven fatalities were recorded, and brought the total costs in the United States
ranging between $4 billion and $10 billion (2003 U.S. dollars) [169].
Another attribute is intent of a threat. Changes can emerge due to natural threat,
or due to malicious actions, either in the forms of malevolent attacks, or asymmetric
threats. Both the 2005 Hurricane Katrina and the 2003 Northeastern Power Blackout
were classified as naturally occurring events. Terrorism is an example of malicious
event, resulting from malevolent threats and attacks. Figure 13 classifies the incidents
according to the attributes of change. The 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole is an
example of an exogenous terrorist attack [232]. While docked at Aden harbor for
a fuel stop, a small craft approached the port side, where explosives were molded
against the hull of the boat. The resulting blast caused a large gash in the ship’s port
side, hitting the ship’s galley. Severe flooding occurred, however damage propagation
eventually went under control, with a death toll of 17 sailors, and 39 others injured.
The 1988 Pan Am flight 103 bombing is an example of an endogenous malevolent
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Figure 13: Historical attacks and disasters
which resulted in 270 fatalities [172].
Observation 1.8: Understanding the basic attributes of change, is necessary to
further understand, classify and analyze the impact of emerging threats.
1.3.2 Dependability and safety management
Referring to the historical incidents, the affected systems have all been designed with
certain capability requirements. Under normal operating conditions, system capa-
bility by-design was at levels, as expected by the mission. However, under extreme
conditions of ”change”, it became very difficult or impossible to ensure the same ex-
pected mission capability. In that regime, it is asserted that system dependability
is what determines the overall system effectiveness. Both system capability and de-
pendability are inherent by design, yet the system’s response under extreme change
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Figure 14: Dependability and safety management
manifest itself. System availability is linked to real time logistics during change, but
it is indirectly still determined by dependability. Based on this frame of reasoning,
dependability is strategically selected to be brought into main focus in improving
system effectiveness through design, for the entire body of this research work.
Dependability is the branch of effectiveness that is directly linked to safety man-
agement, as illustrated in Figure 14. Safety management is the field of safety engi-
neering that investigates accident related system instabilities with associated hazards,
and seeks to propose safety requirements and solutions in order to control system and
sub-system operation performance. But before taking a step further, one needs to
consider the meaning of system safety under this context.
In 1968, Jerome Lederer, the director of the NASA Manned Flight Safety Program
for Apollo defined system safety as [140]:
”System safety covers the total spectrum of risk management. It goes beyond the hard-
ware and associated procedures of system safety engineering. It involves: attitudes
and motivation of designers and production people, employee/management rapport,
the relation of industrial associations among themselves and with government, human
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factors in supervision and quality control, documentation on the interfaces of indus-
trial and public safety with design and operations, the interest and attitudes of top
management, the effects of the legal system on accident investigations and exchange
of information, the certification of critical workers, political considerations, resources,
public sentiment and many other non-technical but vital influences on the attainment
of an acceptable level of risk control. These non-technical aspects of system safety
cannot be ignored.”
Lederer’s definition defines safety in a broader spectrum, which not only includes the
system as hardware, but also all human and non-human factors regarding system
design, operation, policies and procedures, as well as management in all applicable
levels.
From a behavioral point of view, system safety is simply known as the ”sum
of all accidents that do not occur” [111], or that a system is safe if there are no
accidents affecting its normal operating conditions, presuming that the only operating
risks would always result into a certain set of emerging accidents. In another more
generalized version, safety is described as ”the state of the system at which nothing
unwanted happens” [111]. On the other hand, loss of safety can emerge without the
occurrence of anything that might be unwanted, in particular when safety refers to an
organization that may include hardware, software or human personnel[62]. Under the
previous definitions, safety is represented by a state variable that marks the presence
of accidents, or total freedom from them.
But reality indicates that safety is not a binary state representation, thus more
states associated to system safety can be found. Except for full accidents or losses, it
is understood that partial losses are responsible for different levels of safety, thus Leve-
son has extended her definition of safety to the ”freedom from accidents or losses”.
Under these premise, safety is defined in terms of acceptable loss [140], and is quanti-
tatively expressed in the form of a nominal safety target (referring to a performance
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measure, or utility function). Under this view of safety, it is no longer a discrete state
variable, but it takes the form of a continuous loss function, defined as the differ-
ence of the system’s response under normal operating conditions, minus the degraded
performance response [140]:
Vloss = V0 − Vdegraded (2)
A third remark points out that safety is dynamic. It is not only depending on
reliability of static parts, but safety also results as the outcome of complex processes
[258]. Accidents occur when external disturbances and dysfunctional interactions
between system components create a situation that is out of control. Under this
perspective, safety can be viewed as a control problem [141], [183], and the mission of
safety management is to control system and sub-system process performance, under
the effects of operational risk and mission uncertainty.
1.3.3 Safety management concepts
Except for system safety, other major safety management concepts, are system secu-
rity, reliability, and survivability (often consisting of susceptibility, vulnerability or
recoverability). With these concepts as the basis, safety engineers are expected to
apply a portfolio of common techniques, in order to ensure and demonstrate that a
design is safe. In general, they perform fault analysis studies, and propose safety
requirements in design specifications. Safety management techniques are organized
under risk identification [126], assessment and estimation [129], as well as under reli-
ability engineering [267].
Risk is a key metric for safety management [12]. The risk of experiencing an acci-
dent is linked to safety as a means of operational uncertainty quantification [174]. Risk
is typically measured as the probability of a certain set of events occurring, originating
from faults and subsystem or system failures [127]. For large scale systems, complex-
ity is a major factor of increasing operational uncertainty and risk [85]. Conditions
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leading to threats, hazards and failure risks, either external or internal can emerge
between subsystems [100], due to challenging mission expectations or changes in the
system’s environment [155], [111]. Typical behavior of a complex system is nonlin-
ear, nondeterministic, and possibly chaotic, especially for systems with an increasing
number of interactions and subsystem connections [38]. Increasing complexity is also
a consequence of extensive usage of revolutionary technology solutions [140]. The
appearance of new hazards is a common risk factor, especially as more revolutionary
technologies and solutions are introduced for mass consumption with a continuously
decreasing average time of conversion of technical discovery into commercial product,
thus resulting in technologies that are at low readiness levels [139].
Risk identification, along with risk prevention and mitigation is one of the most
common techniques within safety management. Risk identification examines the ori-
gins of faults and failures that might become hazardous and provides a relative im-
portance scale for reducing the number of most significant risk factors that can affect
system safety to a finite set. For effective risk identification, it should be understood
that any choice of technology carries with it possible worst case scenarios that must
be taken into account in any implementation or policymaking decision [25]. The most
common risk identification techniques are:
• Common cause failure (CCF) analysis
• Fault tree analysis (FTA)
• Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
Reliability engineering is concerned primarily with failures and failure rate reduc-
tion. With this approach to safety, the main focus is concentrated on failure as the
cause of accidents. The events leading to an accident may be a complex combina-
tion of equipment failure, faulty maintenance, instrumentation and control problems,
human actions, and design errors [215]. Reliability engineering uses a variety of
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techniques to minimize component failures and therefore complex systems failures
caused by component failure, including parallel redundancy, standby sparing, built-
in safety factors and margins, screening, and timed replacements [184]. While these
techniques are often effective in increasing reliability, they do not necessarily increase
safety. Accidents may be caused by equipment operation outside the parameters and
time limits upon which the reliability analyses are based. Therefore, a system may
have high reliability and still have accidents.
1.3.4 Associating safety management concepts
It is a common concern to clarify similarities and/or differences in safety management
concepts. The association between safety and reliability has been briefly discussed,
yet one may wonder how system security and survivability fit in the big picture.
There are plenty criteria to follow, for the purpose on drawing boundaries of each
concept’s relevance and applicability. One possibility is to create a taxonomy based on
combinations of type (natural, non-intelligent, or malevolent, intelligent threats) and
origin (endogenous or exogenous) of disturbance, not unlike how the historic incidents
of Figure 13 were presented. Based on threat combinations, a 2D schematic of relevant
safety management concepts is constructed, also marking overlapping relationships
as a Venn diagram and is presented [190] in Figure 15.
If safety is viewed as freedom from accidents or losses, then it refers to either
endogenous or exogenous threats, which result in naturally occurring accidents [140].
Reliability on the other hand is the probability that a component will perform its
intended function for a prescribed time and under stipulated environmental conditions
[140]. It is assumed that reliability refers to endogenous and natural non-intelligent
disruptions, but still contributes to system safety. Effects of maintainability, aging
and deterioration are also effects that are considered while assessing reliability.
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Figure 15: Safety, Security, Survivability and Reliability [190]
emergent property that arises at the system level when components are operating
together [216]. Reliability assessment provides measures of the probability of random
failures, not the probability of hazards or accidents, as safety is concerned. Reliability
analysis uses a bottom-up approach (e.g., FMEA) to evaluate the effect of component
failures on system function, while safety requires a top-down approach that evaluates
how hazardous states can occur from a combination of both incorrect and correct
component behavior, such as proper behavior of a component at an improper time or
under the wrong environmental conditions. High reliability numbers do not guarantee
safety, and safety need not require ultra high reliability.
In contrast to safety and reliability, system security is focusing on intelligent,
intended malicious actions, either endogenous or exogenous. Security is a system
property that implies protection of the informational, operational, and physical ele-
ments from malicious intent [136]. A secure system should be under adequate protec-
tion against losses, system performance degradation, in accordance to requirements
imposed by local government or agency regulations. Except for its applicability to
standalone entities, such as physical devices and computers, security applies also in
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networked systems, privacy and information, as well as national infrastructures or
operations. Security can be assessed for either endogenous or exogenous threats, yet
it is restricted to actions that affect normal operating conditions, system integrity
and durability.
Survivability is more relevant to military engineers [18], with definitions and back-
ground that is based on aerospace applications. Survivability has also proliferated in
other engineering fields, such as naval or merchant ship design, IT support systems
and networks [73], or in some civil engineering applications. Survivability also ap-
plies in science based disciplines, such as biology, computer science, systems network
theory [134], etc.
Survivability depends on system susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability.
Susceptibility [16] is the probability that the system experiences a direct hit or sec-
ondary hit effects through an attack by its environment. Susceptibility is an impor-
tant component of survivability, in the sense that a threat can be entirely avoided and
furthermore ensuring that system vulnerability should not be challenged at all. Vul-
nerability is defined [16] as the conditional probability that the system is killed after
it experiences a direct hit or warhead fusing through an attack by its environment.
Survivability brings the emphasis on the system’s behavior and recovery mecha-
nisms. A differentiating feature against safety is that survivability assessment usually
assumes intended, intelligent and malevolent actions. In that sense, survivability is
more closely related to security in that both are concerned with malevolent environ-
ments, where intended and intelligent action take place. Given that the majority
of threats usually translate in exogenous actions and changes around the system,
survivability assessment methods often dismiss endogenous factors.
Observation 1.9: Depending on the change that occurs within the system or around
it, different aspects of safety become relevant, yet they all need to be collectively
considered under safety management in early conceptual design.
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1.4 Looking at the future of Safety Management: System
Resilience
One of the greatest challenges in systems engineering is to ensure that large scale
complex system are safe for their operators and their environment, while maintaining
their mission effectiveness and performance [146]. Acquisition of military systems
must conform to safety standards that the government or delegated agencies mandate
for certification [57]. However, with the presence of operational uncertainty, there is
no definite approach that eliminates operational risks and the presence of system
hazards. Indeed, well-known accidents, either catastrophic, such as the space shuttle
Columbia [45], less severe, such as the Airbus A380 engine stall [53], or the unintended
acceleration incidents involving Toyota vehicles [165], are evidence for vulnerabilities
and increased risks, that otherwise safe certified complex systems encounter.
To address risk, current State-of-the-Art (SoA) safety and risk assessment tech-
niques (PRA, FTA, FMEA, etc.) seek to identify operating conditions and faults
that may escalate to failures and lead to accidents with catastrophic consequences
[220], [47], [57]. To mitigate this risk, safety oriented technologies are incorporated
into system designs, for hazard reduction and safety certification [79].
However, industry and government experts suggest that SoA techniques may not
be always adequate for assessing complex system safety. For technology-based risk
mitigation, low TRL may introduce additional layers of risk, and regarding safety as-
sessment, SoA probabilistic estimates are only effective, when the outcomes of failure
events are accurately identified. The latter requires accurate fault identification and
accident modeling [108], a total departure from the current reactive basis that safety
management is applied on to incidents and risk challenges. Under this approach, a
safety measure is usually taken after certain unexpected incidents occur. Moreover,
there is a strong reliance on historical information of past incidents for the conven-
tional risk management that employ hindsight and calculations of failure probabilities
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[111]. Last, diagnostics are configured to sense and analyze the symptoms of risk,
rather than the origins of risk itself.
Safety engineering and risk management is shifting its paradigm from passive, re-
active and diagnosis-based approaches towards development of architectures that will
explicitly monitor performance and emerging risks and hazards, and autonomously
manage safety and survivability through active, proactive and prognosis-based en-
gineering solutions [111]. However, current technology solutions or advanced design
methods are not adequate for implementing this new safety vision for safety, while it
is necessary to rethink safety assessment techniques for identifying additional sources
of risk [111]. The shift in safety management should not be limited to system ar-
chitecting or sizing, but it should be broader, ranging from the philosophy and un-
derstanding of safety, to safety management essentials, such as rethinking of risk,
accident occurrence mechanisms and risk assessment.
In response to this need, the safety management community has introduced a new
initiative, known as Resilience Engineering [114]. Resilience is an emerging concept
that brings new insight regarding the design of more safe and survivable complex
systems [48]. Within the concept of system resilience, failures do not necessarily
imply a total breakdown or malfunction of a normal system, as conventional safety
definitions would suggest. Rather, a failure represents the inability of the system to
adequately adapt to perturbations and changes in the real world given finite resources
and time [111]. Failure, in this context, is simply the absence of this ability, when
needed, or it is a result of the ”web of ongoing interactions and adaptations” that
characterizes complex systems behavior in the real world [146]. As such, success is
defined by the ability of the system to monitor the changing risk profile and take
timely action to prevent the likelihood of damage.
Observation 1.10: Current safety management practices are limited in terms of
addressing complexity and its resulting effects, as well as understanding failure and
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fault propagation. Resilience is a new concept that is addressing these concerns and
brings a new perspective in safety management.
System resilience is an emerging concept, originally introduced through a paper
published in 1973 in the Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics by C.S. Holling
[106]. Holling’s paper was titled ”Resilience and Stability of Ecological systems”, dis-
cussing the relationship between resilience and stability. The purpose was to describe
models of change in the structure and function of ecological systems, thus resilience
was discussed with this class of systems in mind. The definition of resilience in the
context of this publications is expressed as:
”Resilience is a measure of the persistence of systems and their ability to absorb
change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationship between populations
or state variables.”
Given that resilience engineering is still a relatively new concept, it is not a sur-
prise, that there are several unanswered questions regarding its theoretical founda-
tions and its applicability in real world applications [211].
In this context, system resilience is defined as a system characteristic. It’s a charac-
teristic that contributes to system stability and robustness. Recognizing that resilient
systems are possibly more safe or survivable, scientific communities are embracing the
concept in order to address safety challenges. Resilience has also proliferated to other
disciplines or fields of engineering and science, addressing equivalent issues in system
stability [62], robustness [264], adaptability [96], [168] and survivability [192].
In a broader perspective, Madni describes resilience engineering as a discipline
that is concerned with monitoring organizational decision making with explicit iden-
tification and monitoring of risks [146]. Literature search [120] has indicated that
the notion of resilience is growing [249] in importance as a concept for understand-
ing, managing, and governing complex linked systems of people and nature [252].
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Figure 16: Resilient system initiatives
Four major initiatives have been recently established for addressing resilience in this
context, and are listed in Figure 16.
1.4.1 Resilient organizations - The NASA initiative
NASA has been investigating its own organizational decision making practices, as a
result of the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle accidents. The importance of
such practices, that date back to the post-Cold War policy environment, has been
underlined by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) [45]. Attributed
to NASA’s ”faster, better, cheaper” operating principle [265], these accidents have
revealed a set of patterns, on which NASA has been basing their decision making
approaches[187], and have been documented by the CAIB. These are [265]:
• The drift towards failure as defenses erode under production pressure.
• Past success is a reason for confidence instead of further discovery of underlying
risks.
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• Adaptation of a fragmented problem solving process that may hide emergent
risks.
• Failure to revise assessments as new evidence accumulates.
• Breakdowns at the boundaries of organizational units.
This investigation has demonstrated the inability to balance safety risks with intense
production pressure, pushing the organization closer to the edge of the performance
envelope without understanding the overall risk increase. These patterns in decision
making are not unique to NASA or limited to the Shuttle program, but are generic
vulnerabilities that have contributed to major failures across other complex industrial
settings.
As an organizational accident, the Columbia experience underlines the need for
organizations to monitor their own practices and decision processes, for detecting drift
towards safety limits. The target for organizations is to maintain high safety despite
production pressure. In this context, a key desire is to accurately assess organiza-
tional risk, namely the risk due to insufficient organizational decision making, that
may result to drift towards failure boundaries. Safety experts have been advocating
for resilience engineering, with its alternative approach in understanding risk, faults
and failures in large scale complex systems [145]. As an enabler, the assessment of
organizational resilience will consider additional risk factors, such as human perfor-
mance, and human-machine interaction, and further assist to manage risk proactively.
NASA and other high risk organizations could benefit from resilience assessment tech-
niques in balancing competing demands for increased safety with real time pressure
for efficiency and production capacity [137].
1.4.2 Earthquake and disaster resilient communities
The NASA initiative on organizational resilience has addressed the problem of or-
ganizational decision making practices, as a major contributor of risk in high risk
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organizations. Besides decision making and risk identification, organizational re-
silience depends on the ability of organizations to continue to function in the face of
unexpected events. This ability depends on organizational structure, effective man-
agement and the resilience of participating systems under high risk or unexpected
operations [35].
Historic incidents (e.g the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 1989 San Fransisco earth-
quakes and the 2005 hurricane Katrina) could reveal the socio-economic impact of
organizational resilience to critical performance measures, such as the length of time
that essential services are unavailable and the duration of recovery for the commu-
nity. The September 11th attacks were responsible for business interruption losses
that have by far exceeded the sum of all property losses [2]. After the 1989 San
Francisco Bay Earthquake it had been estimated that 50% of small businesses di-
rectly affected were permanently disabled, with the resulting job losses significantly
impacting the economy of the area [77]. The response to hurricane Katrina and the
subsequent flooding of New Orleans, resulted in most part of the city having been de-
stroyed, while governance, law enforcement, medical care, utilities, communications,
all entirely failed. The death toll was about 1,500 people, while many thousands
became homeless, and billions of dollars of infrastructure has been lost. A million
people descended on other communities, often overloading the local systems, while
the recovery procedure is still ongoing and is expected to last for many more years
[260].
In the wake of such major disasters, recent initiatives have brought attention
to disaster and earthquake impact mitigation through more resilient communities.
With that objective in mind, the U.S. Federal government [99], affiliated agencies
and other independent groups have been supporting the need to evaluate the con-
sequences of risk, while introducing requirements and mandates towards increasing
organizational and community resilience [91]. With ”Project Impact” in 1997, the
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Federal Emergency Management Agency initiated a series of community-based pre-
disaster mitigation programs. The goal for this project was to foster public-private
partnerships that would undertake hazard and risk assessments, community education
programs, and mitigation related projects [241]. Similarly, the Disaster Mitigation
Act of 2000, supports mitigation and preparedness planning, offering incentives for
disaster mitigation. Other similar initiatives support the development of strategies
for disaster resilient communities, while addressing long-term issues of sustainability
and quality of life [159]. Because of their potential for producing high losses and
extensive community disruption, earthquakes have been given high priority in efforts
towards more resilient infrastructures [35]. The civil engineering community is inves-
tigating possible approaches on mitigating seismic risk and the potential for future
losses [52], through voluntary practices or mandatory policies aimed at reducing the
consequences of an earthquake, along with training and preparedness measures.
1.4.3 Resilient infrastructures - The DHS security mandate
The U.S. Federal government has been investigating the concept of resilience, not only
for adressing disaster response, but also infrastructure security [99]. In the past, the
U.S. government policy towards Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) has focused
on physical protection [136] and asset hardening. However, recent events, such as the
9/11 terrorist attacks have lead to reconsideration of all past efforts toward physical
protection of infrastructure assets. In particular, it was understood that isolated
protection is inadequate, since not all disruptive events, natural or man-made, can
be prevented, while terrorism has been included as a threat, against which critical
infrastructure must be protected, as indicated by two of the first post-9/l1 Presidential
directives [36].
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assembled the Critical Infrastruc-
ture Task Force (CITF) in 2005, for providing recommendations on national policy
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and for updating CIP policies to account for unavoidable disruptive events. With the
focus on recommendations that would ensure reduction of the consequences of the ex-
ploitation, destruction, or disruption of critical infrastructures, the CITF’s primary
recommendation was that DHS focus on Critical Infrastructure Resilience (CIR) as
its top-level strategic objective. The recommendation stated that:
”...making resilience the overarching strategic objective would stimulate synergistic
actions that are balanced across all three components of risk. Protection, in isolation
is a brittle strategy. We cannot protect every potential target against every conceiv-
able attack; we will never eliminate all vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it is virtually
impossible to define a desired end state -to quantify how much protection is enough
-when the goal is to reduce vulnerabilities.”
CIR is concerned with how critical infrastructures absorb, adapt, and recover from
the effects of a disruptive event to ensure delivery of critical infrastructure services
[251]. It complements the CIP with fostering systems-level investment strategies,
recognizing that the stakeholders must bear the costs of resilience through cost/benefit
decisions in a changing, competitive environment. The ability to absorb, adapt and
recover must be evaluated from a systems functionality perspective, so that proper
investment strategies can be planned for the future. [50]. CIR implies a systems
approach, one where stakeholders manage both the risks of individual, and the overall
system functions well, during a disruptive event.
The DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is an initiative that is
promoting the resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure [181]. With the shift
from CIP to CIR, the federal government has been introducing resilience initiatives
to understand what features create resilience in critical infrastructures/key resources
(CIKRs). The goal is to build a safer, more secure, and more resilient infrastructure
by preventing, deleting, neutralizing, or mitigating any adversary attempts against
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the nation’s CIKR, while strengthening national preparedness, timely response, and
rapid recovery of CIKR in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency
[50].
1.4.4 Sustainable and resilient system architectures
With the previous initiatives promoting system resilience as an enabling concept in
addressing organizational risk, safety, survivability, and security, a fourth resilience
engineering initiative brings attention on a non-safety management related objective,
that is sustainability of systems and infrastructures [117]. As sustainability goals are
formulated and mandated by governments and environmental protection agencies,
the development of sustainable systems remains challenging, due to the broad range
of economic, environmental and social factors that need to be considered across a
system’s life cycle [83]. Previous work on sustainable design has focused largely upon
ecological efficiency improvements [251]. Examples of this philosophy include material
and energy intensity reduction, as well as waste conversion into valuable secondary
products.
For pursuing sustainable development, a systems approach is necessary for the
design of industrial product and service systems. However, conventional systems en-
gineering approaches primarily rely on disruption anticipation and resistance, without
considering vulnerabilities to unforeseen factors. With time constraints and limited
cognitive and physiological resources, there is enough room for increasing risk and
hazards that could allow for accidents to occur. In the presence of environmental
uncertainty and risk, sustainability challenges may be successfully addressed, when
design for inherent resilience becomes a primary goal. Based on this initiative, the
concept of resilience can be extended to ecological systems, implying cultural adapt-
ability in the face of external disruptions, either as regulatory reform or climate
change. Under this approach, fundamental properties such as diversity, efficiency,
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adaptability, and cohesion are the building blocks of supporting system resilience, in
both engineered systems and the larger systems in which they are embedded.
Observation 1.11: The concept of resilience is gaining interest from diverse engi-
neering communities that have been exploring its applicability. From organizations,
infrastructure and sustainable environments, to large scale mechanical, electrical and
civil applications, resilience is becoming part of the future in safety management
practice, in the form of Resilience Engineering.
1.5 Research objectives and goals
The significance of national security relies upon the fundamental desire for economical
and social stability. To preserve and uphold national security, the Armed Forces have
been mandating the development and acquisition of more capable systems. System
capability requires system safety and survivability, under the presence of operational
uncertainty and risk. From a collective standpoint, these requirements lead to the
need for more effective systems, as previously outlined by Observations 1.1 to 1.5.
System effectiveness is indicative of the system’s total capability of achieving its
current mission’s objectives and reflects how well can these objectives be achieved.
Thus, through capability, system effectiveness is driven by uncertainty in mission
operations and the threat environment, as well as by the system’s internal complexity
and fragility [125]. Besides mission logistics and by-design system capability, a key
enabler for effective military systems, is system survivability (Observation 1.6.1) [182].
This observation is also confirmed by the Navy’s vision for their future combatants,
as expressed by the IEP concept and their direction with the DDG-1000 [143], [43].
Aligned to the Navy’s requirements, the IRIS initiative commands for more effective
systems through increased situational awareness and system survivability, enabled by
automation, reconfigurability and intelligent control architectures [115].
However, the challenge of designing next-generation ship systems [259] that would
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meet the Navy’s goals for system effectiveness, environmental compatibility, and re-
duced cost has grown to the point that traditional design methodologies are becoming
ineffective [33]. Under the direction of improving survivability, a major shift may be
necessary on how survivability-based design is applied. There are concerns that a
posteriori survivability design approaches may increase development and acquisition
costs, add unnecessary complexity and introduce additional design uncertainty, thus
challenging the overall effectiveness of resulting designs. In a broader perspective,
this issue becomes more critical, as complexity is further increasing with larger scale
systems, or by considering process-related obstacles, such as demanding analysis re-
quirements for complex system, large number of objectives and constraints to be
evaluated, and the multitudes of uncertainty sources that appear in current design
problems. Earlier literature search has indicated lack of cohesive and widely accepted
methodologies to address system effectiveness and survivability as design attributes
in the early conceptual design process [218]. As Observation 1.6.2 reaffirms, there is
a research opportunity for the development of conceptual design methodologies that
introduce survivability as on objective function.
Observations 1.6.1 and 1.6.2, along with Observation 1.7 that relates to afford-
ability concerns for future naval systems, lead to the main objective of this research,
that is expressed as:
Objective 1 (Main): Invest towards conceptual design methodologies that improve
system effectiveness through increased survivability.
The goal of this research objective is to produce effective designs that reduce op-
erating costs, while improving safety, security and overall survivability. In accordance
to earlier discussions and summary of observations, the basic steps of establishing this
research direction are presented in Figure 17.











Figure 17: From observations to research objectives
design procedures may not be adequate in addressing new threats, challenges, de-
mands, and opportunities. Moreover, revolutionary architectures and configurations
also advocate for new approaches in survivability-based design. As Observation 1.10
has stated, this new approach must address dynamic phenomena due to complexity
(emergent behaviors), be capable of better predicting the impact of changing require-
ments or environmental conditions, and consider risk and operational uncertainty in a
whole new way. Thus, as Observations 1.10 and 1.11, recommend, resilience engineer-
ing is a new approach that seeks to address these issues, and its underlying philosophy
must be taken into account during the formulation of advanced survivability-based
design approaches. The second objective of this research is to:
Objective 2: Follow the vision of resilience and investigate options on how resilience
engineering can be implemented in advanced design methodologies with safety man-
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Figure 18: IRIS envisioned applicability
The goal of this objective is to infuse the premises and visionary directions of
resilience engineering into advanced design methods for safety management. These
efforts could extend beyond survivability-based design, and find their way on a diverse
set of applications, such as naval systems (destroyers, frigates and carriers), aerospace
or space vehicles (fighters, UAVs, satellites and the space shuttle [14]). The philosophy
of resilience could proliferate beyond the system level, to component or network level,
or to higher organizational levels. (e.g., the Smart Grid [89]). In conjunction with
the IRIS initiative, resilience-based design techniques could benefit a large variety of




This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. With Chapter 1, there has been
an introduction to the problem from a global, less concentrated perspective. The
need for more effective, capable and survivable military systems has been discussed
from a high level point of view, namely from a national, societal and military-oriented
perspective. At the same time, a first introduction on the relevant scientific concepts
has been included, spanning from system safety, survivability and looking at the
future of safety management, through the emergence of resilience engineering.
Chapter 2 aims on providing a process for a clear problem statement, based on
an comprehensive and exhaustive background investigation for all problem related
disciplines. This has been an interdisciplinary effort, ranging from various theoretical
formulations and considering a diverse set of applications, to promote better under-
standing of the practice. The key topic is the investigation of safety management,
in the form of safety, and survivability-based design methodologies, for military and
civil large scale complex system applications. This investigation has returned a great
wealth of technical background information, regarding definitions of key concepts
(safety, survivability, reliability, resilience, etc.) and metrics. With a better theoret-
ical and technical understanding, the ground has been prepared for a concentrated
problem statement.
With better understanding of the design capabilities in safety management, Chap-
ter 3 is advocating for concentration on assessment techniques, as being a crucial step
for safety-based design. State-of-the-Art (SoA) approaches that are currently used
by the government, industry and academia for benchmarking system safety, surviv-
ability and resilience assessment have been explored and presented. For all methods
and techniques identified, under this research effort, comparative evaluation of SoA
techniques follow, with focus on the benefits and detriments of each technique, in
comparison to others. This evaluation lead to a list of major technical challenges
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that are identified and will assist in formulating the clear research directions for this
dissertation, in the form of the Research Questions.
In Chapter 4, the Research Questions for this work have been defined, in accor-
dance to the gaps in SoA approaches. Preliminary knowledge on the derived research
topics, as well as engineering intuition from similar types of problems, have resulted
in a hierarchy of testable and falsifiable research hypotheses that will be further tested
, as part of this dissertation’s grand experimentation plan.
Chapter 5 moves along the path of establishing a resilience assessment framework.
Under the guidance and simplicity of a small scale system model to play the role of a
canonical experiment for method development, the Resilience Assessment Technique
is developed, tested and demonstrated. The canonical problem configuration includes
a multiple-spring-mass-damper system, with a single degree of freedom, which allows
for integration of rule-based, feedback controller, that ensures good system health,
and overall mission capability.
Chapter 6 is focusing on the demonstration of the resilience assessment technique
on a naval system application. The baseline naval system is a small scale naval
operations architecture, that includes an integrated power and cooling system. A
perfect response controller is part of the facility, which allows for system response
prediction, under the presence of leaks on the network, as part of the presence of
operational uncertainty.
Chapter 7 concludes with the key findings and lessons learned from this work.
It also suggests a number of possible improvements and it recommends the future




BACKGROUND: EXPLORING OPTIONS IN SAFETY
MANAGEMENT FOR IMPROVING SYSTEM
SURVIVABILITY
Safety management is the key topic that will drive background exploration through
literature search on safety and survivability-based design methodologies. As sys-
tem effectiveness is the starting concern for the design of future naval systems, the
presence of uncertainty and the effects of risk are always present throughout this
background search. The goal of the chapter is to expand the scientific knowledge on
the field of safety management, while using this knowledge for carving a complete
and comprehensive problem statement that is expected to drive this research.
2.1 Safety engineering
Safety engineering is founded on systems theory and systems engineering, and its
major objective is to prevent foreseeable accidents, while minimizing the impact of
unexpected and unavoidable ones. Safety is not always integrated to the system design
process. It is not until the detailed design phase, when requirements for system safety
certification are considered, and safety enhancements are introduced. These include
modifications on the architecture to retrofit additional safety oriented equipment [81],
or the integration of additional technologies that aim towards maintaining safety and
survivability [167]. In most cases however, system architectures are seldom designed









































Figure 19: General safety by-design practical procedure
2.1.1 Overview of SoA
Current State-of-the-Art (SoA) methods in safety engineering rely on risk identifi-
cation, risk assessment, safety management for hazard control or elimination, and
risk-benefit analysis [140]. As part of the design approach, the acceptable level for
risk is selected, while accounting for other possible sources of risk that may emerge.
Risk assessment is vital for strategic decision making, in selecting safety oriented
design improvements (e.g. component redundancy, separation, advanced safety tech-
nologies). Risk-benefit studies and prototype testing indicate how further must the
designer proceed with safety improvements. A general overview of current practical
approaches in safety by-design, is pictured in Figure 19.
System safety is becoming a core value in systems engineering [223], through
emphasizing on built-in safety characteristics. To address safety as an early design
objective, several risk and reliability-based design methods are available for different
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engineering applications. Safety by-design is mainly enabled by Reliability Engineer-
ing, which is traditionally focusing on improving system reliability through advanced
structural design and manufacturing techniques. One of the most prominent tech-
niques is Reliability-based Design Optimization (RBDO), which concentrates on long
term reliability and system health [267], in operating environments with known distur-
bances. Furthermore, Robust Design is a technique for improving system quality and
performance under varying external factors. Despite its focus on quality of service, it
implicitly does address safety concerns in early conceptual design [230].
Fault generation and propagation models, as well as accident mechanism inves-
tigation are key procedures within safety engineering. Most accidents, failures and
malfunctions result from losses in performance, security and system integrity, under
the presence of threats and environmental hazards. In order to link the impact of
a threat to performance degradations and to resulting faults, threat characterization
is necessary, for obtaining the complete picture of how the system becomes exposed,
vulnerable and eventually affected by their presence. Common accident investigation
techniques are Fault/Event Tree analysis [78] [220], and the Common Cause Fail-
ure(CCF) analysis [185]. Advanced techniques rely on more accurate accident and
damage prediction through physics-based Modeling and Simulation (M&S) [30].
2.1.2 Applications in safety engineering
Safety by-design techniques have been applied to a wide range of system types and
configurations [147]. The State-of-Practice (SoP) in safety-based design techniques is
found in military and civil applications for aerospace or naval systems, while extending
to energy generation and automotive systems. the most commonly applied techniques
for these systems are presented in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: Safety-based design SoA applications
2.1.2.1 Defense and Military systems
As an independent discipline, system safety was introduced for military aircraft, im-
mediately after World War II. Due to the increased number of accidents at the time,
engineers were advocating that safety must be designed and built into aircraft just as
are performance, stability, and structural integrity [141]. In the following years, safety
engineering was recognized as discipline through ballistic missile programs [141]. Sim-
ilar system safety programs became popular within the Army and later with the Navy.
During the early years of safety engineering, each designer, manager, and engi-
neer was assigned responsibilities for monitoring safety, while safety management was
executed as a ”fly-fix-fly” approach [141]. With limitations in prototype testing, the
DoD realized that this approach was expensive and inefficient, while being dependent
on risk analysis methods that use past historical data. In 1966, the DoD issued a
directive for initiating system safety programs, recommending hazard analysis tech-
niques. The goal was to prevent accidents before they occurred and suggest that
operational safety practices be integrated to technical analysis, design and manage-
ment approaches of the time.
Safety is now a major concern in military system development, as well as space
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programs (e.g. the Space Shuttle [14]). The MIL-STD-882 military standards doc-
ument was first issued in 1969, introducing minimum system safety requirements,
throughout the life cycle for any DoD system [57]. Besides new system develop-
ment, the directive also governs upgrades, modifications, resolutions of deficiencies,
or technology development. MIL-STD-882 is the first practical step for a systematic
approach towards managing the acceptable mishap risk, through hazard analysis,
risk assessment, and risk management [57]. A summary of the recommendations for
implementing system safety is shown below in Figure 21.
The U.S. Navy has also introduced policies and procedures for safety monitor-
ing and implementation, which are heavily based on the MIL-STD-882, and they
are complemented by DoD Instruction (DODI 5000.2), by the Secretary of the Navy
Instruction (SECNAVINST 5000.2D) and the Navy System Safety Program Policy
[40]. Their recommendations address critical safety issues around noise & vibration,
ergonomics/human factors, ventilation & heat stress, electrical equipment and radar
operation [167]. The policies seek to identify potential hazards during the design
process, manage safety threats to program viability and cost, track and resolve po-
tential hazards and reduce hazards that were overlooked during the process [171]. In
the system level, the benefits concentrate on operational readiness, health monitoring
and support, and life cycle cost reduction for all acquisition programs, over the entire
program life cycle.
2.1.2.2 Civil transportation systems
The Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) requires that no Hazard Class I or Class II
conditions for single system component failures are acceptable [82] for new aircraft
certification. Class I (Catastrophic) Hazard Level considers of failure conditions that
would prevent continued safe flight and landing, while Class II (Hazardous) Hazard
Level includes of failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the airplane
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4.1 Documentation of the system safety approach
•Program implementation
•Hazard analysis and mishap risk assessment process
•System safety integration 
•Track hazards and residual mishap risk
4.2 Identification of hazards 
•System hardware/software analysis
•Environmental conditions
•Intended use or application
4.3 Assessment of mishap risk 
•Assess severity and probability of the mishap risk
4.4 Identification of mishap risk mitigation measures
•Identify potential mishap risk mitigation alternatives and their expected effectiveness 
•Iterative process to reduce risk to acceptable  level:
•Eliminate hazards through design selection 
•Incorporate safety devices or other protective safety features
•Provide warning devices 
•Develop procedures and training
4.5 Reduction of mishap risk to an acceptable level
•Developer and the program manager must agree
•Communicate residual mishap risk and hazards to the associated test effort for verification
4.6 Verification of mishap risk reduction
•Verify the mishap risk reduction and mitigation through appropriate analysis, testing, or inspection
•Document the determined residual mishap risk
•Report all new hazards identified during testing to the program manager and the developer
4.7 Review of hazards and acceptance of residual mishap risk by the appropriate authority
•Notify program manager
•Rank residual risk
•Review and accept remaining hazards and residual mishap risk
•Include system user in the mishap risk review
•Accept document of hazards and residual mishap risk
4.8 Track hazards, their closures, and residual mishap risk
•Program manager shall keep the system user advised of the hazards and residual mishap risk




•Identify hazards and then performing a fault hazard analysis
•Trace hazards to the aircraft components
Assign reliability targets
•Assign a reliability target to each component
•The aircraft as a whole should reach the FAA failure rate requirements
Component design
•Use the allocated reliability rates
Ensure component and system integrity
•Ensure reliability rates
•High degree of single element integrity
•Apply “fail-safe” design (redundancy to manage single or multiple component failures)
Modify design to prevent known accident types
•Fly-fix-fly approach
•Avoid previous causes of accidents
Figure 22: SoA aircraft safety-by-design approach [141]
or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent
that there would be a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities. As
a possible interpretation of the FAA’s safety policies, Figure 22 outlines a process
for ensuring that a system is safe by monitoring and improving component reliability
rates.
In Europe, similar policies have been formulated by the Civil Aviation Authority
(CAA), mainly addressing system or component failures due to natural unintentional
conditions. Understanding the potential for improving the aircraft’s natural resistance
to detonation of improvised explosive devices and IEDs in cargo areas, the CAA is
focusing on aircraft vulnerability. That includes the effects mitigation of explosive
devices in asymmetric threats or other acts of sabotage towards the aircraft’s fuselage
structure and other vital systems [42].


















Figure 23: IMO philosophy for safety-by-design [204]
is the responsible authority on formulating safety regulations and recommendations
for passenger transport and merchant ships. Except for safety assessment and man-
agement procedures, IMO has introduced regulations (A.265 (VIII)) for ship surviv-
ability. IMO has been working on probabilistic frameworks for safety assessment,
involving prescriptive (regulative) or multi-level, performance-based approaches. Un-
der this direction, ship safety is founded on five main thrusts: structural safety, ship
and cargo survival, passenger survival, seaworthiness and fire safety [204]. To address
these thrusts, the IMO has established four related R&D activities, focusing on the
development of critical technologies, methodologies, tools and techniques, risk-based
frameworks (safety assurance techniques and methodologies), integrated design en-
vironments(utilization of advanced design techniques) and the overall philosophy on
designing for safety. These R&D areas, have become the basis for the formulation of a
template for risk-based assessment, technology development and infusion to support
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Figure 24: EURORO risk-based procedure for safety design [204]
Under the EURORO approach, a key element of the design approach, is the risk
analysis and assessment technique. Risk analysis may require computational tools for
predicting collision, grounding, large scale flooding, cargo shift, extreme load effects,
fire and passenger evacuation [204]. With IMO’s EURORO as the basis, agencies have
been formulating risk-based procedures for safety by-design. An example is presented
in Figure 24, with a EURORO-compatible approach that is implemented in four basic
steps [173]:
1. System and hazard identification.
2. Risk assessment.
3. Comparison to requirements.
4. Risk reduction approaches.
The first step is to identify all possible hazards that increase risk of failure, e.g. such
as flooding and fire related hazards [173]. By monitoring and analyzing the frequency
and impact of hazards, the risk of malfunctions or failure can be assessed. Risk
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assessment relies on risk analysis techniques, such as the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
[78] and the Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA). For FMEA in particular, it
is necessary to analyze the system’s behavior, either through processing of historical
information or advanced simulation-based techniques. Simulation techniques rely on
computational models that predict system degradation in intermediate performance
stages from normal conditions to a total system loss [173].
In the next step, the quantitative risk estimates are compared to risk acceptance
criteria [204]. Risk criteria are derived by policies and regulations that are set by
associated government institutions or delegated authorities. In 1974, IMO established
the Safety Of Life At Sea(SOLAS) criteria, which outline the responsibilities of the
ship as a system and its occupants, for minimizing the probability of ship or human
life loss [118].
As a means for controlling operating risk, technologies and design solutions en-
hance the system’s response in certain emergencies and adversary conditions [47].
With a large set of risk reduction approaches, technology selection will depend on
cost-effectiveness estimations, where effectiveness is viewed as the balance between
performance and ability to satisfy safety regulations. Returning to safety at sea,
an implementation of the risk-based, safety by-design methodology could result in
a multi-step procedure, similar to that of Figure 25. Candidate design solutions
are evaluated based on their cost-benefit performance, with the viable solutions only
thereafter assessed for their effect on other performance factors, such as seakeeping,
cargo capacity, operational efficiency, and turnaround time [31].
2.1.2.3 Energy Systems
In conventional and nuclear powerplant design, safety assurance is based on the use
of multiple, independent partitions. The goal is to ensure the integrity of each com-
ponent, as well as that no single failure of any active component will disable any
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Figure 25: Detailed risk-based procedure for ship safety design [204]
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partition [141]. Powerplant certification for safety is based on the identification and
control of hazards under normal operating conditions [102], and system shutdown for
the investigation of system response to abnormal and unexpected conditions [141].
As part of the design process, safety is not government regulated, but require-
ments are based on insurance needs. Risk analysis requires a number of scenarios.
Scenarios are formulated based on past accident cases, mostly involving operational
disturbances, a protection system that fails, and inadequate or failing physical bar-
riers. The main emphasis is on component reliability and protection systems. Risk
analysis typically takes place during the late stages of the design process, allowing
for any retrofitting of the additional safety equipment that is required for satisfying
the certification requirements [141].
2.1.2.4 Automotive/locomotive systems
Automotive safety depends on vehicle crashworthiness, as well as technologies that
improve crash avoidance. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) offers
recommendations on occupant protection, with emphasis on cabin structural integrity,
functional component design improvements, as well as fire detection and suppression
systems [166]. Thus, vehicle crashworthiness is another way to express vehicle vul-
nerability, as recognized by the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) [164]. Similarly, vehicle crash avoidance is a measure of susceptibility for
ground operated vehicles, which relies on both the vehicle and transportation infras-
tructure.
Crash energy management methods are the enabling backbone for crashworthi-
ness improvement, while computational (finite element) analysis methods are vital
for reducing product development time and cost and satisfying corporate and gov-
ernment crash safety requirements (e.g. NHTSA for frontal, side, rear impact, inte-
rior head impact, rear impact, and rollover) [236]. Vehicle crash avoidance relies on
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technologies that support collision warning [235], adaptive cruise control and brak-
ing. Infrastructure-based approaches focus on intelligent vehicle-highway systems,
for instance, monitoring the dynamic conditions that set apart safe from unsafe lane
changes [22]. Human factors-based approaches investigate the behavior of crash avoid-
ance systems and their interaction with driver performance [80], e.g. human braking
in conjunction to the vehicle’s Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Forward Crash Avoid-
ance (FCA) systems, and Forward Collision Warning (FCW) [80].
Such technology solutions are relatively new and not developed to their full extent,
given the uncertainty as to how situational awareness is maintained and how crash
mitigation systems, could seamlessly partner with human activity [121]. Advanced
design methods for vehicle crashworthiness concentrate around reliability and sys-
tem integrity. Under the presence uncertainty, the Risk-Based Design Optimization
(RBDO) method is applied to address risk concerns in vehicle safety [267]. With
RBDO, a probabilistic constraint can be identified by either the Reliability Index
Approach (RIA), or the Performance Measure Approach (PMA) [267]. For vehicle
crashworthiness, RBDO is using the PMA, when dealing with vehicle safety-rating
scores related to human safety issues, along with response surface techniques for re-
duced cost of application.
2.1.3 Evaluation of SoA in safety-based design
As observed by the SoA review in safety-based design, system safety is receiving great
attention from various engineering disciplines, for civil, aerospace, naval/marine, au-
tomotive/locomotive vehicles, as well as industrial and energy applications. Starting
from the collection of methods presented in Figure 20, a methods evaluation study has
been conducted, in order to identify their strengths, the weaknesses and the oppor-
tunities that arise from the SoA. The insights from this study will steer the research


















































Figure 26: Evaluation of safety by-design methods
been qualitatively evaluated against nine criteria. The criteria were grouped into
three categories, method fundamentals, features and applicability, and more informa-
tion about the criteria development and selection can be found in Appendix B. Figure
26 presents the method evaluation, in the form of qualitative ratings. These methods
effectively range from requirements and regulatory documents, to complete experi-
mental approaches for assessing safety and the impact of possible enhancements.
Regarding method fundamentals, such as metrics and evaluation frameworks, as-
sessment methods and recommendations for enhancement strategies, there is an ob-
vious strength towards the latter. Each method carries their own unique sets of
metrics for safety assessment and design, however these appear to be domain spe-
cific. Assessment methods are necessary for design iterations and testing, yet these
mostly address safety through quantitative estimations, of risk, reliability and main-
tainability. Most methods point out the design improvements that must take place
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for enhancing safety, however, these are present in the form of recommendations and
seldom as steps within quantitative procedures of safety by-design methods.
Observation 2.1: Safety engineering methods range from certification and standards
guides, to quantitative methods with steps on risk assessment and optimizing a design
for safety. All methods offer suggestions on safety enhancement design strategies.
Figure 26 also describes the level at which risk and uncertainty are addressed,
the fidelity of analysis for generating data, and whether methods investigate solution
robustness. Most methods rely on historical information to perform probabilistic risk
assessment, and fewer on the more expensive option for high fidelity modeling and
analysis. Solution robustness is not always addressed from a design space exploration
perspective, but it’s implicitly present through capable technology selection that re-
turn system designs, which would be safe and survivable under several cases of adverse
events.
Observation 2.2: SoA safety by-design methods mostly rely on probabilistic risk
assessment techniques for testing and evaluation, rather than on more cost intense,
higher fidelity modeling and analysis tools. Solution robustness is either addressed
through design space exploration and reliability optimization algorithms, however
more practical approaches depend on safety oriented technology infusion.
The last evaluation group explores method applicability, in terms of method ma-
turity and readiness, cost of application, access and support. Policy-based methods,
despite the fact that contain information with insights on safety improvement and
evaluation, do not constitute a systematic procedure with design space exploration,
or optimization routines that would return solutions for system configuration. The
fidelity of analysis and modeling approaches used determines the cost of implemen-
tation. Access and support is a significant factor for its usability. Methods that
are of high national or strategic interest, can be fully or partially proprietary, and
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can sometimes be less attractive to use. Methods that are open for public use, are
often effective in conceptual design, yet the lack of support or documentation can
sometimes prove them inadequate.
Observation 2.3: SoA methods that are publicly available, tend to be high level,
sometimes generic and less mature for a certain application. More systematic safety
by-design methods with higher applicability and readiness, are application specific,
often proprietary, and in many cases follow advanced modeling and simulation prac-
tices for evaluation, testing and design.
2.2 Survivability engineering
Recalling from Appendix A, system effectiveness is dependent on system availability,
capability and dependability [97]. Dependability is a system property that integrates
reliability, availability, safety, security, survivability, and maintainability [15]. If these
”ilities” are not dynamically affected by time-dependent change, it is presumed that
survivability effectively represents dependability in the effectiveness equation, and
can be generally reformulated as:
SE = f [(Availability), (Survivability), (Capability)] (3)
where other dependability factors (e.g. maintainability, safety, reliability) can be
represented by the survivability term:
Survivability = g((Safety), (Reliability), (Maintainability)) (4)
To further support this presumption, system availability is linked to mission logistics
and dynamically depends on survivability. Capability is brought in as a design at-
tribute, which represents the expected ability of the system to successfully operate
and accomplish its mission. However, if a system does not survive in its operating
environment, neither capability or availability is preserved. At that point, it is system
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survivability that determines effectiveness and mission success based on the system’s
response to a threat [16]. Therefore, within the context of this research, system sur-
vivability is the primary focus as a means of concurrently maintaining availability and
benefiting from capability, in a direction towards designing more effective systems.
2.2.1 Overview of system survivability
Historically, the concept of survivability was initiated by military operations [18],
and has proliferated during the last fifty to sixty years in the form of military combat
survivability. Its significance has been marked by the loss of approximately 5,000
aircraft to enemy fire in the Southeastern Asian Conflict (SEA) [18] in the years
from 1963 to 1973. This milestone brought a new philosophy in military system
design, where survivability has become a critical system characteristic, and has further
evolved to a distinct design discipline.
Civilian systems are often exposed to hazardous conditions that could potentially
lead to accidents. System safety promotes the understanding of accidents, through
fault identification and monitoring of resulting system failures, the interactions with
other changing environmental factors, as well as possible operator errors [17]. While
system safety is concerned in mitigating the impact of threats and hazards, system
survivability is not guaranteed solely through safety. Given that commercial systems
must also withstand the impact of a hazardous environment and continue its mission
while maintaining safe conditions for its crew and its passengers, system survivability
is a crucial priority, in non-military systems as well.
System safety and survivability complement each other through a synergy of de-
sign solutions for hazard and failure mitigation, with the objective of maximizing
survival of the system and its occupants in all environments [17]. This synergistic
nature is underlined by technologies, initially developed for military systems, but are
then often adopted to non-military applications (aircraft, ships, cars, networks). For
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Figure 27: Measuring survivability [16]
instance, fuel system fire/explosion protection technologies, that have been developed
for military aircraft, are now fitted into civilian airliners (following the loss of TWA
800) is an actual example of this common practice [17].
2.2.1.1 Traditional definition of survivability
Original definitions are relevant to military applications, the proliferation of surviv-
ability engineering in multiple scientific areas, however, has lead to a diverse ecosys-
tem of theoretical frameworks, technologies and applications. The classic survivability
formulation, as it has been applied by the military engineering community, is given
though the following simple equation [16]:
PS = 1− PK (5)
where, PS is the probability of survival and PK is the killability or probability of not
surviving the disturbance.
Depending on the type of the disturbance, if this happens to be an external attack,
the equation becomes [16]:
PS = 1− (PH · PK/H) (6)
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where, PH is the probability of being detected (also known as susceptibility) and
PK/H is the probability of not surviving the attack hit and getting killed, after being
detected and attacked.
Susceptibility is the probability that the system accepts a direct attack hit or
experiences secondary hit effects [16]. It is the system’s inability to avoid disturbance,
at least on one of its basic functions, by one or more threats during its mission [16].
System susceptibility is dependent upon three major factors: the threat, the system,
and the mission. A threat is described by its characteristics and the effective impact
on the system, which itself depends on its exposure to the threat by its observable
parts. The mission indicates the physical operating environment, in which the threat
becomes active. The importance of susceptibility relies on the fact that a threat can
often be entirely avoided, making the system not vulnerable at all. From Equation
6, vulnerability is a conditional probability that depends on the outcome of a threat,
while susceptibility is a probability that solely depends on whether the threat was
experienced or avoided.
Vulnerability is defined as the conditional probability that the system is killed after
it experiences a direct hit or secondary hit effects [16]. It is the system’s inability
to withstand the damage caused by a (often man-made) hostile environment, to its
exposure and to its liability to serious damage or destruction when hit [16]. The more
vulnerable a system is, the more likely it will be killed when attacked by multiple
threats. Systems become vulnerable to threats, if they originally failed to avoid the
threat. In complex systems, overall system vulnerability depends upon the subsystem
vulnerability. However, this does not necessarily imply that a system with vulnerable
components, will demonstrate increased vulnerability to threat, especially under the
presence of unpredictable emergent behaviors in changing environmental conditions
or threats [122].











Figure 28: The Kill Chain [16]
sequence of events, after the system experiences a threat. In military systems, a kill
chain is used to describe the chain of events, according to the system-threat encounter
scenario [16]. Kill chains support probability calculations in system survivability
assessment. For instance, according to the kill chain of Figure 28, the key conditional
probabilities are defined and thus allow for the reformulation of Equation 5 as follows:
PS = 1− (PH · PA · PD/A · PL/D · PI/L · PH/I · PK/H) (7)
2.2.1.2 Survivability in science and engineering
Survivability has proliferated in several other scientific and engineering fields [191].
Survivability is considered as a design attribute in naval or merchant ship design
[27], [173]. In civil engineering and architecture, infrastructure and large scale system
survivability is improved against natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes, flooding, hurri-
canes) [19], [34]. Occupant protection in automotive/locomotive systems is another
form of survivability, with focus on protecting human passengers [236]. Security and
protection from malicious and hostile attacks against software (e.g databases), hard-
ware (IT support, banking central systems), implicitly seeks to ensure the survival of
physical devices, along with system functionality and operations [231]. In natural sci-
ences, disciplines, such as biology [56], computer science [6], systems network theory
[133], etc., apply survivability within their own context.
A generalized, inclusive definition for survivability is an open challenge for engi-
neers and scientists. Most current definitions are specific to the application domain.
But, given that the survivability concept is quite broad, with observed commonal-
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Figure 29: Survivability definitions for various engineering and scientific communities
independent and inclusive definition is feasible. A literature search across different
engineering disciplines and scientific fields has been conducted, regarding definitions
and application frameworks. Figure 29 contains a brief summary of definition finding,
while for more information and details on how survivability is defined in each field,
the reader is referred to Appendix C.
The literature survey has revealed strong similarities in keywords and concepts.
Observation 2.4: In the majority of disciplines, survivability is emphasizing the abil-
ity of a system to preserve itself and its mission under the occurrence of disturbances
in a timely manner.
Moreover, there are three key characteristics of survivable systems [198]:
1. Essential functions: Survivable systems must be capable of performing a set
of essential functions at all times. These functions are not necessarily linked to
mission goals and objectives, but allow for ”safety mode” operations. System
survival however, could often depend on the system’s mission success entirely.
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Thus, a system can accomplish its mission successfully, when it can provide a
service through producing an outcome, and delivering a value that satisfies the
original system objectives.
2. Attacks and failures: Survivable systems must protect and maintain their
essential functions, therefore their total health and their mission success, if any
disturbances are experienced. A disturbance is a form of system interruption
on essential functions and mission ability, and describes attacks, or faults and
failures that could lead to accidents, or disasters. All systems have a natural
ability to absorb disturbances, however, designing for robustness and resilience
is one of the grand challenges in survivability engineering.
3. Timely manner: Survivable systems must perform their essential functions
and respond to disturbances within certain time frames. Complex system be-
havior is highly dynamic, and this affects survivability. Thus value delivery
is time dependent, especially considering that a disturbance may unexpectedly
appear at some time point during the mission, and last for an unknown time
period.
Similarities in survivable system characteristics support the prospect of introduc-
ing a generalized definition of survivability, independent of systems, platforms and
disciplines. Based on the same three common observations for different types of
engineering systems, Richards et al. [191] have defined survivability:
Survivability is the ability of a system to minimize the impact of a finite disturbance
on value delivery, achieved through either:
• the satisfaction of a minimally acceptable level of value delivery during and
after a finite disturbance or




















Figure 30: Towards a unified and global definition for survivability [198]
Figure 30 illustrates the typical behavior of a dynamic system that survives a
disturbance [198]. Time is divided into epochs, namely time periods with a fixed
attributes, such as static constraints, fixed design concepts, technology selections
and properties [198]. Epoch 1 assumes normal environmental conditions, with the
system being able to deliver a certain performance value V0 at its original state. A
disturbance suddenly occurs, resulting in system performance degradation with time
and reaching a minimum, at the end of the second epoch. At the third epoch, the
system is attempting to recover and reach its original value delivery state V0, within
a certain recovery time. The system does not always have to return to V0 in order to
survive, but it may be adequate if it restores to a performance value higher than the
minimum expected V(r(min)), no later than the permitted recovery time T(rp).
In conclusion, system survivability is seen as a concept, metric, design attribute.
Despite the domain specific definitions and quantitative frameworks, the basic concept
remains similar across disciplines. Survivability is highly dynamic in uncertain and
changing environments. Overall ,a survivable system must be capable of continuously




















Figure 31: Fighter aircraft loss rates in historic campaigns [16]
recovery, within a recovery time Tr.
2.2.2 Applications of survivability-based design
Survivability-based design methods have been developed and originally applied for
aerospace and naval military systems, since the 1950s. Figure 31 compares losses in
fighter aircraft, for three historic campaigns, World War II, the Southeastern Asia con-
flict (SEA) and operation Desert Storm, and essentially illustrates the improvement
in survivability, with loss rates becoming much lower for the most recent campaigns
[16]. Over the past two decades, application of survivability-based design methods
has expanded beyond military, aerospace or naval systems to include networks [170]
(communication, transportation, power distribution, etc.), infrastructures [19], [34]
and organizations.
The literature investigation has concentrated on survivability-based design meth-
ods for military systems, aircraft and naval ships, as well as complex networks. The
most prominent ones are listed in the following:
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1. Aircraft design for survivability by Robert Ball [16].
2. Methods by Joint Technical Coordinating Committee for Aircraft Survivability
(JTCG/AS)[209].
3. Zonal design for naval survivability by Norbert Doerry.
4. Risk-based survivability design by Alan Brown.
5. Intelligent architectures for survivability and operability.
6. Survivable networks and IT systems.
2.2.2.1 Aircraft design for survivability
The Department of Defense (DoD), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
other government agencies have published regulations and directives for advancing
survivability and airworthiness. Driven by customer requirements and government
regulations, survivability-based design for air vehicles is centered around viable, cost-
effective technologies [150], aiming to reduce susceptibility and vulnerability [16].
Ball’s method combines survivability assessment techniques with susceptibility and
vulnerability reduction concepts [16].
Based on susceptibility and vulnerability assessment of baseline designs, the goal
is to examine the impact of design enhancements on system survivability, along with
associated costs for the upgrades. Cost-effectiveness analysis determines the benefits
of survivability enhancing solutions, against overall mission effectiveness, as well as
acquisition and operating costs [16]. If targets are not met, iterations on the design,
and further assessments are necessary. An overview of Ball’s methodology for selection
of susceptibility and vulnerability reduction features is illustrated in Figure 32. The
steps for survivability-based design are the following:
1. Mission threat encounter analysis.
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Figure 32: Ball’s method for survivability based design [16]
2. Flight & mission critical functional analysis.





8. Survivability enhancement trade studies.
The first three steps are equivalent to a system and threat identification process.
The next three analysis steps, are the basic modules of the complete survivability as-
sessment for a given baseline design, if subjected to a given set of component fault or
failure scenarios. Survivability testing for certification purposes, is based on hardware
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Table 1: Mapping of engineering systems to failure types [16]
Susceptibility reduction Vulnerability reduction
Threat warning Component redundancy with separation
Noise jamming and deceiving Component location
Signature reduction Passive damage suppression
Expendable Active damage suppression
Threat suppression Component shielding
Weapons and tactics, flight performance Component elimination
Crew training and proficiency Component replacement
prototypes and is mandated by government agencies at the latter product develop-
ment stages. For instance, live fire testing (also mandated by congress) is a realistic
survivability and lethality testing for newly developed military aircraft. Other surviv-
ability aspects that need to be tested is the footprint of the vehicle, as well as signature
management. Structural vulnerability is another feature of interest, indicating the
ease of repair after damage, that allows for system recoverability.
Enhancement strategy selection (e.g. technology additions or architecture modifi-
cations), is based on survivability assessment, testing, and cost-effectiveness estima-
tions. As an example, Table 1 lists six concepts that were implemented in the F/A-18
for susceptibility and vulnerability reduction. Figure 33 schematics illustrate how the
concepts eventually made their way in the F/A-18 [16].
Typical options for reducing susceptibility include attrition management, ammu-
nition increase, stealthiness improvement, addition of electronic equipment, while
constantly updating the mission profile [16]. Accommodation, cooling and protection
of electronic warfare equipment (threat warning, noise jamming and deceiving) must
be considered as well. Signature reduction (such as radar signature or IR signature) is
an inclusive susceptibility reduction strategy that extends beyond technology infusion
to the overall design philosophy. However, conflicts or performance downgrades may








Figure 33: Susceptibility and vulnerability reduction features for the F/A-18 [16]
statically unstable aircraft [18]. For the successful implementation of these options,
improved manufacturing procedures are necessary, contending with different materi-
als, higher tolerances, complex shaping requirements, and suitable sensor placement
optimization for minimum contribution to the system’s signatures.
Vulnerability reduction techniques concentrate on four key requirements:
• Protect critical components (through redundancy and separation).
• Protect critical functions (lift, thrust, control).
• Improve system reconfigurability.
• Control damage propagation (maintain structural integrity and fire suppres-
sion).
The six basic concepts on the right side of Table 1 are options for supporting the four
requirements in designing for low vulnerability. The major requirement however, is
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that all occupants be protected, regardless of the damage or fault tolerance of the
system.
Architecture-based design practices, such as component redundancy, allow for ad-
ditional resources and capability, if the primary components become inoperable. Sep-
aration of components, or distribution on a physical architecture commands for more
sophisticated and intelligent component allocation, given that certain locations and
areas are more exposed to threats than others. Component elimination or replacement
is targeting on ease of maintenance and supports intelligent resource allocation in real
time. Active damage suppression relies on damage avoidance or control systems that
the system hosts, while passive damage suppression is implemented through strategic
architecture design and energy absorbing materials selection for improving crash sur-
vivability. One of the expected outcomes of low vulnerability is graceful degradation,
which provides enough time for occupants to safely abandon the system.
2.2.2.2 The JTCG/AS process for survivability engineering
The Aerospace Systems Survivability Handbook Series was developed by the Joint
Technical Coordinating Committee for Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS) to provide
guidance to government and industry survivability managers, engineers and analysts
involved in systems acquisition [209]. Recommendations for survivability-based de-
sign start from survivability requirements for a system, and evolve throughout the
entire system acquisition process, while extending through the development, test, and
evaluation of system prototype models.
The proposed design process is summarized by the following steps:
• Perform trade studies.
• Perform system and item analyses of the candidate design.
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Figure 34: Survivability domain as defined by OPNAV P-86-4-99 instruction [245]
• Make detailed decisions that transform requirements, resources, and constraints
into design.
Survivability enhancement trade studies return the relative contribution of a single
enhancement to overall combat effectiveness, cost, and schedule. It is quite possible
that an improvement through enhancement, is also combined to detriments in other
response figures. Decision making on final enhancement must focus on a compromise
that returns optimal system survivability in terms of total figures for combat effective-
ness, cost, and schedule. This approach is based on traditional systems engineering
practices for susceptibility and vulnerability enhancement, however, it may lack the
required depth and insight that is required for this analysis in the conceptual design
phase.
2.2.2.3 OPNAV P-86-4-99 instruction
Similarly to (JTCG/AS), there have been equivalent initiatives within the naval sys-
tems community that promote survivability as a design discipline. The U.S. Navy has
a standard procedure for survivable ship design and survivability assessment, that is
published through the Survivability Design Handbook for Surface Ships [245]. The
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Figure 35: Elements of dynamic survivability [245]
OPNAV P-86-4-99 instruction [245] is the most prominent amongst naval engineers,
providing definitions, metrics, and design processes for susceptibility/vulnerability
reduction.
The Navy defines survivability as a probabilistic measure that depends on ship
susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability, as composed in Figure 34. From a
dynamic perspective, the three survivability components can be described as in Figure
35, given that the system will degrade, but it will maintain its ability to recover.
The proposed design methodology relies on susceptibility and vulnerability reduc-
tion techniques, as revealed by Figure 36, which also describes the objectives of the
process. The core of the method is the improvement of operational performance, how-
ever, life cycle cost issues are addressed, along with the identification of technical risks
for the design procedure (design feasibility, producibility and supportability). In addi-
tion to susceptibility and vulnerability, there is special consideration of recoverability,
mostly from the ship’s dynamic stability aspect, as well as damage identification and
repairability.
The survivability-based recommended procedure for total ship acquisition is illus-
trated in Figure 37. The first step of the process is the formulation of system require-
ments. It requires input from the Mission Needs Statement (MNS) for a new ship
76
Figure 36: OPNAV Total Ship System Survivability Objectives and Procedure [245]
Figure 37: OPNAV Total Ship System Survivability Acquisition Process [245]
or naval system, which typically describes the desired operational system capability,
along with SoA shortcomings, thus introducing the need for a new concept. The MNS
then translates to the Operational Requirements Document (ORD), namely the for-
mal requirements statement. It clearly outlines the expected capabilities, which must
be transformed into technical requirements. Typically the technical requirements are
driven by the survivability objectives, as shown in Figure 36.
The formulation of a baseline solution, is the input to the second step of the OP-
NAV process that suggest a series of assessments. These assessments address Total
Ship (TSS) and Battle Force (BFS) Survivability, live fire testing (either virtually or
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Figure 38: Threat environment for survivability assessment [245]
experimentally) and volumetric vulnerability assessment. Other testing sessions are
necessary for survivability certification and approval. In conclusion, the TSS and BFS
assessments investigate the total ship survivability, and discover potential gaps and
shortcomings. Assessment results indicate the directions of improvement and allow
for selection of survivability enhancement strategies. To conduct the assessments, sets
of operational scenarios must be formulated, which reflect realistic events, such as tor-
pedo or missile attacks, mine contacts or extreme natural environmental conditions,
as shown in Figure 38.
There are several options for translating scenarios into practical, executable forms.
The kill chain approach is one option, that applies for any type of military simulation.
In naval applications, the kill chain additionally includes system recoverability, as
presented in Figure 39, for a naval combatant mission scenario.
With a finalized list of design enhancements for survivability, the third step is to
optimize system performance and perform tests and evaluations, in order to achieve
the design requirements that have been set by the ORD. For susceptibility, the focus
is on signature reduction through reducing the Radar Cross Section(RCS), heat and
acoustic energy emission plus the ships magnetic signature. Susceptibility can also be
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Figure 39: Kill chain for naval survivability assessment [245]
reduced through hull or mechanical/electrical system design, especially by improv-
ing weight distribution for better stability, maneuverability, component shielding,
and overall situational awareness and readiness. Vulnerability reduction measures
emphasize on maintaining ship flotation, stability, structural integrity and systems
operability. Techniques for vulnerability reduction include subsystem redundancy,
separation and intelligent distribution and co-location for vital ship operations.
2.2.2.4 Zonal design for naval survivability
Except for total survivability-based design approaches, it is quite possible to improve
survivability by focusing on a particular subsystem, such as the power generation
and distribution system of a naval ship. Zonal Ship design is a design philosophy
for more survivable architectures, that brings focus on power system survivability
[180], by monitoring the quality and continuity of service [64]. Quality of Service





















Figure 40: Volumetric Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (VIVA) [65]
end user and calculated as a Mean Time Between Service Interruption (MTBSI) as
viewed from the loads. It is taking into account equipment failures, however it does
not consider survivability events such as battle damage, collisions, fires, or flooding
[65]. The ultimate goal is to maximize the Quality of Service (QoS).
Zonal design is applied at early conceptual design and feasibility studies [64]. With
a concept of operations and baseline solution for the distributed systems architecture
as a starting point, mission critical subsystems and component can be and the iden-
tified and allocated into zones. A key decision point is the identification of the zone
boundaries. The boundaries of the zones must allow for zones that are large enough,
such that any damage does not span more than two adjacent zones, yet, their size
must allow for an adequate zone number, which ensures sufficient mission capability
and survival, after the loss of any two adjacent zones [64]. Zonal design falls under
a generalized design philosophy that calls for distributed system architectures, with
subsystems that are not entirely independent, but interrelated to certain level [65].
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With a given zonal configuration of the baseline distributed architecture, the anal-
ysis of the ship model for QoS estimations and survivability assessment, is performed
through a computational ship synthesis tool, that reflects the selected component
allocation in zones. QoS and survivability analysis depends on preselected threat
scenarios, and evaluations are primarily driven by the power system architecture,
subsystem reliability and system operations. To complete this step, the Total Ship
Survivability Assessment (TSSA) method [245] has been chosen for the assessment.
In support of the TSSA, the Volumetric Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (VIVA)
[65], predicts the modes and rates of damage propagation through the architecture,
as explained in Figure 40. Furthermore, VIVA returns the affected systems, within a
given volume of space of the ship architecture.
The final stages of zonal design utilize the outcomes of TSSA and VIVA for QoS
and survivability analysis, which will aid in determining the directions of improvement
for better addressing the survivability requirements at the lowest acquisition and op-
erating costs. Cost and performance drivers can be applied and in conjunction with
design space exploration techniques, in order to concurrently optimize (e.g. Genetic
algorithms, Monte Carlo methods, or gradient-based methods) for QoS, survivability
and cost. To optimize the architecture, zonal design relies on two strategies, spatial
redundancy and source-load alignment. Assuming damage control prevents dam-
age propagation outside the damaged zones, spatial redundancy allows for the main
systems to maintain operations, under the support of distributed subsystems [65].
Regarding source-load alignment, electrical system generation capacity is matched to
load capacity within each zone. The strategy provides a level of autonomy for each
zone, thus not always requiring zones to interconnect for power exchange. Survivabil-
ity is enhanced, but this is not always the case for QoS, thus interconnections among
zones is still permitted.
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Figure 41: Risk-based ship design optimization procedure [33]
2.2.2.5 Risk-based survivability design
The Multi-objective Ship Design Optimization technique is a risk-based survivability
design method, that has been demonstrated by Dr. Alan Brown, for merchant and
passenger transport ships [32]. Influenced by the recommendations of the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO) and the SAFER-EURORO [204] initiative for
merchant and ferry ships, the method aims to improve ship safety and survivability
through a multi-objective function investigation of alternative solutions, against a
given set of pre-generated scenarios. The objectives include functions for cost, effec-
tiveness and risk. Design space exploration and risk optimization [26] is performed
through risk-based decision making [31], e.g. with the Multiple-Objective Genetic
Optimization (MOGO) algorithm that is presented in Figure 41 [32].
Probabilistic calculations are supported by two risk-based approaches, the risk
objective attribute approach, or the uncertainty-based approach. With the first
approach, risk is quantified as a single objective attribute, the Overall Measure of
Risk (OMOR), representing the probability of failure associated with discrete failure
events in system performance, cost or design inconsistencies and technology maturity
[31]. With the second approach, risk is quantified through probability distribution
functions for objective attributes (cost, performance), and is calculated by explicitly
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Figure 42: OMOE development process [33]
introducing uncertainty (inherent, statistical, modeling, technology, human) in the
ship synthesis (modeling and analysis) process. The process for OMOR and OMOE
calculation is shown in Figure 42.
Inspired by principles of axiomatic design, the suggested design process can be
imagined as a sequential mapping between four domains: the mission or customer
domain, the functional domain, the physical domain and the process domain [227].
It is concluded that uncertainty analysis is best applied in post-exploration design
optimization, after specific cost and performance goals and thresholds have been set,
to maximize the probability of achieving these goals [31].
2.2.2.6 Intelligent architectures for survivability and operability
The problem of survivability-based design for large scale systems, is alternatively ap-
proached from a system intelligence and control standpoint. This is a SoA approach,
when systems need to be reconfigured and retrofitted with intelligent system technolo-
gies at the latter design stages. Design for intelligence and reconfigurability should
be implemented concurrently to design for performance, mission effectiveness and
affordability at the early conceptual design stages [193]. Under this philosophy, sur-
vivability relies on reconfigurable architectures and intelligent controls. Along these
lines, Sudhoff’s approach calls for optimization for naval power system operability
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[225]. Another effort is the Reduced Ship’s Crew by Virtual Presence (RSVP) ini-
tiative, the survivability problem is approached from a practical controls, health and
status monitoring perspective [210].
Sudhoff’s operability-based method, concentrates on the power generation and
distribution system of a naval combatant. According to the method, operability
improvements depend on enabling technologies that support reconfigurability and
performance stability [225]. Systems engineering and architecting is a key enabler as
well, subsystem integration for instance, as the next generation of naval shipboard
power and propulsion systems will feature an electric drive-based propulsion system,
which is fully integrated with a power electronics-based zonal distribution system.
Regarding performance, the immediate benefits include the increased efficiency at
low speeds (through the use of an electric drive), an increased amount of electric power
for pulsed power applications, and a high degree of robustness. Dynamic stability of
both the AC and DC system portions must be further investigated [87], due to the
large number of high-bandwidth constant power loads [226]. Analysis and testing is
based on a layered computational total system model, in which each subsystem is
represented through a separate layer [225]. To support decisions for architecture and
technology selection, the method estimates baseline survivability, through numerical
estimation of system availability for a given mission scenario.
In a more practical exercise, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) commissioned
the RSVP Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) to develop a proof-of concept
system [209]. The basic hypothesis implies that reconfigurable architectures with
increased intelligence and automation, will enhance survivability. The goal of the
RSVP ATD is to demonstrate the feasibility of a system that supports the hypothesis.
Figure 43 describes the prototype architecture, that is composed of sensor units,
Access Points (AP), System Health Monitoring (SHM), a Local Area Network (LAN)
for the entire ship, and a watchstation.
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Figure 43: RSVP Architecture [209]
To reduce installation and maintenance costs, sensors are part of a large network,
supported by wireless technologies. To further minimize costs, and improve reliability,
efficiency and stability, Micro Electromechanical System (MEMS) sensors have been
selected. More conventional sensors form the environmental sensor clusters, mounted
on certain ship locations, and are tuned to monitor temperature, smoke, ionization,
humidity, air pressure, flooding, oxygen, carbon monoxide levels, and acoustic tran-
sients [209]. Structural sensor clusters are mounted on beams and hull locations to
monitor the ship’s structural status, while personnel status monitors are devices worn
by system occupants, to monitor crew member health status. Watchstations are the
interface with the ship’s operators.
2.2.2.7 Information technology (IT) systems and communication networks
Large scale complex architectures often include IT systems and networks of various


















Figure 44: Network Survivability Taxonomy [219]
Most network-based IT systems are bounded (finite dimensions and specific location),
however, such classification is not entirely accurate. For instance, the World Wide
Web (the Internet) is an enormous, theoretically bounded IT system, yet what it
really represents is an almost indefinite large scale network of systems.
From the perspective of security, and furthermore safety and survivability, size
may not be as important as boundary allocation [72]. Risks are much higher for
unbounded networks, as any individual node can be compromised, but all network
essential services must still survive. Survivability-based design approaches for large
scale networks aim to improve survivability through two different levels, the physical
or the logical level, as visualized in Figure 44. System connectivity is what determines
physical survivability, while switching and routing strategies affect logical survivabil-
ity.
Assessment and enhancement approaches are highly based on heuristics for cases
of low connectivity and static switching, with most SoA models address only single
node failures. Work in the area of dynamic switching, is also limited with only a few
optimization models developed so far [219]. Cutting plane heuristics is an alternative
approach to networks of high connectivity [219]. Graph theoretical approaches are
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the standard for network modeling, in support of network survivability analysis.
Survivability assessment or design methods for networks are dependent on the
network configuration. In order to adjust to the network application, the concept
of survivability reasoning frameworks has been introduced [74]. Understanding that
environmental conditions can be dramatically different across different missions, rea-
soning frameworks take this variating factors into account, through incorporating
such information in a collection of frameworks. For instance, an initial collection of
reasoning frameworks is created, through classification of enemy tactics and environ-
mental patterns into groups, based on the general scenarios to which they respond
[74].
Classification through reasoning frameworks can be used as a prediction tool that
could effectively narrow down the number of critical scenarios for survivability-based
design. Moreover, it allows for predicting the likelihood of system disturbances, based
on how context changes affect system modes of operation. A reasoning framework
is associated with a set of general scenarios, where each scenario is comprised of six
parts [74]:
1. Disturbance: Condition that needs to be considered when it affects a system.
2. Source of the stimulus: Entity that generated the disturbance.
3. Environment: Conditions and context under which the disturbance occurs.
It can dictate the disturbance sources that can potentially threaten the mis-
sion. Disturbance sources (also ”attackers”) can be classified according to their
resources (funds, personnel, and the skill levels), timing(very-near-term objec-
tives, long term wait for opportunity), tools(sophistication level), risk aversion,
system access, objectives (political, financial, criminal, military, personal).
4. System response: the activity undertaken after the arrival of the stimulus
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5. Response measure: the attribute-specific constraint that must be satisfied
by the response.
Regardless of recent approaches in for network security risk mitigation, most ef-
forts concentrate on a narrow, security-based view of defense against computer in-
trusions [72]. Most remedies rely almost exclusively on system hardening (e.g., using
firewall technology) for hacks or malicious attack prevention. Susceptibility measures,
such as intrusion detectability and situational awareness, are mostly post-design ad-
ditions. Networks are designed with performance and functionality in mind, rather
than robustness and recoverability [72]. Survivability enhancing solutions assume a
static network behavior, thus ignoring dynamic environment changes, or graceful sys-
tem degradation [73]. Last, bounded-system thinking (e.g. firewalled sub-networks)
within unbounded domains, effectively a logically bounded system within a physically
unbounded one, could result to solutions that may be flawed from a survivability per-
spective. [72]. Work by Ellison et al., brings focus onto four network survivability
aspects: resistance, recognition, recovery, and system adaptation and evolution.
2.2.3 Evaluation of SoA in survivability-based design
The methods and techniques for survivability-based design that were discussed ear-
lier, are summarized in Figure 45, according to the most established applications.
However, each method does focus on a particular aspect of the survivability prob-
lem. Some of these methods focus on certification checks for mandated minimum
survivability requirements. Others bring emphasis on the accuracy and fidelity of
the modeling and simulation analysis tools. Survivability assessment is a key enabler
that is necessary for decision making on survivability enhancements. Most of them
however, address the survivability design problem through assessment against certain
threat classes, along with recommendations on design or technology-based solutions


























































Figure 45: Summary of SoA in Survivability-based design
For the purpose of performing a comparative qualitative evaluation of SoA sur-
vivability design methods, the criteria that have been used for safety design method
evaluation are applicable, and more information about their selection is found in Ap-
pendix B. The evaluation criteria have been grouped under three main categories
(method fundamentals, features, and applicability) and the results of this task are
presented in Figure 46.
A first look at the comparative evaluation table, it does appear that survivability-
based design methods have been evolving non-uniformly across different disciplines
and applications. It becomes obvious that military engineering applications, namely
aerospace and naval possess the lead in terms of method theoretical development,
effectiveness and applicability. Robert Ball’s method is distinguished due to its rigor-
ous, complete and thorough theoretical approach, yet it still maintains a proper level
of generality to remain platform and application independent.
Observation 2.5: Survivability-based design methods follow the same basic process
steps, however they do depend on the particular application. Robert Ball’s method
is an inclusive, rigorous approach that could serve as a basis for method development
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Figure 46: Evaluation of survivability-based design methods
It becomes apparent that survivability assessment techniques are absolutely nec-
essary for evaluating of system survivability against certain tests, as well as for de-
termining the direction of improvement for survivability enhancements. Formula-
tion of the required experiments, relies on the aspects of survivability to be tested,
namely susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability. Most assessment methods fo-
cus on vulnerability, and either make use of historical data, or employ computational
modeling and simulation. Recoverability is often measurable through performance
data. Susceptibility analysis requires deeper mission understanding and further in-
vestigation regarding the impact of technologies, responsible for system situational
awareness, threat detection and avoidance capabilities.
Observation 2.6: Survivability assessment is necessary for estimating the impact
of technologies and design enhancements. Most approaches focus on vulnerability
analysis, while susceptibility analysis usually requires different analysis and evaluation
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frameworks.
Survivability is generally defined as the probability of survival, thus assessment
and design methods are probabilistic. For more accurate survivability calculations,
a large number of experiments, or number of runs is required, and depending on the
application, there may be additional requirements for higher fidelity of the modeling
and simulation environment.
Observation 2.7: Survivability-based design methods are probabilistic. Large num-
bers of experimental cases are required for better probability estimations. Selection
of modeling tools must take into account the benefits to estimation accuracy against
the cost of use.
Solution robustness is a measure of how well prepared the system is by its design,
to respond to known, or less known external threats or environmental changes. To
ensure system robustness, methods should provide techniques for system survivabil-
ity testing under scenarios with expected threats, as well as some unexpected ones.
Mission profiles can be the source of typically expected threats and operating con-
ditions, but further research is required to formulate possible unexpected conditions.
In the SoA, some techniques mention the above need, but other take a step further,
by discussing scenario development techniques or how survivability testing should
be made. For instance, power system design for survivability by Sudhoff [175], and
Doerry [64] have more in common to robust design techniques. Others do underline
the importance of robust design, yet further research for complete implementation is
required.
Observation 2.8: As a consequence of operational uncertainty, robust design is a
vital component of survivability-based design. To improve solution robustness, one
must invest on modeling and simulation tools of higher fidelity, and on an extended
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mission scenario set that includes more that the expected system threats and distur-
bances.
Method maturity reflects method applicability for a real life application. Ball’s
method [16] and the Navy’s OPNAV P-86-4-99 [245] are mature methods, yet not
immediately applicable to different systems, without prior adjustments to details.
Method applicability usually depends on the system and the level of complexity of
real world practical problems. Less general and structured approaches, rely on more
particular issues around survivability design, especially on technologies and surviv-
ability enhancement solutions for components and subsystems. Cost of method im-
plementation depends on method maturity and effectiveness. Theoretical and higher
level approaches are more affordable, and are more suitable for conceptual design.
More system and technology dedicated approaches are more expensive to apply, and
in many cases less accessible or restricted. The latter refers to access and support,
where methodologically mature approaches are open to implement, where technology-
based, and survivability enhancing approaches that are dedicated to particular system
types are more restricted and proprietary to non-affiliated entities.
Observation 2.9: Generalized approaches for aerospace and naval applications are
methodologically mature. All necessary steps and processes are clearly outlined,
yet they are not application specific or ready. Technology-based approaches mostly
focus on survivability enhancements, thus less mature as complete methods. Cost of
method applicability depends on system requirements and complexity. Last, more
theoretical, generic and inclusive approaches are less restricted than more specialized
and dedicated, technology-based ones.
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2.3 Resilience engineering
Resilience engineering is an emerging discipline, that can be viewed as an evolution to
traditional safety and survivability engineering practices. It brings a new perspective
in understanding and analyzing system uncertainty, risk, and furthermore assessing
safety and survivability. It has been established under a set of premises, which stem
from limitations in understanding of how risk and uncertainty affect safety, or how
system complexity may lead to accidents. Additional issues about complex system in-
teractions in large scale operating environments contribute to overall uncertainty and
nonlinear, dynamic system behavior. Hollnagel has summarized the basic premises
of resilience engineering, in the following statements [109]:
1. Performance conditions are always underspecified.
2. Adverse events can be attributed to an unexpected combination of normal per-
formance variability.
3. Safety management cannot be based on hindsight nor solely rely on error tab-
ulation and failure probability calculations
These statements reflect limitations in current safety engineering practice. They
are the fundamental directions, which resilience engineering has been addressing as
continuously evolving, and emerging discipline.
2.3.1 Overview of system resilience
System resilience is not currently described by a unique and standard definition [146].
There are several definitions that are specific to a discipline or to an application.
However, there must be common attributes in resilient systems of any application.
In order to understand the basic characteristics of resilient systems, an extensive
literature survey has been conducted.
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Figure 47: The three basic functions of a resilient system
A resilient system can adjust its functioning prior to or following changes and
disturbances so that it can go on working even after a major mishap or in the pres-
ence of continuous stress, mainly by being able to be proactive on safety [111]. The
ability to be proactive is emphasizing the reduction in system susceptibility, by either
preventing unwanted events and outcomes or eliminating hazards in the operating
environment. Traditional safety, however is essentially reactive or passive and is
addressing the need for vulnerability reduction, through withstanding outcomes of
unwanted events, or reducing the adverse consequences of unwanted outcomes. In
more practical approach, Hollnagel [109] has provided a template of the fundamental
functionality that resilient systems must possess, that is also visually described in
Figure 47:
1. Anticipate disturbances. That includes potential threats, various disruptions




















Figure 48: Scientific and engineering fields of resilience application
what model is selected to predict the future and under what tolerance for risk.
2. Monitor performance. Except for mission performance and system health mon-
itoring, a resilient system must also be able to monitor risks and threats and
continuously revise its own model of risk identification. This will allow for re-
vealing of non-profound transient effects, that even though are not permanent,
they can still contribute to failures and accidents.
3. Respond to threats. This function implies an intrinsic readiness, along with
an inherent flexibility and adaptability in response to regular, irregular or un-
expected, and unexampled events.
While resilience has been originally discussed around socio-ecological systems,
equivalent forms of system resilience have appeared for other disciplines and appli-
cations [146]. Figure 48 lists most applications of resilience that have been recently
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introduced, based on extensive literature search. Most applications are related to sys-
tems engineering, environmental and civil applications for instance, such as infrastruc-
tures, cities and communities, with resilience defined against disasters, earthquakes,
major climate or other environmental changes [35]. In non-engineering applications,
there is economic and financial resilience of an organization, and industrial or orga-
nizational resilience on a higher level. Resilience of networks, is an application that
can refer to any system that is part of a networked structure. Human behavior and
interactions form another application, under psychological resilience [189]. More in-
sight on resilience, from the perspective of different applications, is provided through
the following sections.
2.3.1.1 Ecological, environmental and civil systems
Holling’s definition [106] associates resilience to the ability of a system to absorb a
disturbance and maintain all its internal connections and functionality. Although
some ecologists [178] consider resilience to be a measure of how fast a system returns
to an equilibrium state after a disturbance (return time), Holling defined it as a mea-
sure of how far the system could be perturbed without shifting to a different regime
(deviation tolerance). The return time, is now known as ”engineering resilience”,
whereas the tolerance based definition refers to ”ecological resilience”, according to
Holling’s 1996 revision [107].
In environmental engineering, where optimal resource management is a necessity,
resilience is defined as ”the capacity to adapt existing resources and skills to new sit-
uations and operating conditions” [46]. Alternatively, Tielley et al., bring the aspect
of flexibility and adaptivity, by explaining resilience as ”both the inherent strength
and ability to be flexible and adaptable after environmental shocks and disruptive
events” [234]. Fiksel links resilience to sustainability, or describing it as ”the essence
of sustainability, or the ability to resist disorder” [83]. For engineering applications
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where the infrastructure is viewed as an interaction with the local community, (local)
resilience describes the ability of a community to withstand an extreme natural event
without suffering devastating losses, damage, diminished productivity, or quality of
life and without a large amount of assistance from outside the community” [159].
Community resilience may become specific to particular types of disasters, such as
earthquakes (seismic resilience), water flooding, hurricanes and extreme temperature
conditions.
2.3.1.2 Social systems
Community resilience refers to the reaction of an infrastructure to a natural disaster,
in conjunction with a local community. If the disaster is extended to include any
type of disturbance, with any possible impact beyond a local community, then this
definition is generalized for social resilience. The latter is defined as the ability of
groups or communities to cope with external stresses and disturbances as a result of
social, political, and environmental change [4]. The 9/11 event was an intelligent, non-
natural and intentionally caused disaster, that its consequences extended through-out
an entire nation, and had furthermore created an impact on the rest of the world,
thus social resilience within an entire country had been challenged.
2.3.1.3 Organizations
When systems are characterized by a composite, detailed, and highly interrelated
structure, resilience is referred to as organizational resilience. It is the ability of a
system to withstand stresses of ”environmental loading” and a fundamental quality
found in individuals, groups, organizations, and systems as a whole [113]. While
the expected resilient behavior is similar, organizational resilience usually refers to
systems that possess a known internal structure, either hierarchical or centralized.
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2.3.1.4 Economic and financial systems
To further support the assertion that the concept of resilience would apply on any
kind of system, in the case when disturbances are of economic nature, organizations
may feature internal mechanisms that make them insensitive to the disturbance and
also give the opportunity to adapt and recover. In other words, economic resilience
is the inherent ability and adaptive response that enables firms and regions to avoid
maximum potential losses [197]. Rose [196] introduced two types of economic re-
silience, that is static and dynamic resilience. Static economic resilience is the ability
of an entity or system to maintain function when shocked [196]. On the other hand,
dynamic economic resilience is the speed at which an entity or system recovers from
a severe shock to achieve a desired state. In other words, static economic resilience is
an instantaneous measure of the performance of an entity or system relative to a non-
resilient or fragile performance, whereas dynamic resilience is harder to assess, as it
involves a long-term investment problem associated for recovery and reconstruction.
2.3.1.5 Network systems
Resilience can be also defined for networks, besides systems and organizations. A
network by itself can be considered as a system, or an organization may be represented
by a network of systems. Wang et al. define resilience the intrinsic ability of the
network to return to a stable or normal operating state following a strong perturbation
or shutdown due to serious failure or outside attack [256]. For example, in a logistic
network, its foundation function is to meet the requirement of all demand nodes.
In the case of a disturbance, recovery of th network depends on the following three
features;
• Redundant resources with adequate surplus to keep supplying the demand
nodes, in the case of disruption.
• Supply from multiple resources, with inherent flexibility that is usually provided
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by decentralized/distributed network architectures.
• Redundant supply lines with different levels of reliability. If cost is propor-
tional to reliability, constant reconfiguration or resource allocation may ensure
continuity of service at minimum cost, based on demand and supply figures.
2.3.1.6 Materials science
Before the concept of resilience was applied to systems, it’s original definition was re-
ferring to materials and their strength under given conditions. Boyd defines resilience
as the amount of work that is required to deform a unit volume of a material to the
elastic limit. In other words, resilience is a measure of the energy that can be stored
in a unit volume of any material and be then recovered as mechanical energy without
any loss. In an alternative explanation, resilience is also considered as a complement
of fragility, with the latter defined as the quality or state of being easily broken or
destroyed [156].
2.3.1.7 Safety, security and risk
One of the most promising application of resilience engineering, is safety and surviv-
ability management. In fact, it is expected that more resilient system designs, result
in improved safety and survivability. Along the lines of adaptability of resilient sys-
tems, Wildavsky defined resilience as the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers
after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back [262].
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security views resilience as an enabler for in-
creased security. According to the 2008 DHS Risk Steering Committee, resilience is
the capacity of an organization to recognize threats and hazards and make adjust-
ments that will improve future protection efforts and risk reduction measures [99]. In
particular, when security risks relate to terrorism, resilience is viewed as the capabil-
ity of an asset, system, or network to maintain its function during or to recover from
a terrorist attack or other incident [50].
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From a survivability perspective, Castet interprets resilience as survivability plus
the ability to tolerate unusual but legitimate changes, namely viewing resilience as a
superset of survivability [39]. along the same path, Caralli [37] views resilience as a
time dependent extension of survivability to include risk prevention and restoration
of normal processes once a disruption has relented.
2.3.1.8 Systems Engineering and Architecting
From an architectural and systems engineering perspective, system resilience is not
much different than safety management. In fact, resilience is more of an architecture
characteristic than a safety feature. It is that some of the benefits of more resilient
architecture are expected to contribute in improving safety and survivability. Allenby
defines resilience as the capability of a system to maintain its functions and structure
in the face of internal and external change and to degrade gracefully when it must [9].
From a systems engineering perspective, the primitive features of resilient systems are
the ability to absorb change and disturbance, to maintain functionality, to adapt to
change or gracefully degrade in natural and autonomous fashion, when it is necessary
for the overall system survival and recovery. The U.S. DHS Risk Steering Committee
supports this perspective, by alternatively recognizing resilience as the ability to resist,
absorb, recover from or successfully adapt to adversity or a change in conditions” [99].
2.3.1.9 Stability and Control
Many researchers have argued and investigated the association between resilience and
system stability. Even if stability is not an essential attribute of a resilient system,
improved dynamic stability is one of the resulting benefits of resilient systems. In
fact, the link between stability and resilience was part of earlier research towards
defining resilience, based on ecology and environmental studies and extending to
engineering applications. Gunderson defines engineering resilience as the speed of
return to the steady state, following a perturbation [252]. Consequently, ecological
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resilience is measured by the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before
the system is restructured [252]. From a dynamic stability viewpoint, resilience may
be alternatively defined as the ability of a system or organization to react to and
recover from disturbances at an early stage, with minimal effect on the dynamic
stability” [111].
2.3.2 Revisiting safety management from the lens of system resilience
In accordance to Observations 2.1-2.3 and the Objectives set in Chapter 1, the over-
all goal is to investigate methods for improving system effectiveness, with emphasis
on safety and system survivability. Given the limitations of SoA approaches within
safety and survivability engineering, which were identified and presented in sections
2.1 and 2.2, the concept of system resilience is investigated within the context of the
particular research directions. Resilience engineering is the enabling philosophy, in
the sense that it addresses relevant issues in safety and survivability management, dif-
ferently than traditional approaches. Such issues have been identified and discussed
by the resilience engineering community[109]. These refer to diversity in understand-
ing of safety, performance variability, accident occurrence, event development, risk
assessment and they are summarized in Figure 49.
2.3.2.1 Performance conditions
Traditional safety engineering approaches follow the assumption of completely speci-
fied performance conditions. Assessments and safety tests are performed in isolated
laboratories, where system operating conditions are fully under control. In that case
performance conditions are also completely specified. However, real operating condi-
tions are often not controllable, thus resulting to unpredictable performance condi-
tions.



























Figure 49: From safety to resilience engineering [109]
and to changing environmental conditions. The latter is also known as operational un-
certainty. On the other hand, there is uncertainty in the system’s ability to maintain
its physical shape, its internal component connectivity and its mission configuration,
relating to design faults and is known as the system’s design uncertainty.
System complexity is a significant contributor, affecting both operational and de-
sign uncertainty. Performance variability is a natural consequence of system com-
plexity. Effects of complexity stem from subsystem interconnectivity, emergent and
unpredictable behaviors, or combinations of the previous [38]. If a system is com-
prised of a large number of components with well defined roles and governed by well
understood rules, it is then referred to as a complicated system [10]. On the other
hand, when a system of the same size is comprised by a set of components that their
properties are not clearly defined or explained, exhibit nonlinear behaviors and are





• Decomposable into smaller parts
• Behavior of individual parts is known
• Overall behavior is explained by the linear (or other 
simple) combination of the component behavior 
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Non-linear / Complex
• Non-decomposable as a function of components
• Behavior of components is mostly unknown and uncertain
• Overall behavior is systemic, emergent and cannot be 
explained or predicted by combining the behavior of 
individual components
Figure 50: Impact of complexity in system behavior
as a complex system.
Performance variability may lead to system instability or even disastrous outcomes
and therefore it is necessary to understand the nature of variability (why, when, how)
in order to limit its effects [109]. Figure 50 illustrates the tradeoff between types
of system coupling (interconnectivity) and levels of system complexity. Complexity-
coupling tradeoffs are essential for better understanding of total system behavior, as
well as discovering possible modes of failures and monitoring damage propagation.
The issue of varying and uncertain performance conditions is addressed by the
concept of robustness. System robustness is defined as the insensitivity of system
value delivery to changing contexts [190]. Given the uncertainty in system operating
conditions and any possible disturbances (also known as ”noise”) affecting system
design performance, the robust design solution is the one which is less affected by
noise [158].






Figure 51: From stable to resilient [128]
to be unpredictably affected. Figure 51 explains the transition from stable systems to
more robust, as performance conditions become more uncertain and less predictable.
Resilience engineering advocates that systems not only should be insensitive to ir-
regular, but also to unexpected and unexampled events. A system that is robust by
design, is naturally insensitive to changes. To address however unexampled and any
other unexpected events, a system must additionally be adaptive to changing condi-
tions, mission requirements and any other physical changes that may occur on itself.
This is a distinguishing factor between robustness and resilience, despite of the many
similarities that researchers have been attributing to the two concepts [69]. Thus,
system adaptability as an intrinsic architecture property is the basis for extending
the concept for system robustness to system resilience.
2.3.2.2 Accident cause
Accidents are triggered by failures, which are further originated by faults on system
functionality. Regardless of fault occurrence, most systems are able to function prop-
erly until they completely fail due to a certain or unexpected reason. Traditional
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Sequential model (Heinrich, 1931)
• Accidents = linear propagation of causes and effects
• Backward accident cause search can be misleading
• Improve safety by removing a domino or spacing out dominos
Epidemiological model (“Swiss Cheese”) (Reason, 1990)
• Interrelations by dynamic unsafe acts by operators and latent conditions (weak barriers 
and defenses as “cheese” holes)
• Focus on components and their function, not overall system function
• Causality is nonlinear but total failure is still triggered by a component failure
• Includes coincidence and dynamic component dependence, yet component relations a 
re still fixed
Systemic model (Perrow, 1984)
• Concurrent conditions and events that are combined towards forming the accident
• Non-linear phenomena that emerge (even combinations of normal operations)
• Performance is varying due to changing environmental conditions and internal 
component behavior 
• Unexpected outcomes usually originate more often from variability of context and 
conditions than to the failures of actions
Figure 52: Accident models
safety engineering practices link failures to system malfunctions and performance de-
viations from normal operating states. Resilience engineering extends these practices
by bringing the perspective of internal component complexity and coupling, for ac-
cident reasoning, including cases with no starting fault or damage. Under this view,
performance variability must be regulated, unwanted combinations of component per-
formance variability must be identified and suppressed, for the purpose of preventing
functional resonance effects [110] or other adverse behaviors.
Depending on internal system complexity, three fault propagation mechanisms
have been identified, and are represented by three behavioral models, simple linear,
complex linear (complex subsystems linearly associated) or complex nonlinear. The
corresponding accident models for capturing fault propagation, are the Sequential
model [104], the Epidemiological model [186] and the Systemic model [176] respec-
tively, as shown in Figure 52.
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In the simple linear system accident model, the sequential (”Domino”) model
explains accidents as a linear propagation of causes and effects [108]. It is noted
however, that backward accident cause investigation can be misleading, since an effect
may have multiple causes [104]. To ensure safety, this approach suggests that a
”domino” must be removed or effectively the system must be designed in such way
that this abstract representation would correspond to more spaced out domino.
In complex linear system models, damage is predicted through a stochastic com-
binatorial approach, when the manageable risk of failure of a single component is
given. The epidemiological (”Swiss Cheese”) accident model was introduced by Rea-
son, addressing the interrelations of dynamic unsafe acts by operators and latent
conditions. The ”holes” in the cheese represent weak barriers and defenses [186].
However, the model’s main focus is on components and their function, ignoring any
emerging behaviors on the overall system functions. While causality here is nonlinear,
total failure is exclusively triggered by component failures. Phenomena such as coin-
cidence and dynamic component dependence are considered, yet component relations
are still fixed and unchanged over time.
Finally, in complex nonlinear system models, systemic accident models consider
resonance effects and emergent behaviors of linked components. Systemic accident
models take into account concurrent conditions and events, which if combined they
result towards accident occurrence [176]. These conditions trigger non-linear phenom-
ena that emerge during system operation (including combinations of normal operating
conditions), while system performance is varying due to changing environmental con-
ditions and internal component behavior (Exogenous/Endogenous variability).
2.3.2.3 Risk assessment
A third point that supports the paradigm of resilience engineering, is the view of











Figure 53: Fundamental steps for Risk Assessment [109]
of a threat must be predicted, thus accident modeling is a significant enabler for
understanding the functional complexity of the system, which in turn determines the
path to failure [109]. The fundamental steps of traditional risk assessment procedures,
shown in Figure 53, depend on the accident model. Traditional safety engineering has
adopted the linear accident model, namely assuming a starting fault, that can lead to
failures and to larger scale accidents. However, it is not guaranteed that unexpected
behavior, or other effects of increased system complexity are captured.
System resilience is founded on the alternative understanding of how system
threats, result to accidents and how damage propagates, under unexpected behaviors,
or other effects of increased system complexity. All complex dynamic systems exhibit
a certain level of performance variability. It is assumed that mission or system failure,
or success are all determined by the nature of this variability [109]. As the levels of
performance variability increase, it is presumed that the risk of failure due to adverse
effects, emerging behaviors and cascading failures is increasing as well.

























• Reactions based on 
erroneous expectations
• Combination of latent or 
adverse behaviors
Figure 54: Performance variability to explain system failure and success [109]
which is performance variability, as Figure 54 suggests. In this context, ”failure” is
viewed as an inability to adapt to perturbations and unexpected events, rather than
just a regular breakdown or malfunction [146]. To avoid failure, the system must
be flexible, effective, robust and reconfigurable, implying lower, but nonzero levels
of variability for mission success. Increasing system performance variability that
could lead to failure is sourced by mostly nonlinear phenomena, such as functional
resonance, unanticipated consequences, reactions based on erroneous expectations, or
a combination of latent or adverse behaviors [110].
2.3.2.4 Event development
Strongly tied to accident models, as well as their application for performing risk as-
sessment, is the understanding of how certain events take place, that could lead to
either a failure or accident, while varying the levels of risk exposure for dynamical
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systems. Thus, event development is another departure from ways of thinking within
traditional safety engineering. Resilience engineering suggests the impact considera-
tion of the environmental conditions and effects of complexity, as opposed to linear
pre-defined paths for event development [214].
With simple system failures (e.g. a light bulb), it is possible to restore full func-
tionality and system health, by just replacing the failed component with a new one.
In simple systems, components are linearly interdependent, without emerging behav-
iors after a single point failure. Moreover, all component interactions for simple linear
systems can be entirely explained, without any uncertainty. Thus, simple system per-
formance is essentially bimodal, where either the system works correctly (as designed)
or it completely fails. The final performance outcome on the other hand, is the prod-
uct of a known path, which is determined by components interactions (similar to a
”domino” path).
Unlike traditional views of safety for simple systems, with resilience engineering
system performance is non-bimodal and safety is determined by the bandwidth of
system performance variability. Given that performance variability is also depen-
dent on operating conditions (context) and mission expectations, safety is a complex
function of multiple factors. This includes unknown factors due to emergence of
unexpected behavior, possibly driven by subsystem cross-connectivity, multi-level hi-
erarchies, complex logic and non-linear coupling, all of them being typical effects of
complex, large scale systems.
This alternative view of event development, is consistent with the systemic view
of failure occurrence and propagation. Safety is now dynamically determined, with
performance barriers that are not globally fixed, but are functions of real time op-
erating and environmental conditions. While performance variability is necessary,
as explained in Figure 54, systemic failures cannot be prevented by just restricting





Figure 55: View of how failures happen ([109])
or ”snowball” effects, however other failure modes can emerge due to subsystem con-
nectivity combinations, even if all operate under normal conditions, and under total
absence of earlier faults or failures. An overview of the event development concepts
relevant to system safety is provided with Figure 55.
In support of better understanding of mechanisms for unexpected complex system
behavior, the functional resonance model is introduced [110]. This approach draws
parallels to systemic event development due to emerging behaviors, to resonance
effects in second-order mechanical systems. The resonance effects induced on a small
bridge, which is being crossed by a group of people marching at the same pace, is a
simple example to illustrate this point. While the bridge is rated to withstand the
weight (sum of all components), it appears that with the total weight unchanged,
the bridge can collapse (lack of resilience) if marching induces resonance effects that
degrade the weight rating (emergent behaviors) and make it effectively lower (effective
weight sum that the bridge has to withstand becomes larger than the weight rating).
The presence and intensity of emergent, nonlinear and non-deterministic behaviors
is representative of overall system complexity. A qualitative measure of complexity is
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the difference in the behavior of a large scale complex system to the behavior of the
equivalent sum of all components of the original complex system [38]. Another way
to assess system complexity is through system fragility. System fragility is a property
related to the system’s brittleness. Fragility is used to describe infrastructure com-
ponents in civil engineering or computational algorithms and networks in computer
science and engineering, and is generally the complement of resilience [124].
Other notable complexity characteristics are the system’s buffering capacity, its
self-restructuring capability, and its natural ability to adapt against changing environ-
mental conditions [109]. Buffering capacity refers to the size or disruption type that
can be absorbed/adapted to without fundamental breakdown in system performance
or structure. In other words, it depends on system design features or technologies
that allow the system to naturally withstand most types of disruptions. With their
self-restructuring capability, complex systems should not only be able to withstand
disturbances, they must additionally be capable of returning back to normal oper-
ational status and complete the mission. Complex system adaptation, even though
possible at local system levels, it is observed as a collective total effect, as part of the
system’s natural response to changing environmental conditions.
2.3.2.5 Engineering solutions
In safety engineering, there is strong reliance on engineering hindsight, and historical
information, regarding risk and uncertainty around system operations and perfor-
mance. While this approach is adequate for conventional designs and for mostly
expected operating conditions, it is not always appropriate for large scale, complex
and revolutionary concepts that often operate in uncertain operating conditions. It a
quite challenging task to ensure safety by design, while more information is required
to design more capable systems under such conditions.
Within resilience engineering, the above limitation is recognized and designing
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complex systems, based on foresight and predictive methods is greatly advocated for.
Foresight is pursued through real time simulations which offer insight regarding the
system’s dynamic response. High fidelity dynamic physics-based models are major
enablers for response prediction and furthermore for design uncertainty reduction.
This approach results in computational Modeling & Simulation (M&S) environments,
that represent large scale system architectures and are capable of predicting a system’s
dynamic behavior under changing conditions. Beyond design uncertainty, further
steps can be taken to address operational uncertainty, which stems from operating
environment risks. Resilience engineering supports the need for improved situational
awareness [75], essentially the system’s capability of properly sensing and assessing
changes in its surroundings, reflecting mission and environmental uncertainties.
2.3.3 Applications in resilience engineering
Resilience engineering has proliferated as a paradigm shift in safety management, and
has been investigated for several different system applications. With system safety
as one of the core values that this discipline seeks to address, resilience engineering
is envisioned to become an ecosystem of basic principles, definitions [156], assess-
ment and analysis techniques, modeling approaches and design methodologies [146],
[114], [211]. The fundamental research initiatives within the practice of resilience
engineering, have been focusing on the following methods and tools [249]:
• Analysis, measurement and monitoring of system resilience in their operating
environment.
• Improving system’s resilience.
• Modeling and prediction of short and long term effects of change, while formu-
lating and selecting management decisions on resilience and risk.
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In an overview of today’s State-of-the-Art in resilience engineering, significant
progress has been made on understanding and clarifying the concept for different
applications. Some of the most common applications are:
• Dynamical systems [54].
• Complex networks [142], [95].
• Organizations [13].
• Materials and structures [160].
• Infrastructures and communities [117], [71].
As the need and interest on resilient systems further advances, government agen-
cies are working on policymaking and requirements formulation on resilient large
scale organizations and infrastructures [52], [91], [13]. In terms of method and tool
development, the literature search has indicated numerous resilience assessment tech-
niques [71], resilience improvement techniques and technologies [149]. Last, modeling
approaches for resilience analysis address system functionality, complexity in system
architectures and interconnectivity, as well as performance and effectiveness.
A complete proposal for a resilience-based design methodology has been intro-
duced through the Resilience for Survivability initiative by IST (ReSIST) [19]. It’s a
collective attempt towards a quantitative methodology for resilient complex systems,
while maintaining a high level of generality. At the same time, ReSIST offers its own
view of resilience engineering, through their definitions and assessment framework.
Richards, et. al, as part of MIT’s SEARI Initiative, has introduced a dynamic
multi-attribute tradespace exploration technique [190], which despite its focus on
system survivability, it does bring ideas that are compatible to resilience engineering.
The demonstrating application is a satellite under possible degradation, which is
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maintainable during its mission, thus exhibiting dynamic recoverability through its
design configuration.
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been working on a Resilient Network
Design Environment (RNEDE), through which it intends to visualize, Create, Edit
and Analyze large complex networks/graphs [248]. Principles of resilience engineer-
ing are implemented for complex network architectures. Within RNEDE, a dynamic
simulation platform is utilized for the development and resilience evaluation of net-
worked system control strategies. The simulation environment (RNEDESim), sup-
ports the method with multiple capabilities, such as scalability, threat and disruption
scenario playback, recovery option suggestions, network visualization, while it remains
application-independent. The method returns a certain topology, which satisfies a set
of constraints, while minimizing a cost function against a series of incidents (disrup-
tions), and performs tradeoffs between remedial options and the cost function.
The resilient design methods survey concludes with two other approaches. The
Resilient Industrial Control System (RICS) design method is based on an application
specific formulation of concepts and metrics for resilient telecommunication systems
[257]. Last, another effort concentrates on resilient design of recharging station net-
works for electric transportation vehicles [250].
2.3.4 Evaluation of resilience engineering approaches
Resilience engineering has been inspiring several researchers and agencies to further
understand and investigate this new emerging discipline. As the literature has indi-
cated, the problem of designing resilient systems is addressed from different aspects,
such as requirements for system resilience, policies, assessment techniques, technolo-
gies for resilience enhancement, and to smaller extent, resilience-based design method-
ologies. Figure 56 presents an evaluation of SoA methods in resilience engineering.







































Figure 56: Evaluation of resilience-based design methods
as an objective function, is the most observed gap and ongoing research efforts are
already addressing it [251]. Most approaches focus on requirements, policies and
assessment methods.
Observation 2.10: For most applications in science and engineering, resilience-based
design methods are still at their infancy stages. Most of them qualitatively address
the problem of resilience, through requirements for ideal resilient system response, en-
hancement recommendations and policies formulation towards more resilient systems.
According to common scientific practices, before one can design a system to adhere
to certain objectives, and that is subject to particular constraints, one must be able
to evaluate system performance and behavior against these requirements. Assessment
techniques are thus a major method building block and the SoA review has confirmed
recent efforts towards system resilience evaluation and assessment.
Observation 2.11: Resilience assessment techniques are currently the main focus
of the resilience engineering community, as they would be one of the basic building
blocks for resilience-based design methods.
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As it may be quite early for validated resilience-based design methodologies, a
few SoA approaches seek to utilize well established design techniques, in support
of designing more resilient systems. For instance, robust design [177] and strategic
decision making for technology infusion [131] are techniques in support for more
survivable and effective systems. However, incorporating advanced capabilities are
expected to implicitly benefit system resilience to most external or internal threats
and disturbances. Furthermore, discipline based approaches, such as applied control
system design [98] and resilient controls [194], are techniques for system adaptability
and mission reconfigurability, that are expected enablers of system resilience [109].
Observation 2.12: While there are no validated techniques for resilience-based de-
sign, research initiatives have been resorting to well established robust design, op-
timization, applied controls and decision making techniques, to implicitly improve
system resilience.
2.4 Complete problem definition
Recognizing that the research problem that the present dissertation is addressing is
quite broad, it is necessary to scope the problem to a concentrated version, which
will be better suited to further exploration and experimentation. The main motiva-
tion, as introduced with Chapter 1, is the investigation of systems engineering and
methodologies for the design of more effective and capable systems. More emphasis
was brought on safety management and how the problem could be formulated from a
survivability standpoint. This present chapter has offered the necessary background
information, regarding today’s SoA approaches in safety and survivability engineer-
ing, as well as future directions with great potential, such as resilience engineering.
A similar SoA investigation, along with the discussions on resilience engineering have
been the basis of the potential contributions towards more effective systems, under








































Figure 57: Scientific method for engineering research [151]
2.4.1 Revision of observations
Literature review on safety management, survivability and resilience engineering has
allowed for several observations regarding the current State of the Art (SoA). These
findings will be the basis of expanding Objectives 1 and 2, to a set of more concen-
trated objectives and a complete, focused problem statement for this dissertation.
The development of the research curriculum is in accordance to the scientific research
process [151], and is shown in Figure 57.
The two introductory research objectives, as stated in Chapter 1 are:
1. Objective 1 (Main): Invest towards conceptual design methodologies that
improve system effectiveness through increased survivability.
2. Objective 2: Follow the vision of resilience and investigate options on how
resilience engineering can be implemented in advanced design methodologies
with safety management concepts as objective functions.
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The SoA investigation on safety engineering, survivability-based design, and resilience-
based design methods, has returned a series of observations, which along with Obser-
vations 1.1-1.11, are summarized in Figure 58.
Observations 2.1 to 2.3 refer to SoA in safety engineering. Safety engineering is
good resource for leveraging methods and techniques, which refer to problems that
resilience engineering is also seeking to address. Safety requirements by military and
certification standards, are valid resilient system requirements, however, these should
adapt to visionary concepts that the resilience engineering community seeks to ex-
plore. As safety assessment techniques, such as PRA, FTA, and FMEA are at the
most advanced level in their history of application, they could become significant en-
ablers for design space exploration for resilient concepts. As a result Objective 2, can
be further expanded to account for these new findings. Objective 2.1: Incorporate
valuable safety management analysis and assessment techniques (e.g. PRA, reliability
analysis, FTA, FMEA) for addressing risk and uncertainty in expected, yet adversary
operating conditions.
Similarly, Observations 2.4 to 2.9 seek to reflect the SoA in survivability-based
design. Survivability is a step closer to system resilience, than system safety, in the
sense that the system must preserve itself and its mission under the occurrence of
disturbances in a timely manner. Following Objective 2:
Objective 2.2.1: Explore the concept of resilience in conjunction to system surviv-
ability
There are several effective survivability-based design methods, yet most are spe-
cific to the application they were developed for. As in safety management, assessment
techniques are the backbone of survivability design methods, both for analyzing the
system’s response to threats, or to allow for design space exploration as a method en-
abler. Survivability is a probabilistic measure that accounts for risk and uncertainty,
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Figure 58: Summary of observations
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thus most methods rely on probabilistic techniques, statistical analysis and multiple
experiments.
Objective 2.2.2: Investigate the applicability of survivability-based design tech-
niques to applications in resilience engineering.
System robustness is implicitly evaluated through survivability and is either achieved
through intelligent design solutions or technology infusion.
Objective 2.2.3: Clarify the associations between system survivability and robust-
ness, while investigating how robustness is related to system resilience.
The last set of observations, Observations 2.10 to 2.12, involve the SoA in resilience
engineering. Resilience-based design methods are still at their infancy stages. It has
been also observed that most research efforts are focusing on better understanding
and defining the ideal resilient system response according to the resilience concept.
As a consequence of the early stages of resilience engineering, resilience assessment
techniques are currently the main focus, as they would be one of the basic building
blocks for resilience-based design methods. Therefore, accepting that system resilience
assessment is indeed, a natural prior step before fully capable resilience-based design
and optimization methods, the ultimate objective for this dissertation is:
Objective 2.3: In support of resilience-based design methods, a system independent
resilience assessment methodology must be developed.
2.4.2 Problem description and application of interest
Objectives 1 and 2 to 2.3 are the basis of the research direction for this dissertation,
which will focus entirely on the development of a theoretical framework for a resilience
assessment method, as summarized in Figure 59. The main set of deliverables for this
effort is a suite of tools, methods and techniques related to resilience assessment and
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Figure 59: Problem Statement - Main goal and objectives
improvement. Along this path, the ultimate future goal is to employ this theoretical
framework in systems engineering and incorporate these enabling techniques into
complex system design methods. By this, not only resilience will be incorporated
into formulating policies on system safety and survivability, but also business planning
practices could be effectively supported [251].
From an application perspective, the long term goal is to investigate how can naval
systems be engineered so that system effectiveness and survivability are maximized,
through enhancing inherent system resilience. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the need for more effective naval systems dates back to early 2000, and has been
popularized through the US Navy’s IEP vision [144]. The Aerospace Systems Design
Laboratory (ASDL) at the Georgia Institute of Technology has introduced the IRIS
concept in response to the IEP vision [253].
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An IRIS designed ship will be self-monitoring, self-assessing, self-reacting and ef-
ficient as determined by IEP initiatives and technologies [115]. Self-monitoring will
enable continuous sensing of all ship-related operations and encourage a system that
is knowledgeable of both current and impending failures. As a self-assessing system,
the IRIS ship will collect input data from all subsystems and sensors and either au-
tomatically diagnose and act on the best course of action or pass the information to
a human/robot decision-maker. The self-reacting feature will allow the resources and
commands to be distributed as necessary and prepare to compensate and continue to
function in the event of system failures. In short, this integrated system and technolo-
gies onboard will have the ability to automatically sense, assess and react to changes
in constantly changing scenarios, in support of the envisioned IRIS operations.
For the sense function implementation, an IRIS-designed ship will contain a net-
work of system sensors for tracking ship motion, monitoring personnel status, detect-
ing damage, monitoring machinery health, and evaluating weapon system readiness.
Each ship subsystem will contain sensors to monitor its respective health status. This
includes power, fluid (fire mains, seawater, fresh and chilled water, fuel and air sys-
tems) and damage control, and other critical systems which will utilize the advanced
network of sensors [70]. Damage control is implemented through fire suppression
and relies on automated valve and pump status control, for damage isolation, and
available resource reconfiguration for optimum continuous operation (e.g. as in the
Reduced Ship Crew through Virtual Presence (RSVP) demonstration [210]). Other
sensors, e.g. Personnel Status Monitors (PSMs), can be used to monitor crew health
status remotely during times of crisis.
On the assess function, IRIS must automatically analyze and assess the data from
the sensors and identify the methods for avoiding or mitigating any foreseen problems.
Despite the load of real time data, the information must be rapidly assessed. A
distributed intelligence system will reduce the dependency on human operators, while
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Figure 60: IRIS and system resilience
reducing operating cost and increasing efficiency [70]. As an autonomous system, the
ship’s attack systems are enabled [1], while onboard operators will directly interact
with a visual, top-level interface with on-demand access to additional information
[144]. When the data are neither accurate nor available, the system has to be able to
infer what the state is.
The react function takes advantage of the distributed intelligence system and the
controllers onboard, to physically reconfigure the different ship modules based on the
sensors and the assessment of the information [5]. For instance, sensor information will
be used to determine the optimum alignment of the ship given the subsystem health
information and any predicted failures in the near future. Possible reconfigurability
strategies would isolate subsystems from remote failures, by rerouting power, fluid
flow or data through redundant paths to avoid cascading failures.
In conclusion, one may wonder how relevant is the concept of resilience to what an
IRIS system is envisioned to perform. In many ways, IRIS is an implementation of a
system that must be resilient to many threats and unexpected events, and that should
be manifested through increased survivability, reconfigurability and adaptability to
environmental changes. As resilient systems must be characterized by properties, such
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as adaptability, self-healing, mission recoverability, safety and security, an IRIS system
seeks to be similarly characterized, by employing advanced controls, intelligence and
autonomous operations. Indeed, both schemes of the ”sense-assess-react” in IRIS
and the ”anticipate-monitor-respond” of a resilient system, describe the iterative
process that an adaptive, autonomous and self-reconfigurable system must execute for
maintaining operations and minimizing impact of adverse effects. Thus, even though
functions are not the same, the end functionality is equivalent, as suggested by Figure
60. However, it is an open challenge to experimentally demonstrate that a system
which is designed as an IRIS system, is actually resilient, and this is one of the goals




ASSESSMENT METHODS IN SAFETY MANAGEMENT
Chapter 2 initiated a multi-disciplinary literature survey on safety management, sur-
vivability and resilience-based design methods. Based on a series of Observations, it
has been concluded that the backbone of a resilience-based design method, would be
a system and discipline independent resilience assessment technique, which allows for
system resilience evaluation, under the presence of uncertainty and changing oper-
ating conditions. This present chapter is presenting a subset of the research survey,
which concentrates on assessment techniques for safety, survivability and resilience,
across different disciplines and applications. The literature survey for the assessment
techniques aims to identify the strengths of current approaches, the detriments and
technical challenges, along the path towards a set of research questions, the upcoming
research opportunities and the experimentation plan for this dissertation.
3.1 Safety assessment methods
Assessment techniques in safety engineering are based on procedures that aim to
quantify risk and provide reliability estimates, when certain uncertainty scenarios
are given. Historically, safety assessment techniques were initially applied for civil
aviation vehicles, as well as military systems. As safety became a major attribute
of interest on other applications, safety assessment methods have been adopted for
space, marine, automotive and civil engineering systems.
3.1.1 Methods survey
The U.S. aerospace industry has been a pioneer in safety engineering and has thus
















Figure 61: Origin and application of safety assessment techniques
Assessment process is standard procedure in civil aviation [203]. The European
aerospace industry follows similar directives on safety, with the EUROCAE ED-79
publication as the equivalent of the SAE-ARP4754. There is also the European Di-
rective 89/392/EEC [63], along with documentation for strategies in selecting safety
measures, based on risk analysis and risk assessment.
As safety is linked to risk and uncertainty, probabilistic approaches have been
developed, such as the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [220]. In other applica-
tions, safety is associated to reliability, thus qualitative and quantitative techniques
are also available [129]. Last, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is using
their own risk assessment technique, for public health and human exposure to haz-
ardous substances and materials [76]. In Figure 61, an overview of the most prominent
safety assessment methods is presented, and classified against the applications, for
which these methods were developed and used.
All assessment methods require the identification of all possible hazards and
sources of risk. Given that risk can be quantified for known sources of uncertainty,
it is possible to determine the acceptable risk levels, and further investigate other
sources of uncertainty that are linked to unavailable or non-existent knowledge. Risk
assessment provides estimates for the overall system safety levels, and further allows
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Figure 62: SAE ARP 4761/4754 safety assessment process model [203]
for estimating system reliability and availability.
There certain techniques for hazard identification that often constitute the build-
ing blocks for most safety assessment techniques. Common hazard identification
techniques are Preliminary (or Failure) Hazards Analysis (PHA), Common Cause
Failure (CCF) analysis, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode and Effect Anal-
ysis (FMEA). Historically, fault trees were introduced by Bell labs [78] in 1961 to
model missile reliability, while FMEA was introduced at McDonnell-Douglas [221].
An example on how these techniques blend together in a safety assessment process,
is illustrated in Figure 62 for the SAE-ARP4754 safety assessment process.
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Probabilistic risk assessment techniques rely on risk estimation for each hazard
(extent of possible harm and probability of its occurrence). For large scale systems
(e.g the Space Shuttle), several aspects must be considered, including persons exposed
(operators and third parties), type, frequency and duration of exposure, human fac-
tors (man /machine interactions, ergonomic effects, etc.), and reliability of safety
functions.
Reliability assessment techniques can be either qualitative or quantitative [254].
Their differences mostly concentrate on how the effects of a failure are modeled. Qual-
itative approaches employ Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) and failure modeling
is performed by:
• Failure Mode and Effect/Criticality Analysis (FMEA/FMECA)
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
• Event Trees
• Cause-Consequence Diagrams
For FMEA, the system of study must be defined along with its main functions and
components. Moreover, the functional limitations of the system and its components
should be specified as well. Given that threats that cause malfunctions and failures
originate from the environment, information must be provided regarding operation of
the system, its components and the environment.
Quantitative methods are utilizing more advances modeling techniques for fault
and failure analysis. Common techniques are:
• Fault trees (dynamic/static)
• Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs)
• Markov chains
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• Stochastic Petri nets
• Standard/custom simulation environments
The option for a custom simulation environments refers to failure modeling through
dynamic simulation models (in Simulink, C++, Java, etc.). While not the most af-
fordable option, the latter allows for more accurate prediction for failure and damage
propagation throughout a system, through physics-based modeling and simulation.
There are two possible ways for investigating the solution space, either form combi-
nations of environmental conditions and mission requirements to obtain discrete sets
of solutions, or perform a Monte Carlo simulation with random combinations.
3.1.2 Evaluation of methods
Starting from the hazard identification, fault and failure propagation analysis tech-
niques, there are certain issues on their effectiveness that can be observed. Fault
trees are top-level oriented. They focus on the ”big picture” of the system, by often
neglecting detailed subsystem and component associations, or assuming that these
do not considerably affect the main failure effects. While fault tree techniques are
adequate for less complicated systems, in the case of more complex or distributed
large scale systems, they fail to capture possible emerging effects.
Observation 3.1: Fault tree techniques are capturing fault propagation, based on
high level system information. They may not be as effective for more complex large
systems, with extended low level connectivity and functional complexity.
Part of this inability, is the fact that they require explicitly prescribed scenarios
as inputs, in order to predict how faults propagate. This approach offers no space for
emerging behavior prediction. Last, the implied binary logic of two failure modes,
either success or failure, does not allow for capturing the intermediate states that
the overall system may find itself in. It also does not allow for accurately modeling
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the actual contribution of a subsystem, in case it is characterized by more than two
states, or a continuous spectrum for its operating modes.
Observation 3.2: Fault trees and reliability block diagrams heavily rely on initial
fault scenarios and often lack flexibility in capturing transient and emerging effects,
as they are binary in nature.
Fault trees, and reliability block diagrams are often ineffective when it comes to
modeling dynamic complex system behavior, especially regarding reconfigurability,
adaptability and maintainability effects. Static and linear causality logic is possible
to be implemented, and for better fidelity in reconfigurability and logistics, Markov
Chains and Petri Nets are better selections for fault and failure propagation analysis.
Observation 3.3: Fault tree techniques are often incompatible to models of complex
system behavior, thus failure propagation prediction is static and does no take into
account reconfigurability and maintainability effects.
Returning to the safety and risk assessment techniques, Figure 63 presents a qual-
itative evaluation of the SoA approaches that have been retrieved from the literature.
The reasoning behind the selected criteria for method evaluation can be found in
Appendix B, as in for the design method evaluation, that was included in Chapter
2. Regarding the basic features, most methods rely on comprehensive sets of metrics
(e.g. SAIDI, SAIFI metrics on power plant reliability assessment), which are evalu-
ated based on data collected after the system’s response to a range of certain threat
types and magnitudes. Given that most methods are standard in the industry or
application of interest, it is safe to accept that they have been successfully verified
and validated
It has been observed however, that the effectiveness of assessment methods does
rely on how threats and disruptions are modeled. Standardized engineering assess-


































Figure 63: Evaluation of safety assessment techniques
On the other hand, disruption modeling is still scenario-based, not always allowing for
accurate capturing of secondary, or emerging disruption effects. The latter feature,
is dependent on the modeling approach and the fidelity of the simulation. As most
methods are probabilistic, behavior variability is a result of the combinations number
for the initial disruptions, rather than the different scenarios that will appear as a
result of different emerging behaviors, for the same initial disruptions.
Observation 3.2.1: To avoid reliance on initial fault scenarios, more accurate,
physics-based dynamic system models are necessary, in order to capture intermediate
subsystem states and emerging behaviors.
In terms of method applicability, most methods possess an increased readiness
level, which makes them effective for most of today’s engineering applications. As
many of them are based on government and industry standards, documentation, ac-
cess and support are at a satisfying level, with the exception of methods that refer
to proprietary systems, or revolutionary approaches in the industry. However, cost of
application, either in the form of cost of testing, or time required to perform the as-
sessments, there are no techniques without compromise in modeling fidelity or quality
of the results.
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Observation 3.2.2: The cost of more accurate, physics-based dynamic system mod-
els is higher than simple, static modeling approaches, thus there is a compromise
between computational fidelity and method accuracy.
3.2 Survivability assessment methods
Assessment techniques for survivability-based design, are focused on survivability
estimations, based on partial evaluations of system susceptibility and vulnerability.
This section will present the most prominent survivability assessment techniques,
used in military aircraft acquisition, as well for naval systems. As in safety and
reliability assessment, survivability assessment techniques rely on scenarios, which
incorporate the effects of threats during mission, or common sources of disruption
and malfunction.
3.2.1 Methods survey
It has been argued that system survivability is an important requirement in military
systems. Thus, most methods are based on military aerospace and naval system ap-
plications. A list of the considered assessment techniques is presented in Figure 64.
Some of these methods are highly integrated and tailored to survivability-based de-
sign techniques, which are also specific to certain applications. However, this aspect
does not reduce their value, given that some underlying principles are system and
application independent. Certain limitations apply in the modeling approach for sce-
nario execution, as well as in the availability of model or configuration information,
especially when military systems are involved. Last, other techniques (e.g. MO-
TISS by Alion Technologies [8]) have been developed as stand-alone computational
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Figure 64: Origin and application of survivability assessment techniques
3.2.1.1 Ball’s assessment technique
Dr. Ball’s technique has been an integral part of his survivability-based design
method, with application on fighter aircraft [16]. It is a close representation of the
methodology that has been adopted by the industry. Aircraft survivability can be
assessed at the campaign level, with multiple aircraft sorties, or at the system level
with a single vehicle at various environmental conditions and mission expectations.
The technique requires the mission profile and a threat encounter analysis to be
initiated. A typical combat mission profile consists of phases, such as loiter, target
search and acquisition, and weapon delivery during encounter between take-off and
landing. Regarding threat characterization, a threat is described by its attributes
(intent, direction, magnitude, etc.) and the operating conditions. A threat can
demonstrate its malicious intent by deploying multiple damage mechanisms, as part
of a system kill attempt, either operationally or physically. Operations around the
threat, involves the series of functions that are executed for target kill. That is,
searching for the target (search-detect-track) and attempting to kill by navigating
the weapon(launch-fire-navigate), or just propagating the threat to increase system
damage.





















Figure 65: Elements of aircraft response to a threat [16]
decomposition is necessary. The system’s essential functions must be identified, either
for executing its mission or its basic operations. Fighter aircraft, must be capable of
locating and engaging their targets, as part of their main mission, while maintaining
their essential operating functions, which include the ability to provide controlled
flight, maintain structural integrity, generate lift and overcome drag.
The next step is perform failure mode and fault propagation analysis. The fo-
cus is brought on analyzing how the system reacts and further behaves under the
experience of a threat. As a means to investigate aircraft vulnerability, damage prop-
agation modeling will indicate the kill modes for the identification of the damage
states, through which the system may undergo. For the fighter aircraft example [16],
vulnerability investigation requires particular measures for damage mode analysis,
and these are presented in Figure 65.
Simulation results, which were produced according to the formulated mission and
threat scenarios, are the basis for terminal effects and kill mode identification. Ter-
minal effects represent the damage state of aircraft components that are subjected to
damage processes, due to threat elements. Ultimately, after several terminal effects,
the aircraft may experience a mission kill or even a system kill. A kill mode is defined
as the component or system response that results in a component or system kill and
possibly an aircraft kill caused by loss of an essential function. In other words, the
kill of some critical components, such as the pilot or an engine, might result in a quick
134
attrition kill of the aircraft, namely system kill. The loss of other critical components,
such as a navigation computer or weapon sensor, can result in a mission abort kill, or
mission kill, because the pilot decides to return to base before achieving the mission
objectives. A list of components that are subject to terminal effects and can result
to kill modes is shown in 66.
With the mission and threat analysis tasks leading to kill mode identification,
the subsequent steps command for the quantitative susceptibility and vulnerability
analysis. With a clear picture of the threat environment, susceptibility risk depends
upon factors, such as radar wavelength (gain pattern for the radar antenna, S/N ratio
for target detection) and radar cross section (RCS) (IR signature). Being aware of
the kill type, either a mission (mission abort) kill or system (quick attrition) kill, the
critical components (CC) and their kill modes are identified.
Susceptibility PH is estimated through simulation, while component vulnerabilities
can be calculated, through fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure mode and effects
analysis (FMEA) techniques, as in safety assessment techniques. For a component i,
vulnerability Pi(k|h) is defined
Pi(k|h) = Av/Ap (8)
where Av is the vulnerable area of the component, and Ap is the component presented
area. As the same calculation is executed for each critical component at several
vulnerable areas of the aircraft, it is possible to draw a planar map of the aircraft,
that can denotes the impact of a hit at a certain area and is used to reveal the areas
of high vulnerability. To obtain such diagram, a Monte Carlo type of experiment is
necessary. An example of a hit plot is shown in Figure 67
Vulnerability estimations are represented within the weapon envelope, depending
on aircraft location (altitude and distance from the launch pad), as well as speed. For




























•Loss of control power
•Damage to control surfaces








Figure 66: List of terminal effects (component kill modes) [16]
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Figure 67: Hit plot for aircraft vulnerability assessment [16]














Figure 69: The Kill Chain [16]
For the case that the threat manifests itself through detonation of a warhead,
estimation of vulnerability could be based on the use of a kill function PK|F . The kill
function is the probability density function (PDF) of the extension of the lethal area
that is formed around the warhead, due to the impact of its detonation. When vulner-
abilities are estimated for all critical components of the vehicle, the total vulnerable




and the total vulnerability for the vehicle/system is given by:
P (K|H) = AV /AP (10)
where AV is the vulnerable area of all components, AP is the aircraft presented area.
For total survivability assessment, a single (or multiple) full scale mission sce-
nario must be constructed and be broken down into mission segments. Each mission
segment can be represented by a sequence of events, essentially describing a one-to-
one scenario of an encounter between the system and the threat. To represent this
sequence, a ”kill chain” graph is used [16], as shown in Figure 69.
There is an unlimited range of possible formulations of the survivability equa-
tion. A step-by-step description of an event sequence is necessary for updating the
survivability equation. With the kill chain, one can identify the key probability met-
rics (mostly conditional probabilities) and reformulate the survivability equation as
follows
PS = 1− (PH · PA · PD/A · PL/D · PI/L · PH/I · PK/H) (11)
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Mission
• Combat Loss Rate (CLR)





• Attack by contact
• Attack by warhead fusing
Figure 70: Engagement levels for total survivability assessment [16]
A kill chain based scenario can be thoroughly developed through a tree diagram and
applied in all four engagement levels, component, system, mission or campaign level.
It forms the basis of survivability assessment and the required probability calculations.
An example of what calculations are performed at each level is shown in Figure 70.
3.2.1.2 SURVICE Survivability Assessment
The SURVICE company has suggested a survivability assessment method for Un-
manned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) [228]. While this method appears not be much dif-
ferent than the proposed approach by Ball, it does demonstrate how Ball’s theoretical
framework has been applied on a practical application. SURVICE breaks down sur-
vivability into four contributing factors, namely battlefield tactics, policy, mission
planning and usage of weapons.
A mission scenario must be formulated and a kill chain representation describes

















Figure 71: SURVICE survivability breakdown [228]
a UAV case, the kill chain contains the following sequence of events: Engagement-
Acquisition-Track-Launch-Intercept-Fuzing-Hit-Kill. Probability of survival is calcu-
lated as in Ball’s method. Finally, recommendations are given for enhancing surviv-
ability, either through susceptibility or vulnerability, as outlined in Figure 71.
3.2.1.3 Total Ship Survivability Assessment (TSSA)
The Total Ship Survivability Assessment (TSSA) method has been supported by
NAVSEA for the Joint Command and Control Ship (JCC(X)), by building upon
previous successful survivability systems engineering efforts. The TSSA emerged as
part of the survivability requirements development, their impact on life-cycle cost,
the concept of operations, and mission package [266]. It brings focus in quantify-
ing operational effectiveness and provides realistic trade-offs by assessing cost and
effectiveness impacts. It also recommends features for balancing survivability and
effectiveness per unit cost. The process concentrates on platform level engagement
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Figure 72: Total Ship Survivability Assessment Method (TSSA) [266]
analysis, thus excluding campaign and mission level assessments, and is represented
in Figure 72.
To initiate survivability trade-offs for this study, one must identify possible combi-
nations of threat weapons, accidents and associated operational situations. For each
scenario, an event-based kill chain can be defined. The total probability of survival
is estimated according to event-specific probabilities for a certain outcome to occur.
For the JCC(X), a kill chain example is shown in Figure 73.
Based on Figure 73, the probability of mission survival is:
P (MissionLoss) = 1− Ps · Pa|s · [1−
∑
(Pth|a · Prs|th · (1− Pmk|th) · Prm|sh)] (12)
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Figure 73: Kill chain for JCC(X) survivability assessment [266]
and for the system survival
P (ShipLoss) = 1− Ps · Pa|s · [1−
∑
(Pth|a · (1− Psk|sh) · Prs|sh)] (13)
In the next step, two alternative design configurations are tested and assessed for
survivability, one being the baseline configuration and the other an enhanced design
for reduced susceptibility and vulnerability. For reduced susceptibility, situational
awareness (SA) is enhanced with advanced threat detection technologies, as well
as signature reduction strategies. Thus, probability of detection and engagement
probability are reduced with the expected number of hits. For vulnerability reduction,
strategies, such as hardening, separation and redundancy, reduces the likelihood of
ship or mission loss, both given a certain number of hits. Last, overall recoverability
consists of probability of ship recovery, given a number of hits, and the probability of
mission recovery given the same number of hits. It reflects the ability to withstand
secondary damage such as fire, smoke, and progressive flooding, or even more active





Based on notional results by the TSSA method [Yarbrough, Kupferer, 2001]
Figure 74: TSSA comparative results for different design configurations [266]
and restore mission capability. A representative way of summarizing and presenting
the comparative results is illustrated in Figure 74.
Figure 75 displays the Pareto frontier on the cost-effectiveness relationship for ship
survivability against procurement cost. To ensure that all designs are evaluated on an
equal basis, survivability metrics were developed from the system analysis (SPs), then
MOPs were combined to MOEs and plotted on a scatter plot for a large number of
possible scenarios. The plot forms a Pareto curve, indicating the compromise between
cost and survivability-based effectiveness.
In the final step, a decision must be made on what design configuration represents
the optimal compromise among all other configurations. A histogram of total surviv-
ability along with the relative contributions is adequate in most cases for providing
with an answer to this problem. The histogram in Figure 76, indicates for instance
that concept C minimizes ship loss through some combination of susceptibility reduc-
tion, vulnerability reduction, and recoverability enhancement.
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Based on notional results by the TSSA method [Yarbrough, Kupferer, 2001]
Figure 75: Cost-effectiveness Pareto frontier in TSSA [266]
Figure 76: Histogram for optimal solution identification in TSSA [266]
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Figure 77: Ship survivability assessment for Ro-Ro class (IMO) [27]
3.2.1.4 Ship survivability assessment by IMO
The International Maritime Organization has recommended complete methods for
conducting survivability assessment of Ro-Ro (ferry) passenger and merchant ships.
The procedure is based on assessing the damage stability component of the vulner-
ability. In other words, it makes possible the assessment of damage cases, where
multiple hits of nonadjacent compartments can occur. The assessment method is
shown below in Figure 77.
Through the survivability assessment method, damage stability of the vessel be-
comes a substantial component of the design and allows for survivability to be a design
attribute and not just a requirement or constraint. The integration with IMO’s total
ship design methodology approach shown in Figure 78.
3.2.1.5 Measure of Total Integrated System Survivability (MOTISS) by Alion
MOTISS is a system survivability evaluation tool, developed by Alion Technologies
[8]. It integrates weapon effects and recovery analysis to assist in survivability-based
design evaluation, requirements assessment, and resource allocation [8]. MOTISS
also enables root-cause of failure determination, structural and network system eval-
uations, survivability design and option comparisons, vulnerability and recoverability
evaluations, threat damage analysis (progressive fire, flooding, ballistic, jet, fragment
and blast damage).
MOTISS is both an engineering process and a software application. As a process, it
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Figure 78: Ship survivability-based design according to SOLAS criteria for Ro-Ro
class (IMO) [27]
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Figure 79: Alion’s System Survivability design Process (MOTISS) [8]
can perform probabilistic survivability assessments for a system running on a mission
with a one or more threats. It makes use of first principle physics, coupled with
empirical data and tests to provide a rapid first order solution, considering multiple
scenarios with varying threat and system parameters. An overview of the application
is illustrated in Figure 79.
Another feature of MOTISS is that one can investigate and compare the effective-
ness of two or more separate survivability enhancement design options, and determine
which provides the best value for minimum cost. Furthermore, with MOTISS, the
design can be parametrically altered, to find which design changes which have min-
imal cost or no cost, but enhance the ship’s total survivability, and thus enhancing
system effectiveness [8].
3.2.2 Evaluation of methods
In order to identify research opportunities and how SoA survivability assessment



































Figure 80: Evaluation of survivability assessment techniques
this section presents findings from the evaluation of the previously presented SoA
techniques. The comparative qualitative evaluation results are shown in Figure 80.
Regarding method fundamental attributes, most techniques are at the same capability
level.
Given the fact that survivability definitions in engineering are very firm and trans-
parent, it should come as no surprise that assessment techniques utilize metrics and
calculations that are fairly standard. As the majority of methods are probabilistic,
probability estimations rely on event sequences, in the form of the kill chain, for in-
stance. Disruption modeling is based on scenarios with prescribed incidents, as in
safety assessment. Dynamic transients and emerging effects cannot be captured, un-
less such capability is supported through a more advanced modeling and simulation
environment. Verification and validation for these techniques has become possible,
through testing in real world application. There is no global V&V guarantee however,
since the techniques have been developed and tested in certain engineering applica-
tion.
Observation 3.4: Survivability assessment techniques in engineering, rely on a quite
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standard set of probabilistic metrics and calculations. Disruption modeling is pre-
scribed through fixed scenarios. Techniques are developed and tested for particular
applications, yet the latter should not prevent a technique to be upgraded for use in
more engineering applications.
With risk and uncertainty recognized as prime factors of system survivability, as-
sessment methods are probabilistic in nature. As part of monitoring fault and damage
propagation, military survivability assessment is based on kill mode identification. Ei-
ther historical information is required, or the use of physics-based simulations. The
fidelity and capability of the simulation, as well as the detail at which the architec-
ture topology has been captured, is critical for the ability of discovering transient and
emerging behaviors. Most techniques though, employ basic kill mode identification
enablers, resulting from fixed initial fault conditions, and assuming that disruptions
are only binary.
Observation 3.5: Survivability assessment methods are probabilistic, and are based
on fault scenarios. Transient and emerging (often unexpected), non-binary states
are only captured with more advanced, dynamic physics-based models for kill mode
identification.
Closing the evaluation with applicability of the assessment techniques, it appears
that most of them are at a very satisfactory maturity level, given that they have
been developed, tested and used by military authorities and the industry for several
years. Cost of application is average for all three types of methods, however, execu-
tion may become more expensive, if advanced modeling and simulation approaches
are commanded, as well as when they are applied on non-conventional concepts,
with increased design uncertainty. Access and support depends on the engineering
application, and the distribution rights by the releasing authorities. The MOTISS
software package for instance, is a complete suite for survivability assessment, but it
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is a tool that not all interested parties would have full access to, either due to cost or
application restrictions.
Observation 3.6: Survivability assessment techniques are at a satisfying maturity
level, and quite affordable, depending on the particular engineering application. The
latter also determines access to the technique and general support towards it.
3.3 Resilience assessment methods
It has been argued that resilience engineering is still at its infancy stages, with re-
searchers currently proposing scientific ideas, metrics and techniques for system re-
silience assessment. The majority of these efforts, have been leveraging similarities
between the concept of resilience with system survivability, or system robustness,
and often are augmentations of traditional survivability and quality assessment pro-
cedures.
3.3.1 Methods survey
Resilience engineering has been famously introduced to address ecological system
stability. It is becoming relevant to other fields of science, such as economics and
business, industrial systems and large scale organizations. At the same time, several
traditional engineering disciplines are embracing the concept, with applications in
materials, structures, infrastructures, architectures and other complex engineering
systems. Resilience also applies on networks, such as supply chains, air transportation
systems, and larger scale socio-ecological systems. Last, human behaviors and social
interactions are addressed under the prism of psychological resilience.
Following the pattern of earlier SoA surveys on safety and survivability assessment
techniques, a similar routine has been put in practice for discovery and identification
of resilience assessment techniques. The investigation has returned a number of ap-
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Figure 81: Origin and application of resilience assessment techniques
• Systems engineering
• Materials science
• Civil engineering and infrastructures
• Network systems
Figure 81 presents the selected, most prominent resilience assessment techniques, as
they are mapped against the applications, or the engineering domain, based on which
each technique has been demonstrated or developed.
Defining and assessing resilience in systems engineering, is the best proof regarding
the recent scientific efforts for unifying resilience engineering in a framework that is
suitable for all engineering applications. A serious step towards this direction has
been taken by Madni and Jackson [146], who have redefined resilience, suggested
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Figure 82: Resilience assessment framework by Madni and Jackson [146]
3.3.1.1 Resilience assessment framework by Madni and Jackson
Madni and Jackson describes resilience engineering as a discipline that is concerned
with monitoring organizational decision making with explicit identification and mon-
itoring of risks. According to their suggestions, a framework for resilience engineering
is based on four key pillars: disruptions, system attributes, methods, and metrics,
with Figure 82 presenting a concept breakdown of this framework.
Disruptions are characterized and classified as natural or man-made, external or
systemic, single agent or multi-agent, and short-lived or enduring. The data of this
classification should be stored and accessed through a reference database
System Attributes are the properties or characteristics of the system including
organizational infrastructure, system functionality, system complexity, system per-
formance and system breakdown structure. A disruption can impact one or more of
these characteristics.
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Methods of the framework contain a suite of traditional probabilistic risk assess-
ments, operations-cost tradeoffs, integrative/holistic methods, history-derived heuris-
tic database and proactive risk management. A key element to implement resilience
is the effective production/safety tradeoffs. These will indicate the necessary com-
promise in production efficiency goals, in order to stay within the safe performance
envelope. Having in mind that goals and environmental conditions constantly change,
methods must be receiving feedback on the side effects of changes and organizational
decisions on program and system risks.
Metrics are intended for monitoring risks arising from potential changes to daily
practices and alerting about possible conflicts between operations and safety. As part
of the prognostic nature of resilience, appropriate system models are required, that by
using the necessary metrics, one could explain how emerging mishaps and accidents
can happen, instead of solely relying on history-based predictions through cause-effect
chains. Resilience metrics also contribute in demonstrating the validity and usefulness
of each resilience attribute. For the reference, as part of their conceptual framework
for system resilience, Madni and Jackson [146] have proposed the following generic
types of metrics:
• Time & cost to restore operation.
• Time & cost to restore configuration.
• Time & cost to restore functionality and performance.
• Degree to which pre-disruption state has been restored.
• Potential disruptions avoided.
• Adaptability within time and cost constraints.
Hollnagel [111] also proposed a similar template. Time scale is a significant factor
either for the disruption or its impact on system recovery. Buffering Capacity is a
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general estimate for system robustness, namely its ability to withstand the change
it is experiencing. Self-restructuring capability is related to the ability to recover
from the occurred change. The last of four components is the system or subsystem
adaptation as an aggregate estimate of the system’s total response to the disruption.
3.3.1.2 Survivability assessment framework by SEARi(MIT)
Richards et al. at MIT’s Systems Engineering Advancement Research Initiative
(SEARi) have suggested metrics for survivability assessment of aerospace/mechanical
systems, yet this approach was partially inspired by resilience engineering principles
and the demonstrating application involved satellites and other space vehicles. The
main objective is to incorporate survivability-based design into a generalized systems
engineering approach for the design and acquisition of resilient and mission effective
systems.
SEARi [155] has asserted that ”non-traditional design criteria such as flexibility,
robustness, survivability and others (referred to as the ”ilities”) are increasingly rec-
ognized as critical system properties for the success of aerospace programs”. Such
criteria are not always well-defined nor easily evaluated in isolation. In response to
the need for a holistic framework with these non-traditional system design properties,
McManus et al. have proposed a framework [155] that can be used to systematically
incorporate ”-ilities” into conceptual design and tradespace studies. The framework
is based on a design space definition that allows for describing ilities in terms of
changes in three dimensions. These consist of changes in the context (environmen-
tal condition), changes in the needs (stakeholder requirements) and changes in the
system itself (physical system form).
The ”-ilities” are the medium, through which dynamical system change is propa-
gated in the 3-D design space. This results in a dynamic design space, unlike the 2-D
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Figure 84: Dynamic system degradation and recovery
exploration study. Aside from the 3-D tradespace exploration, the discrete nature of
the mission events that a system is experiencing, will have to be translated to con-
tinuous representation of dynamical changes. The Epoch/era Analysis links multiple
discrete tradespace studies with time [155], with an example case study shown in
Figure 83.
For initiating the epoch analysis, which would allow for the tradespace exploration,
certain measures are necessary, regarding the system’s dynamic performance response.
Having defined the system’s essential functions that represent value delivery and
mission effectiveness, the system’s dynamic behavior is typically described as in Figure
84. With an epoch defined as a time period with a fixed content, implying static
constraints, design concepts, available technologies and attributes [198], the epoch
analysis would return a chart of a standard format on the system’s response under
certain disruptions or performance degradations [190].
With the information of Figure 84 as the source, survivability estimations are
guided by two major system objectives. First, utility loss must be minimized, while
it must be also ensured that critical utility thresholds are met. Two metrics have
been proposed metrics for total survivability assessment and these are:
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• Time-weighted average performance degradation ŪL and is the difference be-
tween initial utility value U0 and the time weighted average utility ŪT that is











where TAT is the average time above threshold and is the percentage of time





3.3.1.3 Resilience assessment for materials
Compared to other engineering applications, the definition for materials resilience is
specific. Assuming a fully elastic body, the work done in deforming an elastic body
is stored up as elastic energy, which may be recovered as mechanical work when
the load is removed. This elastic energy is called the resilience of the material [29].
Other equivalent definitions describe material resilience as ”the ability of a material
to absorb energy when deformed elastically and to return it when unloaded” [161] or
the ”extent to which energy may be stored in by elastic deformation”.
If the stress on the body does not exceed the elastic limit, practically all the work
which is put into it is recovered. If it goes beyond the elastic limit, part of the work
is lost. The work expanded in deforming a unit volume of the material to the elastic
limit, is called the modulus of resilience of the material. The latter is the elastic
potential energy per unit volume, when the material is stressed to the elastic limit.
It is a measure of the amount of energy which may be stored in a given material and
recovered as mechanical work without loss. If a cubic inch of material is subjected
to unit stress σ, the deformation is σ/E and the average force is σ/2, when the total
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work is expressed as
Up = (σ/E) · (σ/2) = (σ2)/2E (17)
Equation 17 holds when σ is below the elastic limit. When σ is the unit stress at




As an illustrating example, consider a rod that is elongated, with x represent the
total elongation in the rod of length l and unit cross section, and with dx representing
an infinitesimal increment. When the elongation is x the unit elongation is x/l and
the unit stress is E · x/l. For the infinitesimal elongation dx, the unit work done on
the rod is
dW = (E · x/l) · dx (19)




(Ex/l) · dx = (E/2l) · (x22 − x21) (20)
Substituting for x1 and x2 Equation 21 becomes:
W = ((σ22 − σ21)/(2 · E)) · V olume (21)
From a graphical standpoint, material resilience (or the modulus of resilience), is
the area under the stress-strain curve up to the yield stress, as shown in Figure 85.
As explained earlier, it is the strain energy per unit volume required to stress the
material from zero stress to the yield stress [160].
On a more practical issue, material resilience can be assessed and compared for
a wide variety of materials and is generally measured using a uniaxial stress. Re-
silience can vary depending on the direction of stress for anisotropic materials, thus
for isotropic materials, properties are not affected by direction in these materials.












Figure 85: Graphical representation of material resilience [160]
methods are the only way to quantify resilience by computing the area underneath
the stress-strain curve.
3.3.1.4 Resilience assessment for infrastructure and economic systems [251]
Resilience of infrastructures and socioeconomic systems has been emerging as one
of the leading applications within the resilience engineering community. Vugrin et
al. have suggested a framework for assessing resilience of a city infrastructure against
disruptive events, such as flooding or earthquakes. The proposed resilience assessment
framework consists of three core elements:
1. Definition of system resilience
2. Resilience cost measurement methodology (cost impact of system behavior to
resilience).


























Figure 86: The three system capacities that affect resilience [251]
As part of the suggested definition of resilience, Vugrin et al. have been in-
vestigating the factors affecting resilience, which lead to a set of intrinsic resilience
characteristics. These are expressed through the resilience capacities, which are the
following:
• Absorptive capacity is the degree to which a system can automatically absorb the
impacts of system perturbations and minimize consequences with little effort.
It is an endogenous system feature and possible enhancements include system
robustness (strength of individual internal system connections), and component
redundancy(alternative system operation pathways).
• Adaptive capacity is the degree to which the system is capable of self-organization
for recovery of system performance levels. It represents actions taken over time
in response to the disruption, reflecting the dynamic ability of the system to
change endogenously throughout the recovery period. Reconfigurability as the
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extent to which the system possesses all necessary mechanisms and internal
processes to change itself is both a characteristic and enhancement feature that
is expected to improve adaptive capacity.
• Restorative capacity is the ability of a system to be repaired easily, with these
repairs to be dynamic and performed by exogenous entities to the system. The
goal is to allow the system to return close to its original structure. Ease of repair,
either by design, or by the presence of a maintenance and support network is
one possible way of enhancing restorative capacity. Other enhancements could
include automation technologies to enhance restorative capacity, yet technology
immaturity may impede the effectiveness of this approach.
The three system capacities as main contributions to system resilience, with associ-
ated enhancement features are shown in Figure 86.
Targeted system performance is a quantifiable measure of how the system perfor-
mance should vary during and after disruptive events. For quantification of system
resilience, the concept of resilience cost is introduced. Given that recovery is an in-
herent component of system resilience, Vugrin et. al suggest that recovery is a critical
aspect of resilience that needs to be explicitly considered in measurements. Thus, re-
silience cost is linked to the expense of performing all necessary recovery efforts. The
basis for this metric is founded on the premise that a system that moves quickly to
the targeted system performance, but at a high total recovery effort, which may not
be preferable to a slower, but less costly recovery. For the measurement of system
resilience costs, the following factors are taken into account:
• Systemic impact, based on deviation from the targeted system performance
levels.
• Total recovery effort, based on the duration of recovery.
161
• Recovery effort, based on costs and efforts required to change the system struc-
ture for targeted system performance level recovery.
It must be noted that taking just one factor into account, may not be adequate
for full system recovery evaluation. While this still constitutes a partial assessment,
it does not provide a transparent means for evaluating alternative recovery strategies,
with different cost and required time, even with the same outcome regarding targeted
performance. Figure 87 illustrates this point, with two systems that experience iden-
tical disruptions at precisely the same time. Both systems experience same decreases
in system output, and both systems return to pre-disruption levels at precisely the
same time. By only considering systemic impact, these two systems have identical
resilience values, if resilience is the marked area that is bounded by the ideal and real
performance degradation curves. If one also considers the recovery resources used for
the same amount of necessary recovery, it appears that significantly more resources
are expended for system 1 to return to original output levels. Thus, system 2 is con-
sidered to be more resilient because the recovery effort for identical system impacts
had been less than system 1.
Regarding the quantification approach for resilience assessment, two key com-
ponents of the resilience definition are taken into account, namely systemic impact
and total recovery effort. Systemic impact is measured by evaluating the difference
between a targeted system performance level and the actual system performance fol-




[TSP (t)− SP (t)]dt (22)
Graphically, SI is quantified by calculating the area between the targeted system
performance (TSP) and the actual system performance (SP) curves in Figure 88.
Total recovery effort is measured by analyzing the amount of resources expended
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Figure 87: Impact of recovery mechanisms in resilience [251]





On the graph of Figure 88 TRE is represented by the area under the recovery effort
(RE) curve. Higher level resilience calculations incorporate both of these quantities.
The next step is metric formulation to calculate system resilience costs by aggre-
gating SI and TRE. Based on the hypothesis that systemic does implicitly depend
on the selected recovery strategy, two resilience cost measurements were suggested:
Optimal resilience costs OR are the system resilience costs against a particular dis-
ruption d, with the optimal recovery strategy (minimum combination of systemic


















Figure 88: Visual representations of SP, TSP and TRE [251]
Recovery-dependent resilience costs RDR are the resilience costs of a system to a












that is equivalent to:
RDR(d,RE) =




Both OR and RDR costs are normalized linear combinations of SI and TRE.
Parameter α is a non-negative, non-dimensional weighting factor that allows assigning
weighting factors to express the relative importance of SI and TRE (default equal
weighting value is 1). It appears from Equations 25 and 27 that smaller RDR and
OR costs indicate increasing resilience. The nature of the metrics allows for a series
of tradeoff studies that one can perform. For instance, the following combinations of
systems, disruptions and recovery strategies can be constructed;
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• Resilience of different systems to the same disruption. The system that has
lower resilience costs will be the more resilient system.
• Resilience of the same system to different disruption types. The system is more
resilient to the disruption that results in smaller RDR and OR values.
• Resilience of the same system to the same disruption under different recovery
strategies. Each different recovery strategy will result in different SI and TRE
values. The recovery strategy that results in the smallest RDR values will
maximize resilience for the system.
To illustrate the assessment method, Vugrin at al. have proposed a notional
earthquake scenario. The objective of this resilience assessment was to provide a high-
order, qualitative evaluation of the resilience of 18 regional infrastructure systems to
an earthquake. An earthquake of magnitude 7.7 was assumed to occur, with several
major natural gas transmission pipelines being ruptured as the immediate outcome.
Additionally, cascading electric grid failure would likely occur, leading to a blackout
on the region within 30 minutes of the event. With the method is explained in
Figure 89, the evaluations were then gathered in a single resilience matrix, referring
to two functions: emergency services and postal and shipping services. The matrix
qualitatively describes with the letters H, M, or L (for high, medium, or low) the
degree at which the three capacities of the infrastructure have performed, for the two
critical functions.
3.3.1.5 Resilience assessment of organizations and infrastructures [54]
Except for complex systems, resilience also applies on other topological forms, such as
organizations and larger scale infrastructures. From another perspective, an organi-
zation is a system, or a network of systems. Furthermore, a network can be a system
or a network of organizations could be a large scale system. In the end, every system
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Step 1
• Identify system and subsystems
• Identify system boundaries
Step 2
• Identify system performance metrics
• Select the most relevant and fundamental metrics 
Step 3
• Assess or simulate the recovery path
• Identify initial system impact
• Identify system changes with progress in recovery
• Assess or simulate the recovery effort
Step 4 • Identification of the recovery path is necessary
Step 5
• Identify resilience enhancement features
• Assess resilience capacities
• Identify and assess other factors affecting system capacities
Figure 89: Resilience assessment method [251]
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Figure 90: System KPIs as a function of adaptive capacity [54]
has properties that effectively represent its resilience to disruptions and unexpected
factors.
With large scale systems organizations and networks, there is a great diversity
of components, sub-networks and human working groups, regarding their individual
local rules of operation and mission statement. To make an organization resilient,
metrics and evaluations must translate and adjust to the mission of local sub-system
entities within the organization.
Based on the organization’s mission statement, a series of key performance indi-
cators (KPIs) can be formulated, that are the measures by which the organization
can track its performance against its stated objectives. Dalziell eta al. argue that the
key performance indicators (KPIs) can be moved away from their desired levels will
be a function of the system vulnerability. Organizational resilience is being brought
by the adaptive capacity of the system, a function of which is the time it takes for
the system KPIs to recover. The overall resilience of the system will be a function
of the area under the curve, which is the total impact on KPIs over the response
and recovery period, as demonstrated in Figure 90. An example of a full resilience
assessment process for a disaster resilient community is given by Figure 91.
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Figure 91: Resilience assessment for a resilient system community [54]
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Quantification of resilience is an open subject for network-based applications in
engineering as well. Some recent efforts have addressed the issue of a resilience metrics
and assessment framework, Rosenkrantz et al., or Asha et al. to name a few. The
latter authors have introduced the concept of Structure-Based Resilience Metrics to
quantify the resilience of notes and edges in networks. On the application side,
Wang et al. [256] have formulated a problem based on the air transportation system.
Moreover, Kapur et al. have also looked at the resilience assessment problem, only
using a networked infrastructure example to measure community resilience after major
disasters [188].
3.3.1.6 Network resilience of the air transportation system
Wang et al. have proposed their own scheme, to make estimates of the network re-
silience of the air transportation system. It is a very large network that is highly
interrelated to other networks, of smaller scale and of local deployment. A signifi-
cant portion of the large network’s support, originates from logistic networks on the
ground, that guarantee flight safety, maintenance and other operating services. For
the air transportation system, Wang et al. consider two possible views of the network.
The macroscopic view includes the central warehouses or service centers connected
as logistic networks to provide the maintenance or service to several airports in the
network covered area. On the other hand, the microscopic view describes the area as
just an airport. Several maintenance or service groups are serving various airplanes
located on different parking aprons.
Wang et al have proposed a resilience evaluation approach, based on the redun-
dancy and distribution of supply resources for logistic networks. Also, the multitude
of supply and demand nodes is important, as well as the possible was through which
these agents interact with each other. Graph theory is used for mathematical repre-
sentations of network properties and metrics for resilience evaluation depend on these
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Figure 92: A bipartite undirected graph for network representation [256]
Figure 93: Combinations of demand supply nodes [256]
properties. A bipartite undirected graph for representing the network, is denoted as
G = {D,S,E}, where D is the set of demand nodes, S is the set of supply nodes
and E is the set of edges. Their corresponding number of members is n1, n2 and m
respectively. An example of such graph is shown in Figure 92.
The next step is to define the values for demand and supply. For the n1 demand
nodes, demand of node i is di and is the requirement rate at unit time. For the n2
supply nodes, available supply for node j is sj and is the supply capacity at unit time.
For the supply nodes j, reliability of supply is pj. For an edge k, the flow capacity of
the edge ck is defined, along with the reliability qk of the same edge. It is possible to
have a number of supply-demand node combinations. In the case of a single supplier
with a single delivery path, as shown in Figure 93-a, the resilience of the demand
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node is defined as:
ri =
pj · qj ·min(di, sj, ck)
di
(28)
In the case of multiple suppliers g, the resilience of the network is:
ri =
∑g
j=1 pj · qj ·min(di, sj, cj)
di
(29)
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ui · wi · ri (34)
3.3.1.7 Resilient networked infrastructures
Reed and Kapur [188] have introduced a resilience assessment framework, that is
applied on networked infrastructures. In fact, their application problem is the eleven-
system interdependent infrastructure, containing the following entities:
1. Electric power delivery (distribution, transmission, and generation).
2. Telecommunications (cable, cellular, Internet, landlines, and media).
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3. Transportation (air travel, roadways, fueling, mass transit, rail, water and port
facilities).
4. Utilities (water supply, sewage treatment, sanitation, oil delivery and natural
gas delivery).
5. Building support (HVAC, elevators, security and plumbing).
6. Business (computer systems, hotels, insurance, gaming, manufacturing, marine-
maritime, mines, restaurants and retail).
7. Emergency Services (911, ambulance, fire, police and shelters).
8. Financial systems (ATM, banks, credit cards and stock exchange).
9. Food supply(distribution, storage, preparation, and production).
10. Government(offices and services).
11. Health care(hospitals and public health).
Reed at al. have proposed a resilience measure that combines two associated
measures, system fragility and quality. As mentioned in earlier sections, fragility is a
concept pertinent to resilience and has been extensively used by structural engineers
to characterize the probability of damage given a level of hazard demand such as wind
velocity or ground acceleration. Fragility is a means of representing the strength of
a structure or a low rise building and a common way to represent this information is
through the fragility curves.
In the context of the networked infrastructure, fragility of a line is the percentage
of outages relative to the total number of customers residing within the boundaries of
the infrastructure. Keeping in mind that engineers would use the term ”inoperability”
rather than ”damage”, fragility f1 for a power line is defined by Equation 35.
f = P (inoperability|V 2) (35)
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where V is the appropriate wind speed parameter for the hurricane, while V 2 repre-
sents a dynamic wind pressure.
The earthquake engineering community is using another metric, the quality of an
infrastructure. It has been derived by the MCEER [212] group and is intended to
describe structural performance over time following earthquakes. Reed et al. have
extended quality to include other possible inoperabilities due to several threats for
disaster. Quality Q(t) is given by Equation 36:
Q(t) = Q∞ − (Q∞ −Q0)e−bt (36)
where Q∞ is the capacity of the fully functioning structural system, Q0 is the post-
event capacity, and b is a parameter derived empirically from restoration data follow-
ing the event. Parameter b is in other words a measure of the rapidity of the recovery.
Also, Q(t) = 1 means the system is fully operable and when 0 means inoperable.







and is visually represented by the area below the Q(t) curve on a Q-t plot. It has






To calculate the total resilience for the infrastructure, resilience measures must
be taken for all subsystems. Total system resilience is a function of the individual
subsystem resilience measures:
Rtotal = g(R1, R2, ..., Rn) (39)
with g being a function that reflects subsystem interdependence and connectivity.
According to this particular formulation, it must be noted that the system resilience
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Figure 94: Evaluation of resilience assessment techniques
3.3.2 Evaluation of methods
Given that the development of a resilience assessment method remains the fundamen-
tal objective for this research, it is critical to evaluate the SoA in resilience assessment,
and learn from these different approaches as well. The comparative qualitative eval-
uation results are shown in Figure 94. Starting from the fundamental characteristics,
a different trend is observed, compared to earlier safety and survivability assessment
techniques. Resilience assessment techniques are quantitative and utilize metrics and
evaluation procedures that are in accordance to the attributes of resilience, as every
technique is defining it.
Observation 3.7: Resilience assessment techniques are in principle quite similar to
safety or survivability assessment, in terms of evaluation metrics, disruption modeling
and scenario-based analysis. However, entities are suggesting their own application-
specific definitions and evaluation approaches.
However, only basic disruption scenarios are taken into account, with fixed fault
conditions, as in safety and survivability engineering tests.
Observation 3.7.1: Disruption modeling is currently done without much provision
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on capturing combined, emerging and unexpected behaviors. It strongly relies on
statistical information, or basic physics-based modeling and simulation.
With resilience being a very recent emerging engineering philosophy, most techniques
have not been entirely verified and validated for their outcome reliability and real
world relevance.
Observation 3.7.2: Due to the early stages of resilience engineering, resilience as-
sessment techniques are not fully verified and validated in most engineering applica-
tions, especially for long term system performance.
There is no doubt that operational risk and environmental uncertainty are prime
contributing factors to system resilience. While this has been acknowledged by the
literature discussions, probabilistic calculations and uncertainty modeling have not
been entirely integrated to the proposed techniques.
Observation 3.8: Despite the fact that uncertainty and risk have been addressed
within the resilience concept, they have not been entirely implemented in current
analysis techniques.
A key enabler in effectively addressing uncertainty, is the modeling and simu-
lation environment, which is used for system analysis. One of the foundations of
the resilience concept is the view of safety as a continuous and dynamic characteris-
tic, which is dependent on dynamic system behavior. Equivalently, uncertainty and
risk could be similarly observed. Under this premise, it is necessary to incorporate
dynamic, physics-based models for capturing expected and unexpected emerging be-
haviors, especially for large scale, highly interrelated complex system architectures.
Substantial, but minimal progress has been made towards this direction, not much
on the physics-based modeling, rather than on capturing the interconnectivity effects,
through network theory and graph modeling [256]
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Observation 3.8.1: To successfully address uncertainty and risk, system analysis
should be based on dynamic, physics-based models for capturing expected and un-
expected emerging behaviors, especially for large scale, highly interrelated complex
system architectures.
Following earlier observations, except for active developments in evaluation metric
formulations, other aspects of resilience assessment techniques lie on a low maturity
level. More time must be allowed for independent research efforts on different en-
gineering applications, for reaching a point, where more capable simulation environ-
ments become available, as well as more sophisticated disruption modeling techniques.
Observation 3.9: Most techniques reside on a low maturity level, and further devel-
opments are necessary for properly addressing shortcomings in capturing uncertainty
and the modeling approaches.
Cost of executing SoA techniques is fairly low, and is mainly driven by the analysis
technique of choice. It is expected to increase with more sophisticated simulation
tools, as well as disruption modeling techniques.
Observation 3.10: Cost of application is currently low and driven by the analysis
and modeling technique of choice.
Access on technique documentation is open, however, for application-oriented and
more dedicated implementation, it is expected that information may partially become
proprietary.
3.4 Technical challenges and research opportunities
At this point, the overview of SoA approaches in safety management techniques has
concluded. Chapter 2 brought focus on design methodologies, with safety, surviv-
ability or resilience as the main objectives. After this study, the objectives for
this research have been repositioned and redirected towards the development of a
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resilience assessment technique. Resilience assessment is a substantial enabler for
resilience-based design space exploration and optimization. Following the evolving
research focus, Chapter 3 has presented the literature search on resilience assessment
techniques, for system safety, survivability and resilience. The literature search has
revealed a diverse envelope of proposed approaches, extending to various scientific
and engineering domains, and covering several engineering applications.
3.4.1 Summary of technical challenges in safety management SoA
Starting from safety assessment techniques, most limitations relate to fault and failure
propagation modeling approaches, in conjunction to system functional and topological
complexity. These are:
• No leverage of detailed function and topology information for predicting fault
propagation.
• Static fault scenarios, formulated upon historical data does not allow for flexi-
bility in capturing transient and emerging effects, that may lead to prediction
of additional sources of fault and failure.
• Fault prediction assumes binary states, while it may be possible that there are
more than two intermediate states of system degradation.
• Physics-based modeling for fault propagation prediction offers more accurate
estimations, yet it is not always an affordable option, and a compromise between
cost and accuracy must be considered.
• Reconfigurability and maintainability effects are not captured by the fault pre-
diction modules.
In survivability assessment techniques, similar limitations have been identified.
However, except for the fault propagation prediction modeling and complexity effects,
additional ones are found:
177
• Except for fault propagation prediction, event development prediction (e.g. Kill
Chain-based techniques) adds another layer of difficulty, which must be ad-
dressed by dynamic modeling and simulation.
• Kill mode identification (or catastrophic failure for non-military systems) be-
comes more challenging with increasing system complexity.
• Life expectancy or the time the system survives before it reaches kill mode/catastrophic
failure, is a key survivability measure and dynamic simulations must accommo-
date for varying total operations duration.
• For complex networked systems, classic probabilistic calculations for survivabil-
ity are insufficient. Advanced probabilistic or stochastic techniques must be
investigated for capturing the increased complexity and dynamic transients.
• As in safety assessment, real time reconfigurability and maintainability must be
incorporated in simulation environments.
Last, observations on resilience assessment techniques have returned another list
of technical limitations that must be considered. As resilience assessment techniques
are in principle quite similar to safety or survivability assessment, earlier limitations
could still apply at this point. There is however an additional set of limitations, which
originate from the philosophy of system resilience itself. These limitations are listed
in following:
• Current resilience assessment techniques, are application specific.
• The identification of standard metrics, evaluation frameworks which do not rely
on applications and adequately address the resilience of dynamical complex
systems
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• Even the most complete assessment techniques of current, would still require
verification and validation for assuring the reliability of their estimations.
• Many technique proposals rely on non-probabilistic approaches, with risk and
uncertainty not entirely addressed.
• Accident and fault propagation modeling must capture systemic events.
• Resilience assessment must be affordable enough to allow for parametric design
and event space exploration.
• The technique must provide transparency in contributions to system resilience,
whether it is due to architecture design effects, reconfigurability, adaptability
and control architecture effects, maintainability or other.
For the purpose of method benchmarking, the literature investigation and tech-
nique evaluation has allowed for distinguishing a few of them. Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA) [220] is a good starting point, covering the basics in safety as-
sessment, through risk identification and assessment. The survivability assessment
technique by Dr. Ball, has been benchmarked for survivability assessment, and of-
fers great insight for event formulation, experiments and probabilistic calculations
for susceptibility and vulnerability, as well as how survivability is assessed and im-
proved. Last, out the very few current attempt towards system resilience assessment
techniques, the process by Vugrin et al. stands out, with an approach that is con-
sistent with their resilience definition, with a quantitative evaluation framework and
plenty of insight regarding the proposed directions, for improving and expanding the
technique.
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3.4.2 Research opportunities for the development of resilience assessment
techniques
As a result of summarizing earlier observations on all assessment techniques, this
section is discussing the corresponding research opportunities that are the key direc-
tions for the development of a resilience assessment method. These are organized in
threads, which are the following:
• Theoretical framework formulation
• System and fault modeling
• Methods for assessment
• Implications in resilience-based design.
• Applications
The first thread involves the theoretical foundations for resilience assessment. It
would refer to an ecosystem of fundamental definitions, necessary measurements,
evaluation metrics (either on performance or more related to resilience) as well as
statistical measures and correlations. Starting from definitions, these are the topics
that must be addressed:
• Definition of resilience in engineering.
• Attributes and characteristics of resilient systems.
• Dependence of system resilience from the application.
• Association of resilience to other safety management concepts (safety, security,
reliability, survivability).
• Association of resilience to robustness.
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Remaining in the resilience framework, there are several opportunities in the quanti-
tative aspect of the problem:
• Quantitative resilience estimations, either through physical metrics or objective
functions.
• Independent variables, factors of resilience, along with sensitivities of resilience
metrics to these factors.
• Quantification of constraints.
• Dynamic aspects of system resilience (transients, dynamic stability, time con-
stants, etc.).
As the literature survey indicated, most attempts to address all previous research
topics, have been specific to a focused application. Thus, metrics for system re-
silience have not been established to the point that can be applied as a standard for
most applications. The lack of a standard analytical, quantitative and application-
independent resilience assessment framework [146], has lead to an overarching research
opportunity for the development of a unified, global resilience assessment approach.
As part of this overarching initiative, several opportunities arise on the modeling
and simulation aspect of the resilience assessment problem. This thread however must
be consistent with the vision of resilience engineering, allowing for the investigation
of certain phenomena and resilience related behaviors, such as functional resonance,
reconfigurability, life expectancy, maintainability and dynamic stability. The basic
requirement, however, is the ability of the M&S environment to adequately predict
fault propagation, system failures and accidents, based on dynamical system behavior.
Historical data is expected to be inadequate, especially if revolutionary configurations
are investigated, or unexpected phenomena are sampled. In short, the modeling
aspect of resilience gives way to the following opportunities:
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• Physics-based modeling for large scale complex systems.
• Dynamic system response analysis to expected or unexpected (emerging threats).
• Fault propagation modeling and prediction, system failure prediction, based on
dynamic simulation results.
• Inclusion of reconfigurability and maintainability effects, for the implementation
of truly recoverable systems.
• Modeling fidelity balancing (breadth & depth), according to resilience analysis
requirements.
With the two first research threads on the theoretical aspect of resilience and
with the required modeling approaches, most of the research efforts are concentrated
on method development for assessing resilience. As part of formulating the building
blocks for a complete resilience assessment technique, the following research oppor-
tunities arise:
• Scenario formulation and selection.
• Experimentation plans.
• Link equations between simulation data to resilience estimations.
• Screening tests for statistical significance of scenario effects (faults, degrada-
tions, failures, etc.)
• Effects of architecture and design characteristics on system resilience.
• Correlations of scenario effects to resilience estimates.
• Visual representations of resilience assessment.
• Method verification & validation.
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• Cost of recovery and resilient response.
As the backbone for this dissertation, most of the upcoming research focus will be
based on these research directions. These will be formally addressed through series
of research questions, and the experimentation plan that is tailored for advancing the
knowledge along these lines.
Resilience assessment however, is not where this research path is limited. The
ultimate purpose of resilience assessment and evaluation techniques, is to support a
resilience-based design methodology. Thus, assessment techniques must seamlessly
integrate and be part of the larger design framework, and contribute towards design
space exploration for large number of system configurations and evaluations against
large number of scenarios for full uncertainty investigation. The upcoming research
opportunities in support of resilient design space exploration are:
• Requirements analysis for resilient dynamical systems.
• Objective function and constraint formulation.
• Optimization algorithms for the design of resilient system architectures.
• Technology effects for improving resilience.
• Automation and control strategies.
• Optimization for reconfigurability and maintenance strategies.
• Compatibility of resilient system design solutions.
• Addressing ”unexpected” uncertainty factors in the design process.
As stated in the introduction, before certain design oriented research tasks are reached,
development and validation of resilience assessment techniques must first take place,
in accordance to the scientific methods.
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Assessment and design space exploration techniques are envisioned to be appli-
cation and system independent. As this requirement would ensure the added value
of the technique, it is not possible to ensure that this will be the case for all engi-
neering application and all kinds of small/large scale dynamical systems. For the
purpose of developing the technique, as well as demonstrating it with an application
of an adequate scale, the appropriate baseline system configurations must be selected.
To remain consistent with the original problem formulation and taking into account
the modeling & simulation environment availability, the following options have been
considered:
• Power generation and distribution systems.
• Chilled water systems.
• Network architectures.
• Large scale power grids.
• Civil infrastructures.
These options are considered for the demonstration of the technique. A smaller scale
dynamical system configuration will be chosen as a canonical problem to assist in
developing the technique. The criteria for canonical problem selection concentrate on
scalability, transparency of transient and steady state behaviors, and overall simplic-
ity, customization and portability. Last, similarities in form and dynamic behavior of




RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION PLANNING
In this chapter, research directions are being established, based on the technical chal-
lenges that have been identified and discussed in the previous sections. Chapter 4
facilitates the transition from research need identification and background investiga-
tion, towards the experimentation plan setup, for supporting the proposed approach
in addressing the problem. In the following sections, the research questions along
with the suggested hypotheses are presented, as well as the complete dissertation
experimentation plan.
4.1 Formulation of the research questions
In accordance to the steps of the scientific method [151], the literature review has al-
lowed for the identification of the fundamental directions for this research. Except for
the research objectives in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, these directions are expressed through
a set of research questions. They address phenomena, effects, and relationships of
interest, which will guide the research contributions, for answering the research ques-
tions. Figure 95 describes the progression of the research objectives to the research
questions.
Research question RQ1 is addressing the need for a generalized framework for sys-
tem resilience assessment. The overarching goal is to provide and support a definition
of resilience in engineering. Although this may not be possible within this iteration, it
is expected for the proposed framework to be independent of the system application.
Thus RQ1 is expressed as:
Research Question RQ1: How are resilient systems in engineering defined and
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Figure 95: From objectives to research questions
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what are the observed characteristics of a resilient system?
By linking RQ1 to the identified research opportunities at the end of Chapter 3, the
intent is to investigate the built-in attributes and observed characteristics of resilient
systems, as well as their association to safety management concepts (safety, security,
reliability) and survivability, in particular. Clarification of similarities to system
robustness is also a consideration.
With the introduction of the definition, attributes and observed characteristics
for resilient dynamical systems, Research Question RQ2 leads the research efforts
towards the formulation of a process for assessing dynamical system resilience, under
the presence of uncertainty. It is expressed as follows:
Research Question RQ2: How are the resilience and effectiveness levels of a dy-
namical system affected, under the presence of operational uncertainty?
Besides being the basis for the development of the resilience assessment technique,
other relevant issues are addressed by RQ2, such as the necessary experiments, input
scenario formulation to capture operational uncertainty, screening tests for statistical
significance of scenario effects (faults, degradations, failures, etc.), as well as method
verification & validation.
Up to this point, RQ1 and RQ2 have been leading the development of a re-
silience assessment technique. The ultimate purpose of resilience assessment and
evaluation techniques, is to ultimately support a resilience-based design methodol-
ogy. Thus, assessment techniques must seamlessly integrate and be part of the larger
design framework, and contribute towards design space exploration for large number
of system configurations and evaluations against large number of scenarios for full
uncertainty investigation.
Research Question RQ3: How do architecture enhancements affect the resilience
and effectiveness levels for dynamical systems, under the presence of operational
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uncertainty?
RQ3 concentrates on investigating options for improving system resilience. Among
these options, resilience on certain levels of uncertainty may be improved with en-
hancing system reconfigurability, adaptability, or advanced architecture design ap-
proaches. The quantification of the impact for these solutions, is expected to support
design exploration, constraint quantification, and the development of optimization
algorithms for resilience as a design objective.
4.2 Hypothesis formulation and support
The research scope for this dissertation has been finalized under the three main re-
search questions that were presented in the previous section. However, this scope
is still quite large and volatile, in terms of possible approaches for addressing the
research question. According to the scientific method, the research hypotheses in-
troduce scientific evidence, and rigorous thinking, towards a suitable and adequate
solution to the stated research problem. The hypotheses could be based on a hierar-
chy of assumptions, assertions and more fundamental hypotheses, responding to an
equivalently hierarchical structure of research questions.
In terms of constructing a hypothesis, it could be formulated as a suggested expla-
nation on given observations, knowledge from literature search, or it could be based
on a working assumption that is bound to be tested, through proper experimentation.
Hypothesis formulation is critical task, which sets the ground for the experimentation
plan, as hypotheses must be testable, supportable and falsifiable [151]. Indeed, the fal-
sifiability conditions determine the tests that must be planned for hypothesis testing.
The following sections discuss the breakdown of the three main research questions,
to a hierarchy that will allow for an effective hypothesis formulation, touching most
of the different aspects of each research task. Corresponding to the main research
questions, three main tasks have been introduced:
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1. Theoretical framework for resilience assessment (RQ1).
2. Dynamical system resilience, under the presence of operational uncertainty
(RQ2).
3. Adaptability and robustness tradeoffs in resilient systems (RQ3).
4.2.1 Theoretical framework for resilience assessment (RQ1)
As stated earlier, the goal for this research thread is to formulate the essential elements
of the resilience framework. Besides a clear, universal and comprehensive definition
for resilient dynamical systems, it is necessary to investigate other aspects, such as
the attributes, and characteristics of resilience. Resilience characteristics, are the
features that could be observed through testing and experimentation, and serve as
a manifestation for the resilience levels of dynamical systems. Resilience attributes
refer to intrinsic system capabilities, which allow for a system to be resilient. The
attributes and characteristics are the basis for a framework, which will allow for
quantitative resilience estimations. The framework is the backbone of the resilience
assessment technique under development.
4.2.1.1 Observed characteristics of resilient systems
In order to better understand the characteristics of resilient system, a starting point
is the exploration of the system’s dynamic behavior and the discovery of certain
trends, such as recoverability, mission and health level restoration, life expectancy
and recoverability. RQ1.1 is setting this research direction and is expressed as:
Research Question RQ1.1: What are the observed characteristics of resilient sys-
tems?

































Figure 96: Typical restoration process after a single disturbance on a dynamical
system
behavior, that different resilience frameworks are based upon, for their response anal-
ysis. Dynamic responses that are linked to resilience, such as system health degrada-
tion, or others that are associated to mission objectives, such as system performance
ability, are some examples.
At this point, it is necessary to clarify the basic behavioral patterns of dynamical
systems, before proceeding. In Figure 96, a typical response curve of a dynamical
system’s mission performance is presented. The system’s response can be broken
down into three phases, or Epochs. In Epoch 1, the system maintains its original per-
formance state and health status, without experiencing any disruptions. At the end
of phase 1, an unexpected disturbance, forces the system to degrade its performance,
with possible adverse implications in its health. The system’s performance degrades,
yet it does reach a minimum point and then performance improves, as the system
is heading for recovery. In Epoch 3, the system either fully or partially restores its
mission performance ability.
As some of the literature work recommends, recoverability is a basic resilience
characteristic, that is manifested through a dynamical system’s response. There is
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however no standard method for quantitative estimates of a system’s ability to recover
after a given disturbance. Understanding that the impact of resilience-based design
solutions is a long term goal, RQ1.1.1 is introduced:
Research Question RQ1.1.1: How is it possible to quantify recoverability?
System recovery is a collective result of partial system efforts, towards restoring
its health status and its mission performance ability. In other words, for complete
recovery the system must:
• Recover performance
• Maintain/Restore mission performance ability
• Maintain/Restore system health (subsystem connectivity and integrity)
Based on the three recovery tasks, a set of corresponding quantitative estimations
is introduced. It is also assumed that dynamic system performance is available, similar
to that of Figure 96, and is representative of the system’s Mission Capability MC(t)
time history. The performance minimum point is:
MCmin = min(MC(t)) (40)
while the total degradation from the original performance point is:
∆MCdeg = MCmin −MC0 (41)
Based on the minimum performance point MCmin, one can solve for the time
point tMCmin , at which the minimum performance point occurs:
tMCmin = t(MCmin) (42)
which is the starting point for estimating the recovery time, until a steady state is
reached. The minimum time required ∆trp to reach a restoration steady state is the
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time elapsed from the performance minimum tMCmin up to tss recovery:
∆trp = tss − tMCmin (43)
where tss is the time point, when steady state has been reached. At tss, the system
has been restored at the value MCss, which is not necessarily the original value MCt0
= MC0. The restoration point offset from the original is:
∆MCrec = MCss −MC0 (44)
The total recovery time ∆trt is the total degradation time ∆tdeg plus total recovery
time ∆trp
∆trt = ∆tdeg + ∆trp (45)
Based on the restoration point offset, a metric equivalent to steady state offset can
be defined as:
ess = |(∆MCrec)| = |(MCss −MC0)| (46)
However, the system might not be fully restored to its original value MC0.
Another response of interest, is the recovery rate RR. The average recovery rate
ARR at which the system’s mission performance ability is restored is:
ARR = ∆MCrec/∆trp (47)
namely the averaged time derivative of the mission performance value for the recovery
phase.
Besides mission capability MC, the system is expected to maintain subsystem
connectivity and integrity. As part of its ability to maintain its health, the SHratio
ratio is defined, either for component or connectivity status.
SHratio = SHss/SH0 (48)
where, SHss and SH0 are the health indicators for the steady and the original state,
respectively. The health indicator SH is defined as the fraction of the number of
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damaged/inoperable components over total initial number of components:
SHDamaged = NDamaged/NTotal (49)
The purpose of the analytical formulation for dynamical system behavior analysis,
is to further support resilience-based design methodologies and become one of the
building blocks of the resilience assessment. As a response to RQ1.1.1, Proposition
1.1.1 reflects the need for the above dynamical system behavior analysis:
Proposition 1.1.1: Unless a threat is avoided and no performance degradation is
observed, a resilient system’s ability to recover its mission from a given performance
degradation, is a measure of its recovery rate and time, and of the number of re-
stored/replaced components, regarding its health levels.
Another observed characteristic of more resilient systems is their improved life
expectancy and survivability, under the presence of external disturbances, in the
form of faults or failures. Therefore, Research Question RQ1.1.2 brings attention on
quantification methods for survivability:
Research Question RQ1.1.2: How is it possible to quantify survivability?
According to Ball’s classic survivability formulation, survivability is defined as:
PS = 1− PK (50)
where, PS is the probability of survival and PK is the killability, or probability of not
surviving the disturbance. The complete mission is described through a scenario that
is broken down into epochs and actions. The latter can be accomplished through an
event tree breakdown (or a kill chain), where the entire incident is broken down into
subsequent time epochs. The scenario will help define the survivability equation, and
depending on the type of the disturbance, Equation 50 can become:
PS = 1− (PH · PK/H) (51)
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where PH is the probability of being detected, also known as susceptibility and PK/H
is the probability of not surviving the attack hit and get killed after being detected,
namely system vulnerability. It is interesting to observe that vulnerability is a con-
ditional probability that depends on the outcome of a threat, while susceptibility is
a probability that solely depends on whether the threat was encountered or avoided.
An alternative survivability formulation depends on system lifetime distribution,
and is widely used in the field of Biostatistics [162]. It is suitable for dynamical
systems that undergo longer term effects, and this formulation estimates its survival
probability, based on lifecycle calculations. Survivability is expressed through the
survival function, S(t), which is defined as:
S(t) = P (T < t) (52)
where t denotes time (assuming t0 = 0), and T is a random variable denoting the
time of death. In other words, T , implies the duration of the system being active, or
its life expectancy. The survival function is the probability that the system survives
for a time period, which is longer than a specified time t. For t = t0 = 0, it is assumed
that it is always S(0) = 1. Based on the survival function, the lifetime distribution
function F is the complement of S(t) and is defined:
F (t) = P (T ≥ t) = 1− P (T < t) = 1− S(t) (53)
Thus, based on the application of interest and the dynamical characteristics of the
system, as well as the uncertainty effects in its operating environment, survivability
is formulated accordingly. It can either be a measure of vulnerability to a chain of
disruptive events, or the outcome of lifetime distributions, in response to long terms
disruptive effects, which determines the system’s life expectancy. Proposition 1.1.2
summarizes the role of survivability as a characteristic of resilience.
Proposition 1.1.2: System survivability is a measure of vulnerability, or life ex-
pectancy.
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4.2.1.2 Attributes of resilient systems
There has been a long lasting debate within the resilience engineering community,
regarding a consensus to a commonly accepted definition for resilience, as well as
a description of the possible internal mechanisms, that would allow a system to be
resilient, according to this definition. For further investigating this matter, Research
question RQ1.2 brings emphasis on the resilience attributes, and is expressed as:
Research Question RQ1.2: What are the inherent attributes of resilient systems?
Despite diversity of opinions on term usage when describing the nature resilience,
”attributes” is a ”working term”, that refers to a minimum set of internal, system
embedded functionalities, that are responsible for a system to be resilient to threats
and uncertainty effects.
As part of the early literature, Holling’s definition emphasizes that a resilient
system must adopt to change and be able to absorb any adverse effects that result
from this change, while maintaining its physical and functional integrity. By this
definition formulation, Holling implies that resilient system must perform at least
two fundamental functions, the ability to adapt to change, and to absorb. In a
more recent formulation for system resilience by Vugrin et al. [251], there is a third
internal function, for the system’s ability to restore mission operations. Moreover,
it is presumed that all dynamical systems, contain a natural capacity to perform
each one of these three functions, thus asserting that all systems could be inherently
resilient to some extent [111]. As a result, Vugrin et al., refer to the three resilience
functions, as capacities.
Other literature resources have suggested equivalent resilience function schemes.
Retaining the term ”function” to describe these resilience capabilities, a resilience




Sense threat impact on system
Accommodate system expectations based on threat 
impact
Avoid threat
Persist against threat adversity (fight back)
Resilience Absorb
Neutralize impact of change on system
Restore
Maintain/Restore System Health (subsystem 
connectivity and integrity)
Maintain/Restore Mission Performance Ability
Figure 97: Scheme on resilient system functionality
elaborate on it. The scheme is presented in Figure 97. For the ”absorb” function
to be activated, it is assumed that the system is experiencing adverse effects due to
a threat, which has caused certain dynamic changes on the system. The ”absorb”
mechanisms either seek ways to neutralize the effects of the threat, or persist against
it and fight back.
The ”adapt” function on the other hand, is a distinguishing function for system
resilience, enabled through a series of lower level functions that support system self-
restoration. These range from a sense of self-awareness, and concentrate on either
avoiding a threat, or accommodating the system to better adjust to a continuously
changing operating environment. ”Restore” is a behavioral function, which serves as
the basic mechanism for manifesting resilience characteristics. Last, to complement
the study of resilience functionality, all three functions have been mapped against
similar concepts, in other safety management related disciplines, and the results are
presented in Figure 98.
As part of elaborating on the proposed resilience functionality scheme, the three
functions will be examined in detail. As observed in Figure 98, the description of
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Susceptibility Vulnerability Recoverability
Sense threat impact on system       
Accommodate system expectations based on 
threat impact       
Avoid threat       










Neutralize impact of change on system  X     
Maintain/Restore System Health (subsystem 
connectivity and integrity)  X    X 
Maintain/Restore Mission Performance Ability  X X   X 
Legend X: N/A : Low : Moderate : High
Restore
Figure 98: Mapping of resilience functionality to safety management concepts
the absorb function relates to system robustness. Even though a concept with great
overlap to resilience, system robustness mostly refers to a system’s ”passive” ability
to neutralize or mitigate the adverse effects of a disturbance.
There has been a great debate on drawing the line between robustness and re-
silience. It has been argued that what the resilience engineering community has been
describing as a resilient system, is in fact a robust system architecture. Moreover,
experts in system controls and stability argue that most resilience characteristics can
be implemented through robust control strategies [98].
However, system robustness and system resilience are not the same. Robust sys-
tems are reactive to change, through design-based solutions, such as component re-
dundancy, improved shielding, separated machinery and connectivity. A resilient
system would be more proactive for avoiding exposure to the threat, withstanding
and recovering from performance degradation. Being proactive requires additional
mechanisms for threat discovery and monitoring, system reconfigurability, along with
advanced intelligence for decision making. Based on earlier arguments, a resilient
system is robust, yet a robust system is not necessarily a resilient system.
To further investigate robustness effects and include them in the resilience as-
sessment, Research Question RQ1.1.1 brings the focus on quantifying the impact of
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robustness in dynamical systems:
Research Question RQ1.2.1: How is it possible to quantify robustness effects?
Responding to RQ1.2.1, and in accordance to findings from Figure 98, robustness
effects are captured by the ”absorb” function, with a capacity that could be estimated,
based on performance degradation measures, as Assumption 1.2.1 states below:
Assumption 1.2.1: A dynamical system’s ability to absorb the impact of adverse
effects, is represented by measure of its performance degradation, for a given level of
uncertainty effects.
The system has two options for responding to change under the ”absorb” function,
either fight back against the adverse effects, or neutralize the impact of change.
Quantifying robustness related effects, is not a very straightforward task. Re-
garding the recoverability analysis, the metric development was based on a series of
observations on dynamical system behavior time histories. To possibly use the same
type of source information, to conduct estimates on the system’s ability to ”absorb”
change, a methodological approach is needed. Thus, the Goal-Question-Metric (G-
Q-M) method [261] is a systematic procedure for metric development. It has been
selected for the development of a quantitative approach for providing estimates on
the system’s resilience functions. More about the G-Q-M approach can be found in
Appendix D.
As a measure of a dynamical system’s ability to directly mitigate the effects of
change that could lead to performance degradation, the rate at which the system’s
performance MC(t) is degrading, has been introduced. The average degradation rate
ADR is the average time derivative of the loss in performance ∆MC(t). Thus, ADR
is defined for the degradation time period ∆tdeg as:
ADR = ∆MCdeg/∆tdeg (54)
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with the performance degradation, defined by Equation 41. For the same time period,
the maximum performance degradation MCmax is defined as:
MCmax = max(MC(t)−MC0) (55)
As a cumulative measure of how well a system can neutralize impact of a threat on
itself, the time-averaged performance degradation tMC is defined, and is expressed
as:




given that MC(t) ≤ MC0, for all time instants t, and with τ defined as the total
time duration of the captured time histories. An alternative approach suggests a
time-weighted, time-averaged estimate t2MC:




With this modification, earlier system degradations, penalize more the system’s ability
to ”absorb” the change, as early reactions may be critical for the future evolution of
the system state.
In order to establish a better link between the system’s ”absorb” function, and
system robustness, a degradation-to-threat D/T ratio is defined. Earlier metrics only
capture the variability of system performance, without any perspective on the inten-
sity of the disruption. This variability is the combined outcome of the performance
degradation due to a disruption in normal operating conditions, and the efforts of the
system to assist itself and recover its operations. The D/T describes the system’s
ability to absorb the disruption effect, with respect to the levels of adversity it is
encountering.
In order to evaluate the impact of the threat that is causing operation disruptions,
and further leading to faults, failures or large scale accidents, the THR levels are
defined. The THR however, is specific to the application, and especially on the
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types of threats that it describes. To shed more light on threat types and their
characteristics, a threat assessment is necessary. The goal of this assessment is to
characterize the threat, and in most case this involves its deployment in space and
time. For instance, a pandemic, a computer virus, a toxic cloud, are all examples of
threats, which all have a certain footprint in space, they deploy themselves at certain
rates and affect their environment at certain intensities. It is often possible to model
the presence and activity of a threat through a threat function d, which is generally
expressed as a distribution function d(x, y, z, t). In some cases, spatial variation is
independent of its temporal, thus the threat function becomes:
d(x, y, z, t) = d0 · f1(x, y, z) · f2(t) (58)
The magnitude d0 is is the maximum intensity of the threat. The spatial distribution
function f(1d)(x, y, z) is the distribution of the threat intensity in (x,y,z) space, while
the amplitude f(2d)(t) represents the temporal change of threat intensity. Threat
severity level THR is a cumulative measure of threat intensity on the system, over
a certain time period. To calculate the THR for a system that occupies a certain






[d(x, y, z, t)]dtdV (59)
Combining tMC and THR, the signal-to-noise ratio D/T is defined as:
(D/T )log = −10 · log10(D/T ) = −10 · log10(tMC/THR) (60)
A similar path has been followed, in order to extend the framework for evaluating
the system’s ability to ”adapt” to changing conditions. It has been asserted that
adaptability is implemented through increased reconfigurability. It is suggested that
a system is adaptive, if it can perform at least these three lower level functions:
• Sense threat impact on system
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• Avoid threat
• Accommodate system expectations based on threat impact
Except for the sensing function (which falls under situational awareness), the abil-
ity of the system to adapt to change and accommodate its mission, its health status to
the changing environmental condition, is the most challenging function to implement
and to evaluate. The effects of the ”adapt” function are incorporated to the total
measurable behavior from MC(t) time histories, and cannot be disentangled from
the effects of robustness. Going on a lower functional level, threat avoidance is not
unique to adaptability, but active system reconfiguration and mission accommoda-
tion is a an exclusive adaptivity characteristic. Thus, adaptability evaluation metric
development will focus on this particular aspect.
A simple way to investigate the ability of a system to accommodate, is to as-
sess how successfully it can remain within certain performance bounds, or switch to
another bounded regime, if deemed necessary. Given a set of prescribed thresholds,
adaptability estimates are possible, by calculating time-averaged degradations, with
respect to each one of the predefined thresholds.
For instance, if three critical performance thresholds are defined, MCnegl (negli-
gible), MCmarg (marginal), and MCcrit (critical), which describe the severity of the
MC degradation, the offsets for MC(t) from these thresholds are defined as follows:
∆MCnegl = MC(t)−MCnegl (61)
∆MCmarg = MC(t)−MCmarg (62)
∆MCcrit = MC(t)−MCcrit (63)
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Averaging the offsets over the threat activity duration τ , the cumulative time-averaged













The standard threshold values that refer to the offset for the targeted performance
value MC0 from the given thresholds, are defined as:
∆MCnegl0 = MC0 −MCnegl0 (67)
∆MCmarg0 = MC0 −MCmarg0 (68)
∆MCcrit0 = MC0 −MCcrit0 (69)
Then, based on the instantaneous thresholds offsets from Equations 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.2,
and 63, the Relative Threshold Offsets RTO can be obtained, when dividing with the
standard offsets:
RTOnegl0 = tMCnegl0/∆MCnegl0 (70)
RTOmarg0 = tMCmarg0/∆MCmarg0 (71)
RTOcrit0 = tMCcrit0/∆MCcrit0 (72)
A cumulative adaptability index can be constructed as a combined weighted average
of the three, threshold-based RTOi offsets. The corresponding Research Question
RQ1.2.2 is expressed as:
Research Question RQ1.2.2: How is it possible to quantify adaptability effects?
With the support of the adaptability evaluation equations, it is assumed that:
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Assumption 1.2.2: A dynamical system’s ability to adapt to uncertainty driven
changing conditions, is represented by a measure of how well can the system retain
its performance degradation above certain critical thresholds.
The third element of resilience, when it comes to its attributes, is system recon-
figurability. While reconfigurability is not exclusive to any one of the three resilience
functions, it is a characteristic of an architecture that would in theory be capable of
supporting all three functions. From Research Question RQ1.2.3:
Research Question RQ1.2.3: How is system reconfigurability enabled?
There are several options for reconfigurability implementation. Some solutions fall
under robust design (reactive architectural elements), or some others are software-
based (active, intelligence-based solutions). For large scale complex systems, a com-
mon approach for system reconfigurability, is through intelligent control strategies.
In particular:
Assumption 1.2.3: Reconfigurability is enabled through rule-based intelligent con-
trol architectures.
In conclusion for this section, Research Question RQ1 is discussing the theoretical
and quantitative formulation, which will serve as the basis of the resilience assessment
technique. All necessary elements of resilience have been addressed, from definitions,
resilience attributes, functions and characteristics, to quantitative evaluations on a
system’s ability to be resilient. An overview of the associated responses to research
questions and formulated assumptions and hypotheses, is presented in Figure 99.
By combining Premise 1.1, which originates from the investigation of observable
resilience characteristics:
Premise 1.1: A resilient system is capable of recovering itself, either by avoiding a
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Figure 99: Overview of RQ1 breakdown and proposed research directions
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threat, or restoring its mission capability and health levels, with observed improve-
ment in system survivability and total life expectancy. and Premise 1.2, that is
addressing resilience attributes:
Premise 1.2: A resilient system is a robust and stable architecture that dynamically
adapts to change and reconfigures itself and its mission.
Hypothesis 1 is formulated as an inclusive response to RQ1, which is essentially the
proposed definition for a what a resilient system is and does:
Hypothesis 1: A resilient system is capable of deploying tactical changes, while
supported by its built-in robustness, in order to avoid a given set of threats, or
restore its mission capability and health levels, if degraded.
This is working hypothesis, in support of the upcoming hypotheses, which lead the
way for experimentation and testing, as well as for testing the credibility of the
proposed resilience definition.
4.2.2 Dynamical system resilience, under the presence of operational un-
certainty (RQ2)
Based on the theoretical grounds for this research set by Research Question RQ1, the
second RQ2 is concentrated on the resilience assessment problem. This direction is
stated by RQ2, as follows:
Research Question RQ2: How are the performance and resilience levels of a dy-
namical system affected, under the presence of operational uncertainty?
The development of the resilience assessment technique is centered around RQ2, in
the sense that it drives the development and testing of the process building blocks.
These fundamental blocks are:
1. Operational uncertainty and how is it modeled and included in the process.
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2. Dynamical system behavior and performance analysis.
3. Survivability assessment.
4. Variation of resilience attribute capacities.
5. Association of system performance and health status.
4.2.2.1 Operational uncertainty
The presence of uncertainty in dynamical system operations cannot be eliminated.
Operational uncertainty triggers disruptions, disturbances, that if combined, can re-
sult in larger scale failures or accidents. Uncertainty and its resulting phenomena
are integrated to the concept of resilience. From a practical point of view, resilience
is manifested through a system’s response to the effects of uncertainty. Therefore, a
system’s dynamic behavior, and its performance must be studied, in order to obtain
estimations on resilience capacities. But, before experimenting, certain assumptions
are needed, regarding the uncertainty conditions. According to RQ2.1:
Research Question RQ2.1: How are the performance and resilience levels of a
dynamical system affected, under the presence of operational uncertainty?
There are several approaches regarding uncertainty modeling, as suggested by the
relevant literature. Most modeling methods are used in risk assessment techniques,
while the safety and resilience engineering communities concentrate on accident mod-
eling [108]. In military systems, the equivalent approach for addressing uncertainty,
is threat assessment and modeling. Last, reliability engineers, typically model uncer-
tainty through faults and failures.
Selecting a technique for uncertainty modeling, depends on the particular engi-
neering application, and the depth at which the assessment study must extend. The
outcome of uncertainty analysis provides the input for the assumed conditions, at
which dynamic simulations of system operations can be performed. This input is
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a collection of certain events, either expected or unexpected (from a system’s point
of view), occurring serially or concurrently, at different time points and for certain
durations (for continuous events). Not only a modeling approach for formulating this
collection of events is required, the system simulation model must allow for capturing
the effects of these events on system operations.
The resilience concept is advocating for advanced modeling approaches, to better
capture expected and unexpected emerging events. Given that resilience engineering
itself, is an emerging discipline, and advanced accident modeling is a quite broad area
of active research, it is recommended that the resilience concept be first investigated
for common types of faults and failures. As progress is made on advanced threat and
accident modeling, it would be possible to link the well known forms of faults that
reach the system, to the emerging fault causes, which advanced modeling approaches
return.
As part of scoping down the focus of this research to a certain part of the un-
certainty spectrum, it is assumed that only faults and failures are considered for the
experimentation procedures. Thus, Assumption 2.1 states that:
Assumption 2.1: Operational uncertainty is manifested through combinations of
faults and performance degradations which could result in system failures or accidents.
The details regarding the types and properties for each assumed fault, depend on
the system application and are finalized as part of the experimentation plan. A
generalized perspective on threat characterization and modeling, which would result
to different types of failures, is available in the Appendix E. Based on this generalized



















Figure 100: Events for uncertainty modeling
4.2.2.2 Uncertainty impact on performance and survivability
The most critical part of the assessment technique, is the investigation of the un-
certainty impact on system performance and its overall dynamic behavior. Research
Question 2.2, in particular, brings focus on mission capability, recoverability and
survivability:
Research Question RQ2.2: How is operational uncertainty affecting performance,
recoverability and survivability?
In order to formulate a response to this research question, it is assumed that the
analytical framework of equations under Premises 1.1 and 1.2 is part of the supporting
hypothesis. Moreover, Assumption 2.1 regarding uncertainty modeling is taken into
account, for the selection of fault types and combinations. Thus, Research Question
2.2.1 is:
Research Question RQ2.2.1: How is performance degradation affected by opera-
tional uncertainty, if it depends on fault propagation?
As the literature investigation has revealed, risk assessment techniques are prob-



























Figure 101: Dynamic scenario formulation procedure
risk, the statistical accuracy depends on the size and the quality of the sample data.
It is not only important to formulate several cases for ensuring low statistical error
and noise, but one must also properly select these cases, so that the event space is
adequately captured.
A commonly used technique to generate cases that describe certain combinations
of event, are the Design Of Experiments (DOE). The technique allows for experiment
planning, through the use of various event combination patterns, in order to better
reflect the need of the experiments. Whether the experiment objective is accuracy,
screening, data generation for modeling, or a combination of affordability and fidelity,
different DoE generation methods are available from the literature.
A full factorial design guarantees low statistical errors, but it is usually the most
expensive option. For given set of possible events, a full factorial DOE contains exper-
imental cases that represent all possible combinations. However, it is often possible
that not all event combinations are valid. Depending on the application and the lim-
itations of the simulation environment, the invalid combinations must be identified
and omitted. Screening tests and sensitivity analyses could reveal combinations, that
do not significantly contribute to response variability, and thus can be also omitted.
As the dynamic aspect of uncertainty is of high interest, time-based information is
necessary for the event combinations. Dynamic scenarios are formulated, by including
event frequency, duration, and the time instants at which an event occurs. Last, when
probability distributions on event occurrence is available, it is possible to augment the
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dynamic scenarios, for accommodating a Monte Carlo simulation. Thus, Hypothesis
2.2.1 is stated as:
Hypothesis H2.2.1: The number of faults, as well as the frequency of fault occur-
rence, is the primary driver of fault related performance degradation.
An overview of the scenario formulation procedure is presented in Figure 101.
The purpose of planning scenarios for dynamic simulation runs, is to collect data,
which will return performance time histories, similar to the one Figure 96. These
could refer to the dynamic performance, or health status for each component and
subsystem, and for the entire system as well. Analyzing time histories is necessary
for the identification of all possible simulation outcomes. Except for total system
failure or kill, there could be partial system failures, which correspond to subsystem
performance degradations, or total failures. Time history analysis is a key enabler
for recoverability estimations, which allow for assessing survivability, with respect to
the planned scenario sets, and Research Question RQ2.2.2 is aligned to it:
Research Question RQ2.2.2: How are recoverability and survivability affected by
operational uncertainty?
To formulate the hypothesis for RQ2.2.2, a system’s notional performance time
history for a single disturbance event is considered. Based on the proposed definition
(Hypothesis 1), a resilient system is expected to have fully recovered its performance
levels, within a required time frame, and eventually surviving through the single dis-
turbance. Based on the idea that a resilient system is robust to a certain extent, the
disturbance and its transients must be effectively absorbed. The adaptability mecha-
nism of a resilient system, also ensures that the performance levels will remain above
certain mission required thresholds, and that system performance will be restored to
its original levels. This notional response is illustrated in Figure 102.

























Figure 102: Resilient response to disturbance
103. In the case the disturbance causes a larger degradation, the system’s recovery
response will follow different paths. The resulting path depends on the location of
maximum degradation (minimum performance point), with respect to the critical
thresholds, namely the recovery and non-recovery thresholds. For conventional sys-
tems with some level of robustness to changing conditions, the maximum degradation
point hits the non-recovery threshold, and the system has no chance of restoring its
performance (dashed line). Adaptability effects, on a more resilient system, would
enable the restoration mechanisms (”restore” function), and the system follows a
different path (solid line), towards partial recovery and restoration of its original
performance.
If, however, the system is not robust to disturbances and cannot adapt to earlier
thresholds, it will reach the (ultimate) failure threshold. The absence of resilience
functions and mechanisms could result in a total catastrophic system failure, even if
some recovery was achieved for a short period, as it is shown in Figure 104.







































Figure 104: Catastrophic failure response to disturbance
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Hypothesis H2.2.2: For dynamical systems with certain robust solutions (by-
design, e.g. redundancy, intelligent control), survivability is less affected by the
number and frequency of faults.
Last, the closing hypothesis 2.2, in response to RQ2.2, is based on combining
Hypotheses 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, along with prior intuition on dynamical system responses
to external disturbances:
Hypothesis H2.2: Being representative of the operational uncertainty, fault den-
sity and frequency mostly drive the system’s performance degradation, yet with less
impact on survivability, for robust and resilient designs.
4.2.2.3 Uncertainty impact on resilience attributes
Within the context of the theoretical formulation, in support of Hypothesis 1, a
functional breakdown for a resilient system response has been proposed. Given that
three basic functions are what a resilient system is expected to perform, a set of
equations has been developed, in order to describe the system’s capability to perform
these functions. The essence of the metrics reflects the capacity of a system to perform
the three functions. In particular
• The ”restore” function capacity is described by the average recovery rate, and
the comparison of the restoration value to the original levels of performance.
• The ”absorb” function capacity is described by time-weighted average estima-
tions of performance recovery and through a signal-to-noise ratio, in comparison
to the external input threat or disturbance levels.
• The ”adapt” function capacity is described by time-weighted estimations of
how well system performance can remain above a threshold or within certain
performance boundaries.
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With the capacities linked to the proposed metrics for resilience assessment, the
next point of interest is to investigate the impact of uncertainty on the resilience
capacities. As Research Question RQ2.3 states:
Research Question RQ2.3:How are the resilience capacities varying, in the pres-
ence of operational uncertainty?
RQ2.3 is broken down to address capacities for adaptability (”adapt”) and ro-
bustness (”absorb”), under RQ2.3.1:
Research Question RQ2.3.1: What is the correlation between dynamical system
resilience and operational uncertainty?
as well as recoverability (”restore”) and survivability, through RQ2.3.2:
Research Question RQ2.3.2: How are resilience capacities affecting system sur-
vivability and recoverability?
There is not adequate evidence from the literature, for formulating a hypothesis
on RQ2.3. The identification of variation trends for the resilience capacities against
operational uncertainty, is an open question for the resilience engineering community
[251]. The formulation of Hypothesis 2.3 will be based on the general response ex-
pectations for resilient systems. If one goes by the proposed definition of Hypothesis
3.1, resilient systems are expected to be flexible to changing operating conditions. As
such systems must absorb the effects of change on their performance, it would make
great sense to assume that it must also vary its capacities of performing the ”adapt,
”absorb”, and ”restore” functions, as part of this flexibility and response readiness.
Thus Hypothesis 2.3.1 is formulated as:
Hypothesis H2.3.1: As part of their inherent flexibility, resilience systems adapt to
changing conditions, and absorb the impact of uncertainty, thus resilience capacities
depend on operational uncertainty.
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With support evidence on Hypothesis 2.3.1, RQ2.3.2 captures the essence of
RQ2.3, and one of the fundamental goals of this dissertation. This goal is to demon-
strate that resilient systems (in accordance to the presumed definition) are more
survivable to conditions created by a large range of disturbance scenarios, given that
they are capable deploying the ”adapt-absorb-restore” functionality. Thus Hypothesis
H2.3.2 summarizes this point:
Hypothesis H2.3.2: The presence of resilience, either through the ability to adapt
to change, or avoid/absorb the impact of change, improves system survivability and
recoverability.
In response to H2.3.1 and H2.3.1, Hypothesis 2.3 states that the system resilience
capacities, contribute to improving recoverability and survivability, yet they are af-
fected by operational uncertainty:
Hypothesis H2.3: For resilient systems, resilience capacities are affected by opera-
tional uncertainty, and they contribute towards improving survivability and recover-
ability.
Summarizing Hypotheses 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, Hypothesis 2 is formulated as response
to Research Question 2, regarding the effects of uncertainty on resilience capacities
and system survivability.
Hypothesis 2: Under the presence of operational uncertainty,in the form of faults
and performance degradations, system resilience ensures and augments the necessary
levels of survivability and recoverability, with a self-adjusted, synergistic relationship
between system capability and health levels.
The proposed plan and scheduled research work for Research Question RQ2, is
summarized in Figure 105.
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Figure 105: Overview of RQ2 and the associated proposed plan
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4.2.3 Architecture enhancement for more resilient systems (RQ3)
In accordance to the framework that has been presented thus far, the levels of sys-
tem resilience are evaluated according to the system’s ability to perform three basic
functions, at the occurrence of single, or multiple disturbances. This ability is quan-
titatively expressed through the capacities of performing the ”adapt-absorb-restore”
functions. Absorptive and adaptive capacities are critical for initial stages of disrup-
tions, where system repairs may be impossible in the short term, thus prioritizing
restorative capacity to build up in the long term after the disruptive event. While
adaptability and robustness allow for a system to be insensitive to a disturbance or
neutralize its effects, they cannot always guarantee recovery. Thus restorative ca-
pacity of a system depends upon its interdependency to other systems and the inner
reconfiguration strategies. However, there is a big question regarding the dependence
of such capacities and thus system resilience to a particular sequence of events.
Vugrin et al. argue that capacities for performing the three resilience functions
may be highly correlated for different disturbance events. Event timing and time
constants of the system response to disruptions also play an important role on ca-
pacities and resilience. According to Hypothesis 2.3, and Hypothesis 1, a resilient
system is expected to be independent of the event uncertainty. There still may be
correlation which is affected by uncertainty, but resilience capacities must remain in-
dependent. As consequence, there is a need for design and optimization approaches,
which would seek to ensure that these capacities are at a necessary level for resilient
system responses, and that they are maintained against operational uncertainty. De-
sign methods would introduce solutions and technology enhancements on the system
architecture for this purpose. It is necessary to investigate how such enhancements
would contribute to overall resilience under uncertainty. This research objective is
expressed through the third research question RQ3:
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Research Question RQ3: How do architecture enhancements affect the resilience
and effectiveness levels for dynamical systems, under the presence of operational
uncertainty?
4.2.3.1 Options for improving system resilience
As resilience is a concept that is differently interpreted by different entities, simi-
lar observations hold regarding the suggested strategies towards improving system
resilience [193]. For instance, aircraft safety and survivability engineers, advise for
redundant critical subsystems [18]. Naval architects also advocate for system redun-
dancy, spatial separation and physical partitioning within a ship architecture [26].
Researchers on vehicle dynamics and controls recommend special robust controllers
that ensure adaptability and stability, also known as resilient controllers [98]. Last,
network and communication engineers would design and optimize for alternate in-
formation transmission paths, to avoid breaches and lack of communication between
critical subsystems [248]. Thus, possible resilience enhancements depend on the type
of the system, internal subsystem connections and physical topology.
Except for design-based solutions, there can be technology infusion for improving
resilience. Taking a biology-inspired approach, a technology acts as an ”antibiotic”
in system health management. Embedded system technologies serve to both actively
monitor and enhance a system’s resilience, by extending absorptive and adaptive
capacities. A separate set of technologies and functions could focus on restorative
capacity, in a fashion similar to how a human body restores basic functions after an
infection has been isolated and neutralized. To implement such functionality, au-
tomation and intelligent control must be combined with reconfigurable architectures
[207]. Thus, Research Question RQ3.1 is addressing this need:
Research Question RQ3.1: What enhancements must be considered for improving
adaptability and robustness to change due to operational uncertainty?
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For enhancing overall system resilience, the literature has returned a set of options,
of which a list with most common possible recommendations is presented in the
following:
• Redundant critical components (e.g., auxiliary power generators, strategically
selected service loads for large scale power systems).
• Strategic placement of components within the topology.
• Automation and intelligence, through adaptive, rule-based control architectures.
• Reconfigurability architecting solutions for strategic and mission specific power
and resource allocation.
Taking into account all these options, experimentation will concentrate on com-
ponent redundancy, and rule-based control architectures, as well as reconfigurability,
as it is partially linked to either one of the two approaches. As a result, it is asserted
that the tested approaches will include the following:
Assertion 3.1: With adaptability and robustness as key enablers for system re-
silience, possible enhancement solutions resort to intelligent control architecture de-
sign, as well as advanced topologies, with subsystem redundancy, strategic spatial
allocation for mission reconfigurability.
4.2.3.2 Effects of enhancements
Hypothesis 3.1 has introduced the enablers for enhancing system resilience, as part of
the experimentation process. Given that the main idea behind RQ3 is to investigate
and quantify the impact of these enhancements to system resilience capacities and
survivability. This goal is addressed by Research Question RQ3.2:
Research Question RQ3.2: What is the impact of resilience enhancements on
system survivability and recoverability?
219
RQ2.3 is broken down to RQ2.3.1 and RQ2.3.2, in order to address the enhance-
ment strategies to be considered, namely topology modifications and implementation
of rule-based control architecture, respectively.
Research Question RQ3.2.1: How do architecture modifications for improved
robustness affect system resilience?
Robust design encompasses decision making for configuration selection, which
ensures that system performance levels are less affected by the noise, that is induced
by variability in changing operating conditions. Based on this particular view of
robustness, the goal for R.Q3.2.1 is to evaluate alternative configurations, through
the proposed resilience assessment approach. Resilience evaluation and assessment is
the preliminary step, in order to support a resilience-based design method for resilient
configuration selection.
The alternative route to design for robustness, is to develop intelligent control
architectures. This direction is stated through Research Question RQ3.2.2:
Research Question RQ3.2.2: How does a rule based control architecture improve
system resilience?
The literature offers great wealth of knowledge on this field, in the form of robust
control design, large scale control architectures, artificial intelligence, and others.
The idea behind intelligent control, is to improve system reconfigurability, with less
investment on extending the size and the physical complexity of the architecture,
while improving the logic behind the automated actions and overall flexibility of
the system. With this approach, equivalent performance and robustness to noise
could be achieved, with less hardware-based investment, but with improved logic and
intelligence.
In order to illustrate the expected impact of enhancements, either in the form
































Figure 106: Comparison of notional responses to a single disturbance, with and
without resilient architecting
example is presented, based on the system response of Figures 103, and 104. As
Figure 104 suggests, the occurrence of a single disturbance, may have such impact
on the system, where it progressively degrades, and fails to remain above the failure
threshold, resulting in a catastrophic failure. If the system was robust to disturbances
of this type and intensity, or carry additional capabilities for reconfiguring itself, and
effectively reacting to the disturbance, it could potentially hold itself above other
higher safety thresholds. In most cases, this could guarantee its dynamic stability
and it would allow itself to avoid the catastrophic failure and restore its performance
(and health) to a value close to the original. This is the basic goal of either one of
the enhancing enablers, and a notional schematic for this targeted, stable dynamic
behavior for system recovery, is shown in Figure 106.
Based on the earlier notional example on resilient system response, Hypotheses
3.2.1 and 3.2.1 have been formulated, in order to test the recoverable dynamic response
of systems, that are robust by-design, or employ rule-based control strategies:
Hypothesis 3.2.1: Enabling robust design solutions on system topology, improves
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system resilience, through recoverability, as a consequence of better ability to absorb
the effects of a disturbance.
Hypothesis 3.2.2 concentrates on enabling control strategies for recovery, without
a robust design to be necessary:
Hypothesis 3.2.2: Enabling intelligent or rule-based control solutions on system
architectures, improves system resilience, through recoverability, as a consequence of
better ability to adapt to changing conditions, that are induced by the effects of a
disturbance.
Therefore, after taking Hypotheses H3.2.1 and H3.2.2 into account, the final Hy-
pothesis 3.2 to be tested is a formulated as:
Hypothesis H3.2: More resilient architectures demonstrate extended life expectan-
cies, improved system survivability and recoverability.
4.2.3.3 Cost considerations
The support of Hypothesis 3.2, along with its supporting Hypotheses 3.2.1. and 3.2.2,
raises the significant issue of the tradeoff between investment on resilience enhance-
ments, against the actual effectiveness of these solutions, to resilience, and surviv-
ability. The investment includes costs of installation (e.g. redundant subsystems),
retrofitting (if architecture modifications are required) for accommodating systems
and technologies, as well as development costs, either for technologies, or control-
based solutions. In any case, costs are incurred if architecture enhancements are
planned, not only for installation, but also for maintenance and running operations.
Last, costs appear in the form of system performance downgrades, or incompatibility
with certain system operations, at the expense of improving resilience. To illustrate
this point, redundant components or power transmission lines allow a power grid to
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be more resilient against unexpected incidents, such as extreme weather, natural dis-
asters, etc. At the expense of a more resilient network, the applies enhancements
add to acquisition and maintenance costs, while accounting for additional weight and
space occupancy, that may eventually negatively affect power output and efficiency.
Current robust design techniques ensure that the system maintain its expected
performance, under the presence of environmental and operational variability. The
range of the variability is often assumed and determined in the design process. Ro-
bustness however, must be ensured in the case of unexpected variability, which may be
beyond the assumed boundaries the system has been configured for. To address un-
expected, but possible uncertainty, is sometimes a common practice to ”overdesign”
a system, especially for systems that are of crucial mission importance.
With the term ”overdesign”, one could refer to extensive redundancy throughout
the architecture, excessive use of strong, durable and sometimes expensive materi-
als, or increased overall complexity. This practice is found in military vehicle design
(e.g. a HMMVEE), where the additional armor, ammunition and weaponry result to
increased acquisition and maintenance costs, along with the associated operational
complexity. Performance may be degraded, if excessive weight is a critical factor,
while the system may lose some of its expected agility and maneuverability, and
furthermore result to susceptibility increase. On the positive side, this practice can
actually support vulnerability reduction, not necessarily by-design, but through ex-
tensive use of technology and active solutions onboard. It is practice that is based
on the idea, that addition of equipment, or technology solutions is proportional to
vulnerability reduction, thus improving survivability.
The ”overdesign” practice may often be effective, fast and easy to implement, but
it does not always result to efficient design configurations. As part of the accepted
compromise, the yield in performance and flexibility may pose a number of unexpected
risks. For instance, robust design are optimized for maintaining their operations
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under unexpected (but predicted) conditions, but they are not always capable of self-
restoring system health and mission operations, when unexpected and unpredicted
operating conditions are present. As resilient systems are expected to demonstrate
capabilities on anticipating both predicted and unpredicted conditions, future resilient
system design and optimization methods must address options for avoiding system
”overdesign”. Cost consideration is the basis for investigating design, performance
and resilience compromise, and is addressed through Research Question RQ3.3:
Research Question RQ3.3: What are the cost implications for more resilient de-
signs?
In order to set the ground for exploring this research objective, certain propo-
sitions are introduced. Based on certain evidence that designing for resilience is a
compromise among different system responses, correlation of these responses must be
explored. System health and mission capability are two responses of interest. If for
certain systems, health degradation does affect mission performance, then one could
assume that health and mission capability are dependent, and their association can
be represented through 2-D scatter or trajectory plots. Assuming that dynamic re-
sponses for mission capability and system health follow the degradation and recovery
behavior of that in 102, the combined dynamic response, allows for the ”trajectory”
to be formed, as explained in Figure 107.
A particular trajectory represents a given system design configuration. The re-
lationship between mission capability and health in the presence of operational un-
certainty, is a trajectory that follows different paths, as a consequence of varying
operating conditions. As a given system configuration exhibits a certain behavior,
the corresponding trajectory of a given configuration follows a unique path, which is
depends on its mission requirements, operational uncertainty and the design charac-















Figure 107: Formulation of system mission-health trajectories
and their capacities, the 2-D trajectories are representative of the system’s resilient
response, in the presence of uncertainty. For 2-D mission-health graphs, with single
constraints for each response, there are four possible outcomes, as the notional graph
of Figure 108 suggests.
For systems that are characterized of certain resilience capacities for the ”adapt-
absorb-restore” functionality, trajectory plots could reveal additional information, re-
garding recoverability for the mission and the system’s health, the restoration points,
as well as the shape of the recovery path. Figure 109 displays three different types of
trajectories, under combinations mission requirements and operational uncertainty,
for a fixed system design. In terms of better survivability, the closed trajectory is
the preferred one, given that system health and mission capability both degrade,
but are both recovered to their original states, with the possible support of resilience
mechanisms. Regardless of whether the requirement imposed constraints are violated,
another trajectory type, is the partially recoverable system, which does not restore
its health and mission capability to the original values. Last, it is possible to degrade
at values below the constraints, where the system possibly fails to recover and restore
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Figure 109: Recovery paths for resilient systems
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It would be interesting to investigate and assert the trajectory shapes, which
would correspond to the different aspects of a resilient system. Robustness effects,
would manifest themselves through shorter degradation paths, with possible partial
or full recovery, in accordance to the robustness characteristic, of the ability to ”ab-
sorb” uncertainty-induced noise effects. A resilient response would be additionally
characterized of improved recoverability and adaptability, thus it would be the one
that allows for full system recovery, at a minimum. Except for its contribution to
recovery and ability to absorb uncertainty effects, adaptability would manifest itself,
as the internal mechanism that allows for full recovery and restoration, even if the
system momentarily violates either one of the mission or health constraints. Last, if
one brings the ideas behind costs and efficiency, a resilient system must fully recover
itself with minimum degradations, by choosing the shortest recovery path, in a fash-
ion similar to reversible processes. Concentrating all previous thoughts, Hypothesis
3.3 can be formed:
Hypothesis H3.3: In contrast to robust design, which may return expensive, over-
capable design configurations that ensure minimum degradation, resilience-based de-
sign is exploring affordable configurations, which possess right-sized capacities for the
”adapt-absorb-restore” functionality, with the objectives of minimum capability and
health degradation due to uncertainty, full recovery and restoration, as well as short
recovery paths.
To summarize this section on RQ3, hypothesis H3 can be expressed as:
Hypothesis H3: Enhancements, such as subsystem redundancy, strategic spatial
allocation and mission reconfigurability contribute to more resilient architectures,
that demonstrate smaller degradations in mission capability and system health, yet
all benefits come at some cost in weight and expenses, or implementation time.
Concluding, the proposed plan and scheduled research work for Research Question
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RQ3, is summarized in Figure 110.
4.3 Overview of the experimentation plan
With the research directions and deliverables having been set in the previous sec-
tions, it necessary to formulate an experimentation plan. According to the scientific
method, a series of experiments must be planned for supporting the research hypothe-
ses [151]. Elaboration on the research questions, did not necessarily result to testable
hypotheses only, as certain premises, assumptions and propositions have been nec-
essary for building the top-level hypotheses, which address the main three research
questions. An overview of the research hypotheses, along with supporting presump-
tions, propositions and assertions for this dissertation is presented in Figure 111.
The experimentation plan brings all necessary elements together, for hypothesis
support, the development and the demonstration of the resilience assessment method-
ology. These include the simulation models for experimentation, the experiment and
a first approach on the resilience assessment process.
4.3.1 Canonical problem for assessment technique development
The motivation for this research has been inspired by the problem of naval surviv-
ability. With resilience engineering to become one of the enabling frameworks for
improving system survivability, it would make great sense to test and demonstrate
resilience engineering methods on complex naval system problems. For method de-
velopment and hypothesis support, however, the high degree of complexity of a large
scale naval system architecture is not the most suitable. To improve experimenta-
tion and the understanding of the observed outcomes, a smaller scale, but equivalent
dynamical system problem is recommended.
For this purpose, a small scale dynamic problem has been formulated and im-
plemented, in order to be used as a pilot problem for proof-of-concept and method
development. The canonical problem is a multi-element spring-mass-damper system
228
Figure 110: Overview of RQ3 and the associated proposed plan
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Figure 111: Summary of research hypotheses
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Characteristic Canonical Problem Large scale dynamic system
Mission 
description
Operation Support load distributions Perform a series of functions
Protection Withstand external forces 
and impulses
Withstand external disruptions, 





External: Missile or torpedo







Threat suppression Elasticity, damping, control 
of structure





Material strength limits, 
natural degradation, 
fatigue, 
Component damage, multiple 
points of initial damage, loss of 
operability




modularity, flexible control 
architecture
Adaptability Adaptive control Resilient system design
Figure 112: Equivalence between canonical and large scale naval systems
configuration, which oscillates under the input of external time-dependent forces (with
pulse or periodic signals). The configuration however for the canonical problem has
not been randomly selected. Based on intuition from operating and experimenting
with naval system model simulation environments, there is a minimum set of charac-
teristics, that describe dynamical systems. This mostly refers to the dynamics and
reconfigurability of power systems and cooling networks of a ship architecture. It is
required that the canonical problem capture dynamic transients in their state vari-
ables, as well as the level of reconfigurability of a larger network. It must also model
damage and possible cascading effects for damage propagation. The impact of envi-
ronmental factors must be also modeled, with time-dependent and space distributed
external inputs. As naval systems are tasked to perform certain missions, a canonical
problem must carry similar tasks, and have the external inputs act as disturbances
towards their mission. A summary of the modeled characteristics for the canonical
problem is provided in Figure 112.
Returning to the canonical problem model, it is a single degree-of-freedom spring-
mass-damper (SMD) system, which experiences external force disturbances of varying
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Figure 113: Canonical problem for investigating system resilience
amplitude, frequency and duration. The system configuration is shown in Figure
113. Energy is stored and exchanged through an array of eight main springs. The
basic ”mission” for this system, is to ensure that the mass m remains within certain
boundaries, as it oscillates on horizontal x axis. The combination of the spring array
and the damper mechanism, is configured for ensuring that the system does not move
out of bounds.
As part of the system’s ”mission”, there is a nominal force of fixed magnitude,
which drives the oscillation. For capturing the effects of operational uncertainty,
there is an additional external force which disturbs the system and tends to push
the mass out of bounds. Both the damper and the spring array, are expected to
concurrently generate the opposing forces, which will compensate for the external
”threat” force. The damper is responsible for dissipating the energy added on the
system, due to the disturbance, while the springs generate the opposing forces to the
disturbance. These mechanisms result in the system’s dynamical behavior in the form
of its oscillation x(t). The system’s mission capability levels are dependent on this
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oscillatory behavior.
To allow for resilience investigation, the model must allow for component health
monitoring. To keep the model simple, the elements that exhibit vulnerability, are
the main springs of this setting. The springs are characterized by certain levels of
stiffness, which must not exceed the given thresholds, if ”healthy” operation has to
be maintained. This form of vulnerability, is a consequence of the material strength
of the springs. Depending on spring material or physical characteristics, the health
thresholds are determined by the limit and the ultimate loads that the springs can
withstand without breaking.
In the case that either one of these thresholds are exceeded, the corresponding
springs experience degraded stiffness, and a subsequent total breakage occurs. To
avoid this possibility, the system is equipped with a rule-based classic feedback con-
troller, which is responsible for monitoring normal spring operation, as well as their
”health” status. System reconfigurability is allowed through an additional array of
four springs, that can be activated by the control system. If certain springs degrade
and partially operate, or are broken, the controller takes action by activating one or
more springs from the redundant spring array. Total system stiffness is increased,
with the goal of restoring the initial total spring stiffness, and effectively restoring
the system’s ”health”.
4.3.2 Reconfigurable cooling network architecture for technique demon-
stration
The purpose of the SMD canonical problem model is to be the pilot application for
the resilience assessment technique development. A different application however,
has been selected for demonstrating the resilience assessment technique. This task
is necessary for indicating the relevance of the proposed approach, to the original
problem and motivation, that both refer to naval system applications. For main-
taining simplicity and better transparency, but without losing in generality, a small
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Figure 114: Chilled water network for resilience assessment technique demonstration
scale naval system application is selected. The chilled-water demonstrator model has
been developed by Icosystem Corporation [179] and JHU APL, allows for dynamic
simulation of cooling network operations, with a view of the network shown in Figure
114. The particular configuration is a smaller scale version of a similar chilled water
system of a full size naval combatant.
The necessary dynamic characteristic requirements for this type of system are out-
lined in Figure 112, essentially being the basic characteristics of complex hierarchical,
dynamical systems, that operate in hostile, disruptive and uncertain environmental
conditions. As it is shown in Figure 114, besides the fundamental elements of a cool-
ing network, such as combinations of pipes, valves, and water pumps, the architecture
has the ability to monitor critical performance outputs, such flow rates and control
flow in different parts of the network, through a number of control valves. The valves
are controlled by a simple, rule-based, ideal response controller, which has been de-
veloped by Icosystem Corporation, and has been provided with the current model
implementation [179].
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As the requirements in dynamical behavior are captured by this model, the par-
ticular implementation is capable of modeling leaks on the network. Network leaks
represent the effects of uncertainty through the changing environmental conditions.
Leaks can occur at specific time instants, as well as in different physical locations on
the network. However, this leak model is not commanding for recurring events, but
for fixed time and location, and fixed rate, non-removable leaks. Multiple leaks can
be considered, thus all combinations for the possible leak locations are allowed. As
a response to leak events, the controller decides which valves must be closed, so that
the network regions that contain a leak are isolated from the rest of the network.
4.3.3 Experiments
The planned experiments for the investigation of Hypotheses 2 and 3 are divided
into two groups. The first group, is addressing Hypotheses 2.2, 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 and
involves experiments that investigate the effects of uncertainty on observed responses,
such as performance, recoverability and survivability, as well as the impact on the
resilience capacities for the ”adapt-absorb-restore” functionality. The second group is
focusing on Hypothesis 3, as well as the specific Hypotheses 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.3, with
experiments on investigating the impact of resilience enhancements on both observed
responses and resilience capacities, as well as tradeoffs between response variable
combinations.
In the following, the full set of experiments is conducted with the canonical prob-
lem, in support of the resilience assessment technique development. The same ex-
periment sets will then be conducted with the naval small-scale problem, as part of
demonstrating the technique, and supporting its relevancy to the naval survivability
problem. Chapter 5 presents the results and findings from canonical problem ex-
periments, whereas Chapter 6 contains the demonstration with the small scale naval
system problem.
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4.3.3.1 Experiments for RQ2
As explained in earlier sections, operational uncertainty is manifested through events,
that have certain impact on normal system operation. An event could trigger adverse
effects on system performance, recoverability, and further impact system survivability,
and resilience. The goal for RQ2 is to investigate these uncertainty effects, thus the
appropriate experiments must be planned.
Operational uncertainty is varying according to the event characteristics, such as
frequency of occurrence, amplitude, direction, duration, and others that capture spe-
cial aspects of the uncertainty induced events. Earlier observations from experiments
have indicated that the variability of these input characteristics, results in varying
responses regarding dynamical system performance and stability.
With these facts in mind, Hypothesis 2.2 implies that varying input settings for
uncertainty factors must result in response variability in performance and resilience
measures. Experiment 1.1 is formulated to test this Hypothesis:
Experiment 1.1: Perform Monte Carlo Simulations with the system baseline (fixed
architecture, fixed control and reconfiguration strategy), under varying uncertainty
factor settings. With the response data, generate a series of scatter plot diagrams and
investigate the relationship between uncertainty factors and recoverability and sur-
vivability responses. Recoverability is described through recovery rate, recovery time,
restoration value offset, and survivability depends on life expectancy time durations,
which returns survivability estimates through survival times.
Hypothesis 2.2 is false under the following two conditions:
1. System recovery and survivability are insensitive to the assumed uncertainty
factor variability
2. Frequency and duration are not the most significant uncertainty factors, to
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system recovery and survivability.
For the canonical problem, the uncertainty factors include the magnitude, frequency,
duration and occurrence of the disturbance input force. Variability in the mission
required input force is also assumed. For the demonstration problem, uncertainty
factors include the number of leaks, and their locations.
Hypothesis 2.3 brings focus on a research topic, without any prior knowledge
available. The validity of Hypothesis 2.3 is less accurate, but Experiments 1.2 and
1.3 will shed more light on it. The goal is to investigate the effects of uncertainty on
the presumed resilience capacities for the ”adapt-absorb-restore” functions. This is
stated through Hypothesis 2.3.1 and Experiment 1.2:
Experiment 1.2: Using the experiment data from Experiment 1.1, perform calcula-
tions for the resilience capacities. Generate and analyze the relationship between the
varying uncertainty input factors and the resilience capacities.
Hypothesis 2.3.1 is false under the following condition:
1. Uncertainty effects keep the resilience capacities unaffected.
To complement Hypothesis 2.3.1, Hypothesis 2.3.2 indicates that the variability
of resilience capacities under uncertainty, is necessary for maintaining better recovery
and survivability.
Experiment 1.3: Using the experiment data from Experiments 1.1 and 1.2, in-
vestigate the tradeoffs between resilience capacities and the levels of recovery and
survivability.
Hypothesis 2.3.2 is false under the following two conditions:
1. Recovery and survivability do not vary with resilience capacities.
2. Recovery and survivability do not improve with resilience capacities.
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Hypothesis 2
Presumption 2.1 Hypothesis 2.2 Hypothesis 2.3
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Figure 115: Experiments for Hypothesis 2 support
Concluding the experimentation plan for RQ2, Experiments 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 are
presented in Figure 115.
4.3.3.2 Experiments for RQ3
The research objective with RQ3, is to investigate the effects of architecture modi-
fications and enhancements, on system recovery, survivability, and the resilience ca-
pacities. Modifications for resilience enhancement are organized into two groups:
1. Physical architecture modifications (e.g. redundancy, separation, or damage
suppression solutions)
2. Control architecture modifications (e.g. control scheme, reaction rules and
strategies)
In order to statistically ensure the reliability of the results, uncertainty effects for this
investigation are the same as the ones assumed for Experiments 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3.
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Hypothesis 3.2 is the central hypothesis for addressing RQ3. Hypothesis 3.2.1,
involves investigation of the impact of architecture modifications on recoverability and
survivability. Further exploration includes resilience capacities. Thus Experiment 1.4
is expressed as:
Experiment 1.4: Incorporate robustness enhancing solutions through physical ar-
chitecture modifications. Execute the Monte Carlo simulations with the same un-
certainty settings, as in Experiment 1.1 Based on response data, estimate recovery
and survivability and track the tradeoffs with the direction of modification improve-
ment. Analyze the resilience capacities and investigate their correlation with the
modifications.
Hypothesis 3.2.1 is false under the following two conditions:
1. Robustness improving modifications do not improve survivability and recover-
ability
2. Robustness improving modifications do not improve any one of the three re-
silience capacities.
For the canonical problem, physical architecture modifications for robustness, are
effectively represented through different damping values. For the demonstration
problem, robustness improvement is performed through the generation of network
architectures with varying total number of control valves.
As a complement to Hypothesis 3.2.1, Hypothesis 3.2.2 similarly supports the idea
that intelligent control architectures, or sophisticated rule-based control strategies can
improve survivability and resilience. Experiment 1.5 is quite similar to Experiment
1.4, with the only difference that there are no physical system modifications, but
experimentation with different control strategies:
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Experiment 1.5: Generate a set of different control strategies and run an equal
number of Monte Carlo simulation, with the same uncertainty input settings as in
Experiments 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. Based on response data, estimate recovery and
survivability, while identifying which strategies improve these estimates. Analyze
the resilience capacities and investigate their correlation with the different control
strategies.
Hypothesis 3.2.2 is false under the following two conditions:
1. Control strategy modifications do not improve survivability and recoverability
2. Control strategy modifications do not improve any one of the three resilience
capacities.
For the canonical problem, control strategy modifications are represented by the
response algorithm, that decides on how redundant springs are being activated, as a
result of broken or inactive main springs. For the demonstration problem, the effects
of control architecture are investigated through two simulation runs, one with and
the other without the presence of the control system.
With RQ3.3 directing to a potential integration of the resilience assessment tech-
nique, as a key part of a resilience-based design and optimization methodology, the
final Experiment 1.6, brings the aspect of cost. As argued earlier, cost implications
can be discovered by investigating the relationship between mission capability and
system health. This is performed through the mission-system trajectories, and it is
asserted that system resilience effects are implicitly present through these trajectories.
Thus Experiment 1.6 is described as:
Experiment 1.6: Using the response data from the enhancement studies of Exper-
iments 1.4 and 1.5., combine mission capability and system health calculations to
formulate the mission-health trajectories. Demonstrate the variation of these curves,
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Hypothesis 3
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Figure 116: Experiments for Hypothesis 3 support
for the given modifications. Identify the combination that returns the assumed ”bet-
ter” resilient response, based on the trajectory curve assertions. Finally, compare the
selection to the corresponding resilience capacity estimations.
Hypothesis 3.3 is false under the following condition:
1. Shortest trajectories do not correspond to better resilience capacities




DEVELOPMENT OF A PROBABILISTIC RESILIENCE
ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE
The experimentation plan that has been proposed in the previous chapter is the
bassi for the development of the resilience assessment technique. For this purpose,
a small scale pilot problem has been formulated, while results and findings from
small scale experiments will become the building blocks for the assessment process.
The technique will then be further developed in fine-tuned with a larger scale naval
problem.
5.1 Introduction to the proposed Probabilistic Resilience As-
sessment Technique
With the finalization of the experimentation plan, along with the research hypotheses
that it supports, this Chapter is presenting the initial findings, from putting the plan
into practice, The core of the plan is the development and testing of a probabilistic
resilience assessment technique. The technique has been christened after Tiresias
[93], a famous Greek oracle that is known from ancient Greek mythology and had a
unique ability, despite his blindness to foresee future events and warn on post-event
developments, thus allowing the people that trusted his vision to be proactive and to
better prepare themselves for what is bound to happen. To a great extent, the scope
of this methodology is to provide similar information on what can happen to a given
baseline architecture, if it experiences certain events and changes on its configuration.
As the technique’s acronym, TIRESIAS stands for: ”Topological Investigation for
Resilient and Effective Systems through Increased Architecture Survivability.” An













































Figure 117: TIRESIAS for system resilience assessment
5.1.1 Step 1 - Define and characterize system baseline
The starting point of the method is to define the system, its functions and its topol-
ogy. For multidisciplinary systems, it is necessary to identify all relevant engineering
domains (e.g. electrical, mechanical, structural, etc.), while the stakeholder require-
ments provide for mission objectives, desired capabilities and limitations, that usually
reflect physical and financial constraints. Physical and functional system character-
ization must return the system state variables and performance response metrics,
which are relevant to the particular engineering application and to the stakeholder
requirements. Depending on the particular problem, system variable mappings to
system resilience variables are necessary.
5.1.2 Step 2 - Set up the Modeling & Simulation
A Modeling & Simulation environment must be set up for experimentation. Depend-





























Figure 118: Features of Modeling & Simulation environment
options, from which the building blocks of a computational simulation tool can be
obtained. Most commonly chosen options are physics-based computational models,
agent-based models, statistical models, and surrogate models, if at least one of the
earlier options is available. Despite the possible options, the selection of a suitable fa-
cility is not always straightforward, especially when affordability constraints become
effective. The latter factor is quite significant for probabilistic analysis methods, given
that they typically depend on large numbers of simulation runs, especially for Monte
Carlo type simulations.
Figure 118 describes the minimum capabilities for the simulation environment.
Based on the selected canonical problem, as well the case study for the technique
demonstration, the previous figure underlines the equivalent features for both prob-
lem formulations, in accordance to the simulation expectations. The expected simu-
lation responses include time histories for subsystems and component performance,
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which are relevant to the system’s overall mission performance ability and system
health. Depending on the application, other simulation capabilities include models
for changing environmental conditions, as well as damage estimation and propagation
prediction models.
5.1.3 Step 3 - Create mission/threat profiles and formulate scenarios
In dynamical system analysis, where dynamic stability, survivability, reliability and
availability are of major concern, it is necessary to define an external stimulus, which
either in the form of imposed disturbance, fault, failure, or other form of disruption
is affecting normal system operations. The stimulus could be the manifestation of
naturally changing environmental conditions, or the presence of a threat. Chang-
ing environmental conditions represent uncertainty in system operations, and rely
on mostly random variability of environmental parameters. A threat however, is a
more sophisticated form of stimulus, and prior analysis of threat possibilities may be
necessary.
Appendix E contains some basic proposed guidelines for threat analysis. Threat
analysis results can be summarized in a threat morphological matrix. This matrix
contains threat profile information, as well as possible combinations of threats, while
it is helpful in decision making for threat combination selection [130]. Uncertainty
and threat attributes that will be considered for this study are summarized in Figure
119.
Following the threat analysis and possible options, the last deliverable of this step
is the preparation of experimental scenario cases. The cases are produced as arrays,
which contain the corresponding input settings. Depending on the planned study, the
input settings could reflect different sources of variability. The input settings, accord-













Figure 119: Uncertainty and threat attributes
• Settings for variability due to environmental uncertainty.
• Settings for faults, and operations variability due to threat effects and failures.
• Settings for architecture variability due to sizing and design modifications.
• Settings for control strategy variability through reconfigurability.
Using Design of Experiments (DoEs), is a great choice for generating the combinations
of input settings, which will then constitute the series of simulation scenarios for the
experiments. When cost of runs is not a major issue, a full factorial design is the most
complete option, for capturing most of the combinatorial space. Other DoE options
of reduced size are also applicable, in the case that the number of simulation runs
is limited. Another source of possible scenario size reduction, is the identification
and removal of incompatible or problem irrelevant combinations for the input factors,
according to event compatibility on the particular application study. Ideally, a DoE
with the minimum number of scenarios and meaningful event combinations, that can
capture most of the response variability, is the most favorable choice for scenario























Figure 120: Scenario formulation approach
been selected. The process for the scenario formulation regarding the Monte Carlo
experiments on the canonical problem, is a combination of a fractional factorial, along
with random scenario selector, as explained through Figure 120.
5.1.4 Step 4 - Resilience & Survivability Assessment for system baseline
With the availability of a working M&S environment, along with the necessary sce-
nario input sets, the first exercise is to perform the resilience assessment on the base-
line design. The return of quantitative results on how the system performs against
mission uncertainty and external variability will serve as a reference point, in further
studies where possible directions of improvement are investigated.
Baseline resilience and survivability analysis depends on system performance time
histories, which is the outcome of the executed experiments. In particular, the fol-
lowing responses are required:
• Real-time capability measurements (e.g. power delivery on power systems, flow
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rates on cooling networks, displacement, velocity, or acceleration for mechanical
systems).
• Real-time system health measurements (e.g. subsystem or component operating
status, or capability measures that also apply for health monitoring).
• Life time measurements (e.g. duration of system operations, event or epoch
durations).
• Real-time damage propagation information (e.g. damage location data, or prop-
agation rates based on damage prediction models, or capability and health mea-
surement analysis). enditemize It is not necessary that these essential measure-
ments are independent of each other. Depending on the system under study, it
is often possible to derive certain measurement types from prime capability or
health measurement with a proper analysis procedure.
As all the required real-time information is collected and properly processed and
stored, the following four tasks are performed within the baseline resilience analysis:
1. Survivability analysis.
2. Life distribution analysis.
3. Damage propagation analysis.
4. Resilience capacity analysis.
Given that task execution depends on the availability of the supporting data, it is
not always possible to perform all the analyses. The resilience capacity analysis,
however, is the core of the resilience assessment technique, thus data availability for
this particular task must be always ensured.
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Survivability and lie distribution analysis, requires event and epoch duration data,
and returns survivability probabilistic estimates that could be compared to the re-
silience capacities. Last, damage propagation analysis is often integrated with a
damage prediction model, that is part of the M&S facility. If time duration data can-
not be extracted from performance or health monitoring information, then damage
analysis is another potential source. Depending on the system that is being consid-
ered, damage propagation analysis could return measurements and estimations for
health monitoring.
Resilience capacity analysis involves all background measurements, for supporting
estimates on the system’s ability to perform the three proposed resilience functions,
namely adapt, absorb, and restore. Observed and analysis derived estimates on re-
coverability, robustness to noise and adverse effects, as well as system state transition
through critical threshold, are representative of the system’s capacities to restore
itself, absorb effects of change, and adapt to change respectively. The number of
experimental cases that were executed for uncertainty analysis, must be sufficient for
reliable statistical estimates on the three function capacities, and allow for correlation
and design space exploration studies.
5.1.5 Step 5 - Tradeoffs with system architecture and control strategy
modifications
The last step of the method, builds upon the assessment procedure for the baseline,
and expands into investigating the effects of architecture modifications on system
resilience. This step is necessary for the exploration of possible architecture enhance-
ments that benefit overall system resilience and survivability, and constitutes the link
between the assessment technique, and a prospective resilience-based design space
exploration and optimization methodology.
In theory, there should not be any limitations on the classes of possible enhance-
ments that could be tested. The key enabler however, is one again the capability of
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the M&S environment. In other words, the simulation facility must allow for model-
ing of the effects of a tested solution, at the level of performance and time duration
responses, at least. For instance, survivability enhancement exercises through archi-
tecture modifications, command for simulation models of modular and customizable
system architectures. As long as the M&S facility allows for it, the same resilience
analysis procedure can be executed, with the study results to be compared to the
baseline responses. For the current research plan, two classes of architecture modifi-
cations are considered:
1. Architecture modifications for robustness, through redundancy and flexibility.
2. Control strategy modifications for leveraging system reconfigurability.
In the following sections, the results of the application of the 5-step procedure are
presented, as they have been performed for the canonical system. The exercise serves
as a process for research hypothesis investigation and support, and as a preliminary
demonstration of the technique, before its application on a large scale system is
introduced.
5.2 Experimental setup for the canonical system study
The canonical problem is a spring-mass-damper (SMD) system, in a parallel con-
nected, multiple-spring configuration. It is a small scale model, as part of an en-
gineering study problem, that is used as a ”pilot” application for methods testing
and development for the resilience assessment technique. The design for the system
baseline configurations has been selected with the following criteria in mind:
• Dynamical system with dynamic responses and behavior that is fairly compara-





























Figure 121: Canonical problem for investigating system resilience
• The description, modeling approach and behavior responses must all be well
understood and explained.
• The selected configuration must be scalable, modular and easily reconfigurable.
• Modeling approach and implementation must be kept simple and transparent.
• Simulation runs must not be expensive to execute (time and setup efforts).
• The configuration must allow for incorporating additional modules, such as
controllers, or other input types.
The SMD system is a single degree-of-freedom (SDOF) model, which allows for its
mass to oscillate in a range, that is bounded on both sides. The selected configuration
is shown in Figure 121 consists of the moving mass, a damper and eight springs of
different lengths L0i and spring constants ki. Moreover, there is an array of four
additional, redundant springs, which can become connected to the mass, when the
control system commands for it. A notional actuator is also part of the system,
and is responsible for executing the commands that it receives from the feedback
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controller in real time. Last, the fixed parameter settings for the SMD system model
are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Input parameter values
Parameter Variable Value
Mass (kgr) m 10
Damping ratio CTRL 0.02
Spring length (m) L0 0.03
Spring diameter (m) D 0.01
Young’s Modulus (N/m2) E 207e9
Yield strength (cast iron) (Nm-2) sigma y 200e6
In a more abstract sense, the ”mission” of the system, is to avoid excessively large
oscillations and remain within its boundaries of operation. This mission could be per-
formed without interruption, if there weren’t additional, ”unexpected” input forces,
which add energy on the system, and could potentially drive the mass to the bound-
aries, while inducing extreme stresses on the springs. The spring modeling approach
includes a performance degradation module, that downgrades spring stiffness, when
certain input force thresholds are met or exceeded.
There are two types of forces that act as external stimuli for perturbing the sys-
tem. First, there is a nominal constant force of amplitude p0, that can be adjusted
according to the system’s mission. The second external input force of amplitude d0
plays the role of an ”unexpected” disturbance, thus essentially capturing the effects
of environmental uncertainty in system operations. The shape of the disturbance
dynamic input signal is adjustable, to either be a step function or a sine wave. The
core of the SMD modeling approach is a single DOF, second order ODE, that is
numerically solved in MATLAB/Simulink, and is the basis of the analysis of system
vibration. More information and details regarding the analytical modeling approach
is found in Appendix F.
The association of resilient systems to adaptability and robustness to changing
conditions has been underlined and is a critical ingredient of the research hypothesis
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formulation. In order to capture the effects of an adaptive and reconfigurable system,
a feedback controller, is programmed to ensure that the proper level of total stiffness
is available to the system at all times. The selected values for spring stiffness, for
both main and redundant springs are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Spring stiffness values for main and redundant springs
Spring Constant Stiffness (kN/m) Crit. degr. force (kN) Rate lambda (sec-1)
Main k01 2 2.5 2
Main k02 2.5 3 2.5
Main k03 2.5 2 2.5
Main k04 2 3.5 2
Redn k01 2.5 2.8 2.5
Redn k02 2.5 2 2.5
Main k05 2 1 2
Main k06 2.5 2 2.5
Main k07 2.5 2 2.5
Main k08 2 3 2
Redn k01 2.5 2.8 2.5
Redn k02 2.5 2.5 2.5
In order to set up the experimentation cases, the variables that represent the
effects of uncertainty through their variation, must be selected. Taking into account
the particular characteristics of the SMD model, the primary variables that control
the vibration of the mass, are the frequency f of the disturbance input signal (if the
sine wave shape is selected), as well as the signal’s amplitude d0. With respect to
event timing, additional uncertainty factors are the disturbance force occurrence time
point tinit, as well as the duration τ of the signal. Last, operational uncertainty is also
represented by the level of expected variation within a mission, thus another layer
of variability is added with the nominal mission input force p0. The settings for the
uncertainty factor variables are shown in Table 4.
In the case of larger scale systems, with available topology information, one can
include the location of disturbance activity, as well as its distribution in space, for the
case of continuous, non-concentrated threats. Each setting combination represents a
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Table 4: Input variable range settings for DOE generation
Mission input Disturbance input Occurrence time Duration Frequency
p 0 (kN) d 0 (kN) t init (sec) tau (sec) f (Hz)
Min 1 1 0.1 0.5 1
Max 10 1000 0.2 1.5 100
unique ”threat” level (and is represented by a THR value). It must be noted however,
that the uncertainty factor breakdown is dependent upon the particular dynamic and
physical characteristics of the system, thus the variable and input value selection
for uncertainty factors is not an automated process, and must be performed by the
designer.
Formulation of the scenario cases has been based on combining a full factorial
DOE with a random case selector. The full factorial DOE generation returned a total
count of 385 unique scenario cases. Then, a random number generator (adhering to
a uniform distribution) selects a certain scenario case, thus creating a total of 2000
cases, in support of executing a Monte Carlo simulation. Each case is executed for a
simulation time of tsim = 5 sec.
Every single simulation case returns a fixed set of output responses. Starting from
the physics of the system, time histories for displacement, velocity, and acceleration
data is available. The three responses are the basis for deriving additional information,
that will be linked to mission capability and system health. A typical time dependent
response, that describes the system’s vibration is shown in Figure 122 for the baseline
case.
As explained earlier, mission capability in dynamical systems, is a measure of the
system’s ability to adjust its actual performance level, to a mission commanded target
performance level. For the SMD system, the mission capability MC(t) is a function
of the envelope of oscillation xmax(t), defined by Equation 73.
xmax(t) = max(x(t)) (73)
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Figure 122: Time histories (in sec) of system responses (displacement, rate of dis-
placement and acceleration)




































Figure 124: Mission Capability and System Health trajectory for a single mission
and threat scenario
The Mission Capability MC(t) is then defined as:
MC(t) = exp(−xmax(t)/L) (74)
where L is a reference length. System health is defined as the current total stiffness
k(t) in comparison to initial total stiffness k0. Namely, System Health SH(t) is defined
as:
SH(t) = k(t)/k0 (75)
A typical set of Mission Capability and System Health time history curves are pre-
sented in Figure 123. Both MC and SH are varying from 0 to 1, with 1 referring to
the system’s normal operating states. Based on the MC and SH time histories, the
system’s trajectory path for a particular mission and threat scenario can be obtained.
An example is shown in Figure 124.
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5.3 Resilience assessment for the baseline configuration
In accordance to the proposed technique, the resilience assessment on the system base-
line entails the four analysis tasks listed earlier, namely survivability, life distribution,
damage propagation, and resilience capacity analysis. The baseline configuration for
the SMD system is defined according to parameter, and spring settings as explained
in Tables 2 and 3. The particular study is concluded with the investigation for corre-
lations between resilience capacities. With respect to the experimentation plan, the
present section contains the results of Experiments 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3., which themselves
have been formulated as responses to Hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3, and to Hypothesis 2.
5.3.1 Survivability calculations based on time durations
Life time analysis is a technique for collecting and performing statistical analysis of
life duration measurements. Such techniques are used in medical and pharmaceutical
research for analyzing and predicting the effects of a certain cure or medicine to pa-
tient. The measurements are presented in horizontal bar charts, or in needle charts in
most cases, for emphasizing the durations of a patient’s life time. An example of nee-
dle plot for life time analysis is shown in Figure 125, and represents life expectancies
for the first 400 scenario cases.
Data from life time measurements could be used as the source of information for
survivability calculations, based on the idea that survival is a function of a patient’s
life expectancy. The same notion is being brought in support of probabilistic cal-
culations within the context of this research. With Figure 125 containing the SMD
system’s life expectancy results after experiencing certain disruptions, one could ob-
tain a survivability plot with the proper calculations, similar to the one of Figure
126
For instance, according to Figure 126, the probability of achieving a life expectancy










Figure 125: Life time analysis (first 400 cases shown)
Figure 126: Probability distribution for system survival
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Figure 127: Life time per phase
procedure has been executed on the system baseline, which has a life expectancy of
3.8798 sec. When additional information on time breakdown is available, time life bars
can contain distributions for the various epochs the system enters, during its normal
operations. these epochs are application specific and are defined through system
states, based on given thresholds. If similarly to safety engineering, one defines the
critical thresholds for system operations, then its possible to allocate the portions of
the total life time to epochs, where the system was operating within two consecutive
thresholds. A representation of distributed life time measurements is given in Figure
127.
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Figure 128: Time-phase CDF distributions for SMD model
5.3.2 Life time analysis
As part of the proposed assessment approach, life time measurements are used for
probability estimates on how long would a certain system remain within two certain
boundaries of operation, in a given threat environment. This is a useful enabler also
for resilience-based design methods, as resilience of a system is pertinent to the time
its remains active, and estimates of adaptability could be based on the time a system
spends within two certain operating states. Figure 128 represents the CDF curves
for time periods within certain critical operating zones. For the SMD system, it is
observed that it did occupy most of the time either the low or critical degradation
zone, with several cases reaching catastrophic failure under certain conditions. Inter-
mediate zones, such as 2 or 4 where transitional zones, or regimes of low operational
”width”, thus the system almost occupies no time within them.
Hypothesis 2.2.2 states that resilient systems are more insensitive to uncertainty
factors, with respect to their life time, and furthermore to their life time distribution.
Figure 129 explains the phenomenon for the baseline, however, factors such as fre-











Figure 129: Effects of variable inputs to total survival time
significant contributors to the variability of total life time.
To expand on this observation, the correlation of time phase distributions against
uncertainty, further supports the earlier hypothesis. The allocation of system response
to a time zone is discrete, with certain levels of time periods observed for each zone.
Variability in uncertainty does not affect the time period levels, except for input
frequency and load magnitude. In support of the previous claim, Figure 130 contains
the mapping of uncertainty to time phases for the baseline SMD configuration.
5.3.3 Damage Propagation
Damage estimation is another key measure for the support of system resilience as-
sessment. Damage is observed through capability time histories, along with extreme
values for system degradation and the degradation rates. It is interesting to investi-
gate the impact of uncertainty on mission capability and observe any modes of damage
through the variation of the performance time histories. Based on the MC histories
for the SMD model, the damage propagation index (DPI) is defined as a cumulative
estimate of damage induced degradation on the system over the system’s life time. As
Figure 131 suggests, the DPI varies with uncertainty, and does significantly depend
on the frequency of the input signal. higher DPI indices are observed in the region
of all values of natural frequency that the system is characterized. Load and input
duration also affect the DPI, but with less impact.
Equivalent to the DPI is the DPR which is the damage propagation rate, and is
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Figure 131: Damage propagation index (DPI) variation to uncertainty factors
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a measure of the rate of change of system degradation, for the time that the system
actually degrades over a threat. Figure 132 also indicates the effects of the frequency
and the higher variability in the range of the system’s natural frequencies (10-50 Hz).
Last, a maximum point for the degradation due to damage can be defined as
the maximum damage point. It is the point of an MC curve, where the effects of
recovery start manifesting themselves. This point is also a measure of a system’s static
robustness. Figure 133 explains the impact of threat amplitude and input frequency
on the maximum damage point. As the system operates close to its natural frequency,
the damage propagation is increasing, as it depends on the displacement of the SMD
oscillation. Regarding the threat magnitude, the smaller maximum damage stands
out as an oddity for higher values. This could be possible for systems that eventually
collapse, with this damage extent being the maximum damage observed before the
system entirely collapses.
5.3.4 Analysis of resilience capacities
As Hypothesis 2.2 has been addressed in the earlier section, Hypothesis 2.3 concerns
the association of the resilience capacities to the uncertainty factors. It would be
interesting to see for instance, how input frequency affects the resilience capacities,
since it does influence survivability and damage related measures, as it has been
previously demonstrated. Starting with the ”restore” capacity, Figures 134, 135, and
136 show the variation of the recovery rate, time, the maximum degradation, the
restoration offset, and the health ratio SH.
The activity time of the disturbance against the system has minimum impact on
the restore function components. Indeed, resilient systems must always contain the
readiness to respond to changing conditions, regardless of the occurrence time and
duration of the input. Frequency does affect the five response metrics, but not as
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Figure 136: Uncertainty effects of duration on ”restore” capacity
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The magnitude of the disturbance input however, does have a significant impact on
the health status. As a result, input signal frequency, along with the magnitude of
the disturbance, drive the characteristics of the system recovery process.
A system’s absorbing capacity is closer to system robustness, as it has been dis-
cussed in earlier chapter. In the context of the resilience framework, the system’s
absorb capacity depends on its ability to persist against the threat effects, either by
neutralizing their impact, or actively fighting against a threat. To quantify the ca-
pacity of system to perform these action, the time-averaged performance degradation
is defined for system. Alternatively, there is the time-weighted averaged performance
degradation, which brings the aspect of timing into the process.
To illustrate the contrast between these two metrics, Figure 137 presents the
two averaged system performance degradation measures, for the same scenarios and
same impact of uncertainty. Except for the impact of uncertainty of the performance
degradation itself, it is illustrated how the time-weighted metric emphasizes the effect
of time. Input signal close to the system’s natural history, result in a more complex
behavior, which is not always predictable, and this seems to be captured by the time-
weighted metric, thus making it more suitable for time sensitive systems. In the
remainder of this study however, the non time-weighted metric is used instead.
As an extension of the time-averaged metrics, the disturbance to threat D/T ratio
is defined, to bring the strength of the threat disturbance into effect. It is equivalent
to a signal-to-noise ratio, but it seeks to compare the impact that a disturbance has
on system performance, to the strength, or magnitude of the disturbance. Figure 138
demonstrates the effects of increasing disturbance duration, input frequency and load
magnitude of D/T . The ratio is increasing with the duration and the magnitude, yet
it appears to be almost independent of the input frequency.
Last, the system’s capacity to adapt to change is being brought into focus. The
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Figure 139: Uncertainty effects on ”adapt” capacity (Relative threshold offset RTO)
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depends on its ability to sense the threat impact on itself, to see how it may be possible
to avoid the threat impact, and if this is not quite possible, to explore options on how
it can accommodate itself to changing conditions. The relative threshold offset RTO
for the MC time histories is a metric that describes the performance deviation from
a critical threshold, and accumulated over the time period of the system’s activity.
It is an estimate of how far system performance could deviate, if it is desired that
for a stable response it must stay within a certain distance from a particular critical
threshold.
Figure 139 hints that the magnitude of disturbance increases the RTO, thus the
system is prone to exceed the boundaries of its normal operating condition. In con-
trast, an adaptive system response would activate the mechanisms of maintaining its
performance position over time, thus the RTO would have remained low. Another
important fact is the impact of frequency. If the input signal is of a frequency in the
neighborhood of the system’s instantaneous natural frequency, resonance effects could
take place and force the system to deviate from its normal operating band. If it’s
not adaptive, the system would be more vulnerable to such effects. As the frequency
steps into higher values, away from the system’s natural frequency, maintaining per-
formance is improved. Last, the activity duration, hints on a turning point in RTO
with longer disturbances. As the optimum response is in the middle, short or long
term effect appear t have equivalent impact on system adaptability.
The end of this section has marked a collection of experimental findings, in support
of Hypothesis 2.3.1, which claims that resilient system vary their capacities of being
adaptive and robust, with the presence of uncertainty factors. This is a natural
outcome, that is pertinent to the ”adapt” and ”absorb” functions, which require for
the system to sense and assess its environment, in order for it to evolve through the
changing conditions.
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Figure 140: Correlation matrix for adaptivity and robustness metrics
5.3.5 Correlation and sensitivity analysis for resilience capacities
After discussing the implications of investigating the variation of resilience capacities
to changing uncertainty factors, one would wonder whether the metrics that express
the resilience capacities are varying in correlation to each other. This is quite possible,
as many of these metrics are based on mission capability and system health calcula-
tions. Despite the fact that they seek to address a different aspect of the problem,
they cold be correlated in certain ways.
Correlation studies for resilience metrics is necessary, in order to ensure that the
same phenomena, described by two different metrics are identified. In Figure 140, a
correlation matrix for the adaptive and absorptive resilience capacities is presented.
It quickly becomes obvious that the time averaged performance degradation is cor-
related to the D/T ratio, with a factor of 0.9549. Far less correlated the former, is
the adaptability measure RTO, which appears to be practically independent of the
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other robustness measures. This is a key observation on robustness and adaptivity,
as they are both supporting concepts to resilience, yet they serve different objectives,
with different internal mechanisms. Last, in the prospect of a resilience-based design
method, the two capacities could initiate design space exploration studies, while al-
lowing the designer to optimize for cost, when the capacities are accompanied with
technology solutions for their implementation.
5.4 Trade studies for resilience enhancement strategies
As part of investigating Hypothesis 3, the planned Experiment 1.4, looks into identi-
fying and discussing the effects of robust system solutions to the resilience capacities.
Experiment 1.5 repeats the same analysis process, but with the use of alternative con-
trol strategies and configurations. On the basis of adaptability and robustness being
fairly independent, two different paths have been follows. Architecture modifications
in the form of redundant systems, effective, high strength materials, all result in a
more robust system, in the sense that they provide the mechanisms for the system
to naturally absorb the effects of unexpected disturbances. Control strategies and
architectures, are enablers of more adaptive systems. They provide the ability for the
system to monitor and record its surroundings, to evaluate the situation and react
to a disturbance. Despite the fact that there are clear lines between robustness and
adaptability, this should not imply that a robust system cannot be adaptive to change
to some extent, or vice versa.
5.4.1 Enhancements for system robustness
As the purpose of the canonical problem is to be the platform for the development of
the assessment technique, it is acceptable to model notional robust system solutions,
through incorporating models of their effective mechanisms. For instance, robustness
of a SMD system is not only improved through the number of the main, or redundant
springs, but also through damping, which provides for another mechanism for the
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system to be able to absorb the effects of a force disturbance.
For experiment 1.4 therefore, a Monte Carlo simulation is performed with 2000
cases, under three different damping settings. For the baseline, the damping ratio is ζ
= 0.02, while the other two settings are for ζ = 0.01 and 0.04. The analysis procedure,
follows the steps as listed in Figure 117. The first responses of interest, are the life time
distributions. Figure 141 presents the system’s time life, with uncertainty factors, and
for three levels of damping ratio values. As discovered earlier, the impact of frequency
and the disturbance magnitude of the system, is more significant than duration of
the input, or its occurrence time point. However, the middle setting of ζ appears to
be almost independent of the two factors. As robustness reflects the insensitivity of
a system to uncertainty, this setting would be a logical design choice. Regarding the
trends, larger input forces reduce the life time, while lower frequencies, closer to the
system’s natural frequency, reduce the life expectancy, as resonance effects appear
and result in earlier catastrophic effects.
Moving into damage analysis, the observed degradation times also give glimpse of
more stable configuration, for the one with damping ζ = 0.02. Higher damping results
into faster degradation, as is the case for lower input force magnitudes. In terms of
input frequency however, there is greater variability and a low point is observed close
to the system’s natural frequency. The offset from the original performance value
is presented in Figure 143, while Figure 144 describes the effects of damping on the
recovery time. Damping does not have an impact on recovery time, as it prevents
degradation, and does not actively enhance recovery.
Estimations for resilience capacity on the ”absorb” function are presented by Fig-
ures 145 and 146. The time-averaged MC degradation is sensitive to frequency input
change, with the outer settings of the ζ range to have the system’s degradation fluc-
tuate more than the middle setting of ζ = 0.02. Confirming earlier observations on
the stability of the 0.02 damping setting, the change of input duration and magnitude
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Figure 141: Variation in survival times with damping ratio
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Figure 142: Degradation time period with damping ratio
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Figure 143: Recovery offset with varying damping ratio
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Figure 144: Recovery time with varying damping ratio
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result in a more stable time-averaged performance degradation. Despite the fluctua-
tions on the time-averaged MC degradation, the degradation-to-threat ratio results
to more stable responses for all three damping settings. The uncertainty variation on
threat activity duration, load magnitude further confirms the insensitivity of the 0.02
setting to external change. Thus, from a robustness point of view, technologies or
solutions that would bring the damping ratio level to 0.02 would allow the system to
better ”absorb” external change, thus making it more resilient through being robust.
The ”adapt” capacity estimates are provided by the RTO metric and the responses
to the varying three major uncertainty input factors is presented in Figure 147. Larger
values of RTO could either imply a large offset from a critical threshold, which is
a desired characteristic, or a large offset from less critical threshold, that could hint
that the system has reached a critical threshold. For different applications, the partial
RTO estimates indicate the actual offset from thresholds, and they are key for defining
the most adaptive response, with respect to them.
5.4.2 Reconfiguration strategy tradeoffs
Experiment 1.5 is a a comparative study, which requires the resilience assessment of
alternative control strategies and configurations, and then compares the responses,
in a n effort to identify the most stable, robust and adaptive solution, which accord-
ing to the resilience definition, can be accepted as the more resilient configuration.
The alternative control strategies differ in terms of what and how many springs are
activated by the rule based controller.
A strategy forms the rules for the controller’s action, and it receives feedback
from total system stiffness measurements. In other words, when one or more springs
reach their limits and eventually break, the loss in stiffness is logged by the health
monitoring system and triggers the commands which decides what redundant spring
to activate, in order to compensate for the lost stiffness. The first two strategies
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Figure 145: Time-averaged performance degradation with damping ratio
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Figure 146: Degradation-to-threat ratio with damping ratio
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Figure 147: Relative total threshold offset RTO with damping ratio
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(CTRL0, CTRL1) are quite conservative in usage of additional resources, thus al-
lowing the system to get closer to the critical threshold, before they commit to full
activation of additional stiffness. The two latter (CTRL3, CTRL4) are more gener-
ous at earlier thresholds, attempting to ensure the system always carries adequate
stiffness. Strategy CTRL3, is an intermediate approach that brings a more balanced
stiffness activation strategy.
Starting with the trends in survival time, Figure 148 presents the time until mis-
sion end or earlier collapse for all 5 control strategies, under the presence of uncer-
tainty, in the form of four varying external factors. These are the load magnitude,
and frequency, given that the load is playing the role for the external threat, along
with variation of the starting time instant and its activity duration. From a general
overview standpoint, it is strategies CTRL1 and CTRL2 that demonstrate better sta-
bility and insensitivity to the changing uncertainty factors. However, for strategies at
the extremes of the alternatives range, maintain a better survival time for the lower
part of the disturbance input range.
In terms of frequency, there is a larger deviation in behavior among the control
strategies, yet there is an overlap of all alternatives observed for the range of 20-40 Hz.
Except for the more robust CTRL1, and CTRL2, the other strategies, ensure better
survivability for higher frequencies, than for lower ones. As frequency approaches
the system’s natural frequency, survival times is dramatically reduced, hinting for
resonance effects, that destabilize the system and drive it faster to collapse. Last,
there is a fairly low sensitivity to the disturbance occurrence time point and activity
duration change.
An equivalent image is seen regarding the degradation time period, as Figure
149. Except for strategies 1,2 which maintain their stability and insensitivity to
changing uncertainty, the others significantly increase the degradation time period
with increasing disturbance magnitude.. The frequency dependency is more complex,
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Figure 148: Variation in survival times with different control strategies
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Figure 149: Degradation time period with different control strategies
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otherwise hinting how much of a significant impact this uncertainty variable has for
periodic inputs to dynamical systems. Disturbance occurrence and duration play
a more significant role for degradation time, yet without the complexity and non-
smoothness of the frequency response. Regarding the maximum damage, behavior
responses are very similar to these for survival times, with same complexities and
stabilities, as discussed earlier. Maximum degradation analysis is presented in Figure
150.
Continuing on the recoverability part of the system’s response, Figure 151 contains
the analysis for the restoration offset. The expected response for a resilient system
requires a low offset. Besides, this requirement, robustness requirements indicate that
the offset is not affected by uncertainty. This is the case for strategies 1, and 2, while
with strategies 1, 3 and 4, the offset increases with increasing load magnitude, and
input frequencies closer to the natural frequency.
It is interesting however, that recovery time is fixed for all strategies, as Figure
152 indicates. Thus recovery time, does not appear to relate to the reconfiguration
strategy, rather than the main topology of the system itself.
Combining information on the recovery offset, along with the recovery time, the
average recovery rate is estimated and presented in Figure 153. As with the recovery
offset, the recovery rate presents an analogous response to uncertainty, since the
recovery time is fixed and independent of uncertainty for all control strategies.
To perform analysis for the ”absorb” function capacity, the time-averaged MC
degradation is necessary to be calculated. Figure 154 presents the analysis results,
which do connect with the rigor behind the stability and insensitivity to change of
alternatives 1 and 2. Regarding the impact of threat magnitude however, there is a
counterintuitive outcome. The response, which mainly depends on MC degradation
is reducing for increasing magnitude values. Unlike earlier metrics where there was a
form of degradation that would always increase with magnitude, in the present case,
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Figure 150: Maximum degradation with different control strategies
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Figure 151: Recovery offset with different control strategies
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Figure 153: Recovery rate with different control strategies
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the current metric is time averaged. As it was earlier observed, lower magnitude
settings result in larger system life expectancies, or survival times. It is thus the effects
of a larger survival time that promotes higher metric values, and are overcoming the
effects of degradation, that would otherwise dominate.
The time-averaged MC degradation is the basis for estimating the degradation-
to-threat effects ratio. At this point, the final assessment on the system’s ability to
absorb the effects of uncertainty factors can be made. Not much different from the
evidence discovered earlier, the D/T response allows for the alternatives CTRL1, and
CTRL2 to be distinguished as being stable and insensitive to the effects of changing
magnitude, frequency and duration of the threat representing input periodic signal.
Figure 155 is supporting this point, while a case is made on how the reconfiguration
strategy can actually make a difference in improving the system’s ability to absorb
the effects of a disturbance and be robust to change.
To complete this study, the RTO response is providing an estimate on how the
alternative strategies affect the ability of the system to ”adapt” to change, and the
results are presented in Figure 156.
5.5 Summary of findings
Chapter 5 presented all efforts on the development of the resilience assessment tech-
nique. With the use of a canonical problem that is transparent, and easy to under-
stand, a series of metrics was developed and tested. In an effort to better understand
the metrics of the framework as, well as all the critical measures for supporting system
resilience assessment, options were explored on combining metrics into aggregates for
high level resilience representation. The basic assessment procedure returned estima-
tions on the three resilience functions, ”adapt”, ”absorb” and restore,, based on MC
experiments with varying uncertainty factors. Significant uncertainty factors, such
as input magnitude or input frequency have been identified and distinguished as the
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Figure 154: Time-averaged performance degradation with different control strategies
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Figure 155: Degradation-to-threat ratio with different control strategies
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Figure 156: Relative total threshold offset RTO with different control strategies
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most influencing uncertainty factors on the resilience of dynamical systems. Compar-
ative assessments, allowed for the investigation of the impact of alternative control
strategies, or the ability of the system to naturally absorb the effects of change. In
conclusion, the technique has successfully demonstrated its ability to investigate re-
silience against uncertainty, to allow for evaluation and comparison of enhancement
solutions for improving resilience and survivability, as well as to support a resilience-
based design space exploration.
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CHAPTER VI
RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT OF A NAVAL COOLING
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
With Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 discussing the formulation and the development of
the resilience assessment technique, respectively, the present chapter’s objective is to
demonstrate the applicability of the resilience assessment technique on a larger scale
architecture, as well as to discuss findings on the investigation of topological modifi-
cations for resilience and improved system survivability. The experiments concentrate
on resilience assessment of system baseline, as well as the effects of redundancy and
controller effects on the three resilience capacities.
6.1 Overview of method demonstration
The general procedure for the resilience assessment is identical to the process that was
followed in Chapter 5 for the canonical SMD system problem. While the basic idea
is the same, however there have been adjustments on mapping of system variables
to resilience capacities and definitions for system health and mission capability. The
basic steps that were taken for the method demonstration are:
1. Define and characterize system baseline.
2. Setup the modeling & simulation environment.
3. Generate the simulation scenarios.
4. Resilience assessment for the system baseline
5. Effects of topology and control system
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6.1.1 Baseline configuration overview
The selection of a system baseline for the cooling network is driven by the mission
requirements, as well as the configuration of interacting subsystems. The piping ar-
chitecture, the number of essential components, such as valves, pumps, and heat
exchangers, as well as their placement, depend on the number, the connectivity and
the location of the onboard ship systems. Their sizing depends on mission require-
ments, as well as safety directives. The objective is ensure that good system health
is maintained, and the system does not experience degradations that could lead to
catastrophic failures. At the same time, the cooling network must be maintain its
mission capability along with its good health, and continuously support both the vital
and non-vital loads.
For the particular example, the system baseline is a smaller scale version of a
naval combatant’s chilled water system network. Except for the vital components,
this topology includes 10 flow meters that have been placed in various locations, in
order to monitor water flow rates. To control flow rates on different network locations,
a total of 32 valves have been placed in key locations. The valves are controlled by
a simple, rule-based, ideal response controller (developed by Icosystem Corp.), and
it is part of the current model implementation. Figure 157 gives an overview of the
network baseline topology.
6.1.2 Modeling & simulation facility
The system testing configuration is an integrated Java application that consists of
the dynamic system model and the rule-based ideal response controller. This inte-
grated simulation facility is the dynamical modeling & simulation environment that
will be used for performing the main demonstration experiments. The module of the
facility which integrates the power system with the cooling network is a monolithic
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Figure 157: Baseline configuration for the cooling network
MATLAB/Simulink implementation [179]. To improve simulation speed, this mono-
lithic module is not represented in the top level facility by its original, but through
compiled executables. It also receives the input scenario information, which contains
the prescribed damage input to the system.
Except for allowing faults as status inputs, this particular facility has been aug-
mented to include leaks on different system locations, as well as to model the effects
of a leak and allow the user to observe the impact on the simulation development.
Thus, a list of leak locations plays the role of the damage input to the system. The
monolithic executable runs a case for a given scenario, and at the end of each time
step, it passes the output information to the Java implemented rule-based ideal re-
sponse controller. As implied by its name, the controller selects the ideal combination
of valves that must be shut, in order to ensure that the part of the network that is
experiencing the leak, is isolated from the rest of the system. As the controller takes
action on setting the valve commands, the monolithic executable receives back this
information and propagates it to the valve actuators. The appropriate valves are shut
and the system dynamically adjust itself to the new reconfigured state of operation.













Figure 158: Modeling and simulation environment structure
Figure 158, while a view of the chilled water network implementation in the Java
environment is shown in Figure 159.
6.2 Experimental setup
The next step of the assessment technique, commands for setting up the necessary
experiments that need to be run for the analysis. This includes the formulation
of scenarios for modeling operational uncertainty, and for the particular study, the
factors are the leak locations, as well as the number of leaks that are preselected to
occur for each simulation run. Each simulation run is scheduled for a 2 sec period.
With a total of 12 leak locations, the scenario generator returns 212 = 4096 different
leak combinations. The actual time for a 2.2-sec simulation time period is about 30
seconds, thus it would be reasonably affordable to execute all 4096 different cases for
each study.
In order to generate the case input settings, a full factorial DOE has been con-
structed, with each DOE case representing a complete dynamic scenario, along the
lines of DOE tables that have been used for the canonical problem. The scenario
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Figure 159: Baseline cooling network model
format involves a 12-element array with a ”1” denoting an active leak, and a ”0” im-
plying no leaks, for each index that represents the corresponding leak location. The
pre-determined possible leak locations are also listed in Figures 157 and 159. The
latter is a visualization of the network that serves as a GUI, where the user can see
what are the specified leak locations, and which valves are being shut down, as part
of the controller’s response.
In terms of the system’s performance during a simulation, this is obtained through
the flow meter readings. The mass flow rates for the coolant are available in certain
locations, where the 10 flow meters are placed. A typical simulation response is shown
in Figure 160, with all flow rate time histories for all meter locations. The rates are
measured in gal/min and the time step for the simulation is 0.1 sec.
Last, two studies have been planned for supporting Hypotheses 2 and 3, with ex-
periments on the cooling network model. Experiments 1.1 to 1.3 refer to the system
baseline, as it is described by Figure 159. With the 32-valve configuration, survival
time measurements and resilience capacity estimations take place, and these are an-
alyzed against the leak combinations that represent operational system uncertainty.







































Figure 160: Typical flow response curves for system baseline
of valves and the controller on the resilience metrics, in a study similar to that of the
canonical problem.
For Experiment 1.4, it is the aspect of architecture robustness that is being tested
against the resilience capacities. For this purpose, six modified topologies have been
defined and implemented within the simulation environment. The total number of
valves is varying across the alternative configurations, ranging from 26 to 32 valves.
The purpose is to observe the robustness of both the topology and the controller
with a decreasing number of available valves. In other words, the effects on the
resilience capacities is solicited, as reconfigurability is degraded through reducing the
number of valves. Figure 161 outlines the different topologies that have been tested.
For Experiment 1.5, the sole impact of the controller is the outcome of interest,
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Figure 162: System activity duration with varying number of leaks
6.3 Resilience analysis for network baseline
In this section, the resilience assessment technique is demonstrated for the 32-valve
configuration, with respect to the full factorial of 4096 scenario cases. The results
cover Experiments 1.1 to 1.3.
6.3.1 Experiment 1.1 - Recoverability and survivability under uncertainty
Experiment 1.1 is focusing on system recovery and survivability, for the 4096 cases on
all the combinations of leaks. With the use of the ideal response controller, the system
demonstrated a survival rate close to 1, namely almost in all cases, the controller has
been very robust. As the life time distribution shows in Figure 162, there are only a
few cases where the system collapses before the end of the simulation, mostly around
the t = 1 sec mark.
Damage propagation in this context, refers to capability degradation. For the
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particular system, capability degradation in a flow meter FMi is defined as the dif-
ference of MC(t) for the particular configuration and leak combination, minus the
MCideal(t) for the same configuration and without any leaks on the scenario. Thus
total mission capability is defined as:




where DeltaMCFMi is the difference of a flow meter’s ṁ
FM
i reading minus to the
corresponding ideal reading ṁFMideali , namely
∆ṁFMi =
∣∣ṁFMi − ṁFMideali ∣∣ (77)
Most damage propagation calculations, as well as estimations on the resilience capac-
ities are based on MC data. The MC value for the ideal case is 1, thus degradation
is defined as:
MCdeg = 1−MC (78)
Since MC varies from 0 to 1, with 1 as the best capability (often by-design capability),
degradation of capability will adapt to the same range, with 1 denoting maximum
degradation, where the system is not capable to perform its mission.
Maximum damage is the maximum degradation point for a given time history
of MC(t). Figure 163 contains the frequency plot for the maximum damage points.
The shape of the distribution appears to closely follow a normal distribution, with
a mean of 0.5, and a standard deviation of 0.144. Based on the frequency plot, the
same figure also contains the CDF distribution.
Similarly, Figure 164 lists the distribution for the damage propagation rate DPR.
The DPR is the average propagation rate of the degradation front. It is the ratio of
the total degradation over the time it took for that degradation to occur. The mean
is 2.5 (MC degradation per sec) and the standard deviation is 0.721.
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Figure 163: Maximum damage point distribution
6.3.2 Experiment 1.2 - Resilience capacities under uncertainty
In Experiment 1.2, the capacities for the three resilience functions are brought into
focus. Changing trends for the capacity measures were documented against increasing
number of total leaks. In the baseline configuration, the restore function is described
by four metrics, namely the maximum degradation, the recovery time period, the
restoration offset and the average recovery rate. Table 5 lists the average values for
all four metrics along with their standard deviations.
Table 5: Restore function capacity baseline values
Mean Std deviation
Max degradation (MC=[0,1]) 0.339 0.109
Recovery time period (sec) 0.475 0.352
Restoration Offset (MC=[0,1]) 0.328 0.08
Average recovery rate (MC/sec) 0.0009 0.076
To put observations into perspective, the maximum degradation throughout the
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Figure 164: Damage propagation rate DPR distribution
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Figure 165: Restore capacity estimates with leaks
entire range of uncertainty effects, are limited to a third of the total system’s capa-
bility. The recovery time is about a quarter of a nominal simulation run, while the
average offset is also a third of the MC capability. The latter is explained by the
low recovery rate, which implies that either the restoration falls short of the original
MC values, or that recovery needs to occur much faster than the nominal simulation
time, thus a larger gradient fails to build up.
Figure 165 presents the variation of the four restore function capacity estimates
with the increasing number leaks that the system is experiencing. The maximum
degradation is increasing with the increasing leaks and that makes perfect sense, as
this is causing greater deviation of the mass flow rate in each meter, from the ideal
response value, which has been used as a reference. The degradation peaks at 10
leaks, and reaches a plateau. The recovery times also vary with the increasing leaks,
though without a monotonous trend, but with local peaks. Thus, recovery time is
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Figure 166: Ternary plot for three partial RTO offsets
varying with the number of leaks, yet the increasing leaks, is not the sole factor of
recovery time variation, as other interactions are hinted. The restoration offset follows
a similar trend to the maximum degradation, and relates higher offsets to increasing
number of leaks. The average recovery rate varies with the number of leaks, yet not
with a unique trend. Local extreme points are observed, but the overall behavior does
not strongly depend on the number of leaks, as it probably does with the particular
recovery mechanism that takes place. In conclusion, passive observed responses, such
as the degradation and the restoration offset do depend on uncertainty effects, through
increasing number of leaks. Restoration, which is seen as an active response on the
system’s behalf, while affected by leak related uncertainty, is mostly determined by
the interaction of other factors, such as the controller and system reconfigurability.
The adapt function, is described by the total relative threshold offset RTO, along
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with the partial, offsets that refer to each one of the three reference thresholds. Simi-
larly to the restore function, the adapt function for the baseline analysis is character-
ized by the average values for the offsets, and the results of the assessment are shown
in Table 6. Another way to view the partial RTO estimates is through the ternary
plot of FIgure 166.
Table 6: Adapt function capacity baseline values
Mean Std deviation
Total RTO 0.489 0.0829
RTO-Negligible threshold (MC=0.8) 0.185 0.134
RTO-Marginal threshold (MC=0.6) 0.463 0.113
RTO-Critical threshold (MC=0.4) 0.628 0.082
Starting from the partial thresholds, average values carry different implications for
the different thresholds. That is, a small offset from the negligible threshold is often
acceptable or even desirable, but it is exactly the opposite for the critical threshold,
where the system must remain away to ensure that a catastrophic failure will not
occur. This logic is indeed depicted through the average values in Table 6, where the
offset from the negligible threshold is about 0.2, while the critical threshold offset is
0.628. Figure 167 presents the impact of leak related uncertainty to the RTO offset.
As expected, the increasing number of leaks induce further MC degradation, which
translates to responses that are reaching closer to the critical thresholds, and thus
reducing the partial RTO estimates.
The absorb function, that is linked to system robustness is characterized by the
time-averaged MC degradation, and furthermore by the degradation-to-threat input
ration D/T . Table 7 contains the average values for both metrics. The former is
an estimate of robustness, while the latter expends this definition, by bringing in
the perspective of the intensity of the input, that the system must respond to. A
resilient system must maintain low degradations over time, thus a low time-averaged
MC degradation, and D/T response is desired. Regarding the effects of increasing
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Figure 167: Adapt capacity estimates with leaks
number of leaks, the D/T average is dropping as the system is experiencing more
leaks, as observed by Figure 168. While degradation is increasing, the drop is the
result of the increasing threat level, in the form of increasing uncertainty. A lowerD/T
however is desired, and if the effects of the increasing leak number is overshadowing
an increasing (but, at a low rate) degradation, then, this response implies a plateau
in degradation after a certain number of leaks. The previous assessment, is also in
accordance to the top response of Figure 165.
Table 7: Absorb function capacity baseline values
Mean Std deviation
t-Avg MC degradation 1.95 1.13
Degradation-to-threat D/T 0.721 0.931
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Figure 168: Absorb capacity estimates with leaks
6.3.3 Experiment 1.3 - Correlation of capacities under uncertainty
In the context of Experiment 1.3, the correlations between the resilience capacity
measures are investigated. The system’s ability to restore its health and mission op-
erations, is derived by the MC(t) time histories. However, the other two capacities
of adapt and absorb functions are inferred by restoration and recovery observations,
in accordance to their respective definitions. One purpose of investigating the corre-
lations of the observed restoration, to the metrics for adapt and absorb functions, is
to confirm the validity of the definitions. Furthermore, response diagrams could also
be used for design space exploration, or requirements interpretation, when it comes
to associating pairs of the resilience function capacities.
Figure 169 describes the association of RTO and D/T to the maximum MC
degradation, in the form of a contour plot. Most scenarios cause a maximum degra-
dation MCmax of about 0.4, with lower values of RTO. Except for the requirement of
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Figure 170: Capacities for adapt and absorb with recovery time
and thus more resilient systems. Similarly, the D/T ratio relates the time-averaged
degradation to the input threat, and thus lower D/T values would indicate a more
resilient system. Two poles are forming, as observed in 169, which indicate that the
same range of D/T is linked to two different MC degradation concentrations.
The same analysis was performed with the system’s recovery time values. Figure
170 shows strong concentration around 0.5 sec, whereas, there are less populated areas
for 0.1 sec and 1.25 sec recoveries for fewer cases. There is no clear trend with RTO,
which is a logical conclusion, given that RTO depends on threshold offsets and not
in any characteristic restoration time. A similar case can be made for the recovery
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Figure 171: Capacities for adapt and absorb with restoration offset
over which the time-averaged degradation is calculated.
Figure 171 indicates that is stronger correlation of the resilience capacities to the
restoration offset. There is a slight linear correlation to the RTO, which is explained
from the fact that the end state of the system, as well as the path that brought it
these, is also determining the offsets from the three major thresholds. As the RTO
reduces, the implication is that in a collective sense, the system is closer to its major
thresholds. If these lower values are due to the system reaching closer to the critical
threshold, then this is also manifested by the large offsets from its original state.
Last, the response diagram between RTO and D/T is possibly of the highest inter-
est, especially from a design space exploration perspective. As both of these metrics
are the characteristic ones for the system’s ”adapt” and ”absorb” capacities, Figure
172 is useful as a definition for a resilience-based design space. Contour concentra-
tions would represent a given configuration. while the size of the data concentration
is an estimate of the effects of uncertainty for the particular configuration. Not only
used as a design space exploration enabler, this response diagram could also serve as
a means of feasibility and viability analysis, when constraints have been imposed on
adaptability and robustness.
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Figure 172: Capacities for adapt and absorb functions
6.4 Tradeoff studies on architecture modifications
The last part of the study for the cooling network, involves the effects on the resilience
capacity estimates, with architecture modifications. Experiments 1.4 and 1.5 include
plans for topology modifications, and the impact investigation of the rule-based con-
troller. The topology modifications refer to the varying number of valves which are
placed on the network, thus 6 different topologies have been formulated and tested
with the resilience assessment technique.
6.4.1 Topology effects on resilience
Besides the baseline configuration of the chill water cooling network, six modified con-
figurations have been generated. The resilience assessment technique that is proposed
through this work, was applied for all modified topologies, and a comparison study
has been conducted, for evaluating the impact of the modifications on recoverability,
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Figure 173: Survival times for seven network configurations
survivability and resilience. The topologies have been derived from the baseline (of
32 control valves total), thus returning configurations of 31, 30, 29, 28, 27, 26 control
valves total for each topology.
The first step of the assessment commands for estimates on survival time, or for
how long the system is in operation, until the end of the mission, or until collapse,
if it becomes bound for that. Figure 173 contains a comparative bar chart that
shows the averages of survival times for all seven configurations. Despite the fact
that differences are marginal, it is the 32-valve configuration that has better survival
times on an average basis, with the 28, and 29-valve variations to be exceptionally
close. A drop in time is observed for the 30 and 31-valve configurations.
It must be understood that the baseline has been developed according to the
mission requirements, and the number of valves has been decided for this particu-
lar configuration setting. Moreover, the controller has also been designed with the
baseline cooling network topology, thus a degraded topology in terms of valves was
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Figure 174: Max degradation for seven network configurations
configuration delivered almost identical survival times to the baseline. This finding
is the basis of a cost-effectiveness analysis that could be planned for further research,
based on which, one could select a topology with fewer valves, in order to reduce
cost of acquisition, installation and maintenance, but without any compromise in ef-
fectiveness. As a result, the merits on survival times can be reshaped to time-based
survivability estimates, where obviously the 32-valve configuration would be the most
survivable configuration, for the given level of uncertainty.
The ”restore” capacity investigation has revealed further variability across the
different topologies for the four metrics of maximum degradation, recovery time,
restoration offset, and average recovery rate. Figure 174 contains a comparison chart
for the variation of maximum degradation with the increasing number leaks on the
network. The 32-valve configuration experiences the smallest maximum degradation.
It is interesting to observe that the variation with the leak number for each configu-
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Figure 175: Recovery time for seven network configurations
and monotonically increasing with increasing leaks, the other topologies do not vary
their maximum degradation monotonically. The 31 and 32-valve topologies are fairly
insensitive to the leaks for a large part of the variation spectrum, except for the cases
with 1-2, and 11 to 12 leaks. In accordance to the earlier result, the 29 and 28-valve
topologies also demonstrate MC degradations close to that of the 32-valve baseline,
further supporting the possible merits of a downsized topology that could be effective
as the optimized baseline.
The recovery time comparison is shown in Figure 175. Once again, the baseline
requires less time to recover, even though this time varies significantly between 1-5
leaks on the system. It must be noted that most of the observed variability in recovery
measures, not only depend on the number of leaks or valves, but they are also affected
by the choice of location of a valve, or the place that leak is observed. The 28 and
29-valve topology require slightly more time for recovery, even though that time is
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Figure 176: Recovery offset for seven network configurations
The restoration offsets after recovery is presented with Figure 176. For the 32-
valve baseline, the offset is increasing with the number of leaks, while it remains as
the only case where the offset is monotonously increasing. All other configurations
follow a plateau for the range of 3-10 leaks. However, the offsets are ranging from zero
to 0.45 of MC. Last, in Figure 177 the average recovery rate is presented. Except
for the 30 and 29-valve configurations, the rates are fairly low, with a non-monotonic
behavior for the baseline.
The final part of the comparative resilience assessment for the different cooling
network configurations, are the capacity variations with leak number, for the ”adapt”
and the ”absorb” functions. Figures 178 and 179 contain the mean values of the
”adapt” and ”absorb” capacity metrics RTO and D/T respectively. The overall
offset from critical thresholds is the highest for the 32-valve configuration, implying
that the system remains at capability levels closer to the ideal, no-leak response.
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Figure 177: Average recovery rate for seven network configurations
Other configurations have scored lower RTO values, yet quite close to that of the
baseline.
Larger variations are observed for the robustness related D/T metric. The ideal
solution would return the lowest D/T , implying that the degradation effects for the
input disturbance levels, are kept at low levels. Consistent to earlier observations
on the comparably low MC degradations for the 28 and 29-valve configurations, the
next lowest values after the 32-valve baseline are returned by the former solutions.
The configurations with 30 and 31-valves have the worst performance with respect to
their ability to ”absorb” the effects of the leaks.
Using information from Figures 179 and 178, it is possible to define a design space
for adaptability and robustness tradeoff investigation. It is based on RTO and D/T
responses and it allows for discovering feasible solutions, when a set of adaptability
and robustness constraints is provided. An example of the response diagram for
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Figure 178: RTO for seven network configurations
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Figure 180: Response diagram with D/T, RTO for resilience-based design space
exploration
design space exploration is shown in Figure 180, where each point represents a given
configuration. The point coordinates are describing the capacities for the ”adapt”
and the ”absorb” functions.
In a step further towards a resilience-based design methodology, feasibility of the
solutions is explored, when adaptivity and robustness constraints become available.
Then, all candidate solutions are evaluated with the resilience assessment technique,
against given uncertainty scenarios. The assessment results are averaged and used
as the source data for populating the design space. Imposing the design constraints,
the response diagram of Figure 180 becomes the constrained design space of Figure
181. As an illustration example, for D/T no more than 2, and for RTO no less than
0.4, the feasibility test would return the 32-valve configuration as the most feasible
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Figure 181: Response diagram with D/T, RTO for resilience-based design space
exploration with constraints
6.4.2 Controller effects on resilience
Experiment 1.5 intends to demonstrate the effects of the controller on the recoverabil-
ity and resilience capacity measures. According to the execution plan, the 32-valve
system baseline responses are compared to the corresponding ones of the same ar-
chitecture configuration, but without the ideal response controller activated. The
controller is ideal, in the sense that it does not actually infer the locations of the
leaks by itself through some analysis process, but instead it becomes aware of them,
as part of receiving the scenario information as an input. This is not a realistic mod-
ule, given that it automatically shuts the neighboring valves, when it receives the list
of occurring leaks. As a result, the reliability of this comparative study has been
question, yet however, the comparison study regarding resilience assessment for both
configuration was performed.
Starting from the analysis of survival times, the distributions for both cases were
identical. The configuration with the deactivated controller, has returned a mean of
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Figure 182: Recovery times for controlled and uncontrolled configuration
2.2 sec for survival time and 0 for standard deviation. The controlled configuration
has returned a mean 2.195 sec with 0.072 standard deviation. The dispersity of data
in both cases is minimal, and cannot guarantee the statistical quality of the further
processing of results.
Another indication for the irregularity of the experiment, was the estimation for
recovery times. While the controlled configuration did return a measurable distri-
bution for the recovery time, the uncontrolled system returned a null distribution
regarding recovery. Part of the responsibility for this behavior is the early termina-
tion of the system activity in a large number of cases, with the remaining ones to
have the system unaffected in a non-realistic sense. Thus, the comparison for recovery
time has returned Figure 182, where the non-controlled configuration did not gather
any cases with any recovery process. As a consequence, a similar response has been
observed for the average recovery rate ARR.
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6.5 Summary of findings
With Chapter 6 , a complete resilience assessment study has been conducted for the
32- valve baseline configuration of the chill main system model. As the effectiveness
of the assessment technique has been demonstrated, two studies were carried out, for
the investigation of the impact of topology modifications, as well as the benefits of the
rule based controller on system resilience. The former study, not only reaffirmed the
optimized performance of the baseline configuration, it also allowed for quantifying
the resilience capacity and performance differences from other valve configurations.
The framework, has also showed its potential for supporting a resilience-based design
methodology, through the exploration of the robustness-adaptability design space.
Effects of the controller also supported the idea that intelligent control is an effective




As a conclusion to this research, this last chapter provides a review of the original
research objectives, along with the work that has been completed for addressing
the research questions and supporting the hypotheses. Based on these findings, the
list of the research contributions is presented and discussed. With a clear view of the
contributions and their evaluation against remaining gaps on the research curriculum,
it is possible to formulate the potential future tasks that would support the main
research idea and further advance the development of the concept.
7.1 Review of research objectives
The present research efforts have been initiated by the need for more effective and
survivable military or civil systems. In other words, the idea originates from the
requirement that complex systems must be effective for the mission that it has been
designed for, while maintaining mission capability and survivability, when exposed to
an expected/unexpected set of external disturbances that affect its normal operating
conditions. This requirement is the basis for Objective 1.
Several possible enabling concepts have been considered for supporting a solution
to the previous problem. Resilience engineering is an emerging discipline, that is
pertinent to safety management and provides a vision that could potentially address
several open research opportunities towards the goal, implied by Objective 1. How-
ever, resilience engineering has not matured entirely as a discipline, thus there is a
large number of open opportunities to be investigated. These range from definitions
on resilient systems and resilient behavior to certain types of threats or disturbances,
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evaluation frameworks, assessment techniques, and design methods that would sup-
port a resilience-based design initiative for complex systems. Ultimately, the main
goal for the present work has been the development of a theoretical framework, upon
which a resilience assessment techniques could be based.
7.2 Reiteration on research objectives
In this section, the main research objectives will be reviewed and evaluated based on
experimental findings. The basic objectives have been summarized on developing a
theoretical framework for resilience engineering, namely definitions, characteristics,
requirements and applications for resilient systems, a resilience assessment method-
ology, and the demonstration of the methodology on a naval system application.
7.2.1 Theoretical background and framework development
The starting task for this research, underlined the need for system resilience to be
redefined, along with the relevant attributes that a resilient system would possess.
Resilience has been viewed in association to other safety management concepts, such
as reliability, safety, survivability and security. Other aspects of resilience, accord-
ing to the proposed definition have brought the corresponding degradation levels for
mission performance ability and system health.
Part of the work has been primarily focusing on the understanding of resilience
in materials science and structures, as well as how the current literature suggests the
application of the concept in systems engineering. Resilience was mostly known as
a characteristic of a structure, which highly depends on the selected material and
design of the structure. An analogy can be drawn between the basic functions and
behavior of an engineering structure against an engineering system. For instance, a
structure that supports a load distribution of increasing amplitude goes through a
series of thresholds that determine the level of degradation, up to the limiting state
where the structure collapses. A similar scale and series of states for system collapse
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can be devised, taking into account a system’s equivalent degradation and propaga-
tion through recoverable/non recoverable states until system collapse. However, the
current status of implementing resilience in systems engineering is still at its infancy
stages. In particular most experts have described how a resilient system must behave
and what its basic functions are, yet it is still unknown how such a system can be
implemented or even if they are feasible overall.
Thus, as part of the contribution to bring resilience engineering in the conceptual
design of a system, a metrics framework has been defined and further developed to
support a methodology for system resilience assessment. This method, along with the
accompanying metrics carries many similarities to existing metrics and risk assessment
techniques. Yet, it is centered on the concept of resilience, seeking to address how
effectively a system can perform the necessary functions that would allow one to
classify it as resilient.
For the development of the framework, a multi-spring-mass damper system model
has been used, with a controller wrapped around it. In order to capture all the
envisioned attributes of a resilient system, several assumption were made regarding
the SMD model, for the purpose of both simulating and emulating the behavior of a
true resilient system.
7.2.2 Probabilistic resilience assessment technique
With the probabilistic technique, the capability of a system to adapt, absorb change
effects and restore itself after a given set of possible disturbance condition combina-
tions is evaluated in a transparent way, that is consistent to the resilience definitions.
All systems carry certain capacities to perform these functions by design, yet one of
the objectives was to investigate how these capacities vary not only with uncertainty,
but also with design or reconfiguration strategy change, while the system is operating
on its mission.
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Clarifications on the definitions for safety, survivability, robustness, adaptabil-
ity and resilience have been discussed, and their association has been investigated
through experiments. Mission uncertainty was analyzed and modeled through mul-
tiple factors. Capacities for the three resilience function were compared and their
correlation was examined. Last, topological or logical changes on the controller were
evaluated with the derived metrics and trends were investigated and linked to the
system’s physical behavior. Last, as part of fulfilling one of the earlier objectives, the
relationship of system resilience to survivability was investigated as, certain enhance-
ment solutions would improve the system’s capacities and furthermore return longer
life times, hinting for more survivable systems.
One of the challenges that have arisen, mostly due to the nature of the problem,
was the possibility of modeling an entirely unexpected scenario case. Remember that
according to the resilience definitions, a system is expected to be able to withstand
not only expected but somewhat uncertain disturbances on their deployment, but
also it should manage to have a reasonably favorable response when affected by a
never seen before disturbance. That requirement is beyond the scope of this research
to address and can be a noteworthy proposed idea for future work.
7.2.3 Demonstration of the resilience assessment on a naval system ar-
chitecture
The last objective is to demonstrate the applicability of the resilience assessment
technique to a naval architecture problem. For the method to be applicable, certain
requirements were in place for the two problems, in terms of their dynamic responses
and the availability of dynamical system time histories. The same set of research
questions (RQ 2, 3) was in place for the demonstration, and the research hypotheses
have been explored for the larger scale naval system. Additional comparison stud-
ies, between the alternative architectures has revealed the benefits on survivability,
recoverability, and overall resilience, in accordance to the proposed definition.
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7.3 Research Contributions
After reviewing the research objectives that have initiated this research and eval-
uating how well the expectations were met, it is important to clearly identify the
contributions that have been made to the field of resilience engineering through this
particular research effort. Part of this would be to describe how the achievement
contributes to the current state of the art, given that the state of the art has already
been identified through the literature investigation presented in Chapters 2 and 3.
As both the SoA and the proposed method have been documented, the advantages
of the new method over the established methods are discussed. Last, other aspects
of the benefits of this research are outlined, such as the practicality of the method,
scalability and its readiness to be used in larger scale complex systems in the real
world.
7.3.1 Summary of contributions
The key contributions of this research to the SoA for system resilience assessment are
summarized in the following:
• Definition of system resilience. Not only a complete definition of what a resilient
system is but, there was also a discussion of how resilience as a safety manage-
ment concept relates to other safety management concepts, such as survivability,
reliability and security.
• Complete resilience assessment framework. Moreover, this definition was taken
further to produce a list of envisioned resilient system attributes. These at-
tributes were the basis of the three basic functions that a system must be able
to perform for being resilient. Eventually, based on that set of functions and
attributes, the necessary resilience measures have been formulated.
• Resilience assessment method. With the resilience measures as the basis, a
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range of higher level and aggregate measures was obtained for a given system
baseline. This method is useful for quick comparisons of varying architectures
when subjected to a given scenario. Equivalently, a fixed architecture can be
subjected to a range of different scenarios, allowing for assessing its resilience,
mostly from a solution robustness and adaptability perspective.
• Demonstration of survivability improvements with more resilient designs. This
contribution implies the extension of the deterministic resilience assessment
method to become a probabilistic analysis for resilience. This allowed for seam-
lessly integrating the measures of system resilience, when the system is experi-
encing a chain of events that impose change on its normal operating conditions,
to survivability contributions and thus to overall system survivability.
• Simple problem demonstration. In order to develop the methodology and the
resilience framework before this, a canonical small scale problem has been de-
vised and implemented. Thus, the canonical problem has been a physics-based
simulations that emulates the behavior of resilient system, as closely as possible,
in order for the lower level measures to return nonzero or nontrivial values.
• Assessment of a scaled-down naval system. Last, the full scale probabilistic as-
sessment method has been demonstrated on notional small scale YP ship cooling
network. With this contribution, not only the applicability of the method on a
practical problem is demonstrated, but a case is made for its scalability and flex-
ibility to be used for any large scale complex system that behaves dynamically
and is experiencing certain changes on its mission and overall health.
Besides the contributions on the research curriculum, there has been a number of
technical contributions. these are:
• A complete JMP script suite for response analysis and supporting visualization
for the resilience assessment method.
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• Scenario DOE generation procedure
• The SMD implementation in Simulink.
• Enhancements and added flexibility on the integrated Java-Simulink model for
the naval system architecture.
7.3.2 Foreseen and unforeseen research questions
Except for the addressed research questions, that have been supported by a set of hy-
potheses, based on experiment findings, several new research questions have emerged,
mostly pointing towards the direction that this research is expected to take. Some
these questions are:
• Is there a more generic and multi-purpose scheme for the resilience assessment
metrics?
• How can reconfigurability and adaptability effects be better modeled and eval-
uated?
• As advocated in chapter 5, system adaptability could possibly manifest itself
through dynamically changing critical threshold, how could such functionality
be implemented and properly evaluated?
• How can the probabilistic resilience assessment method be extended to become
an integrated part for resilient systems design?
Most of these questions were foreseen, yet any attempt towards addressing them
would be out of the scope of this research. On the other hand, such questions could
definitely be a good starting point for research opportunities to be explored in the
future.
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7.3.3 Practicality and importance of findings
One of the guidelines for developing the method, was the comprehensibility that it
should carry for non-specialists to understand and follow. The key concepts around
system resilience and the proposed functions that support the four resilience capacities
carry a high degree of generality. this allows for the concept to be applicable for any
engineering system, and also for non-engineering systems as well. Given that the raw
simulation model is only required to provide dynamic data on system degradation
regarding mission performance ability and system health, this allows for the method
to be applicable for any complex dynamic system that can provide such information.
7.4 Recommendations for future work
This present research has been a remarkable example of how gaps in the state of
the art and open research questions can lead down to a path, where the start and
end points share so little in common. With the need for designing more effective
systems, the major first checkpoint towards addressing the problem, has been the
need for designing more survivable systems, under the expectation that increased
survivability always make a military of civil large scale system more effective. Exten-
sive background literature search has revealed the State of the Art in survivability
based-design techniques across multiple engineering and scientific domains. Most
approaches offer a great set of options for formulating requirements for survivable
systems, assessing survivability of given system architectures and suggesting multiple
design enhancements.
At the same time, resilience engineering has been introduced to provide alternative
ways of understanding and analyzing the problem, however, this action brought more
challenges on a problem that is already of high uncertainty. While resilience has been
a very suitable concept to address the problem, it represents a new, emerging field
that has its growing dedicated scientific community that is still exploring the concept
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from quite diverse perspectives and for a multitude of applications. In other words, it
is only the onset of the proliferation of resilience engineering as a scientific field and
there are no standard definitions, metrics, assessment methods, or relevant system
design methodologies with system resilience as an objective function. This research
has concentrated on conducting a thorough SoA investigation on progress made by
the community on the above fields, and proposing a set of metrics and definitions
for supporting a system resilience assessment methodology. However, many oppor-
tunities for extending this effort to the level of a systems engineering-based design
methodology have arisen.
The first opportunity has been the idea of developing and proposing a unified gen-
eralized metric and evaluation framework. In other words, work that is presented with
this research is extended to become a general procedure for a larger range of complex
dynamic systems. This framework would enable multi-domain design procedures for
increased system effectiveness and resilience. With the inherent design uncertainty in
complex systems design, a physics-based Modeling and Simulation (M&S) environ-
ment has been considered as a necessary tool for scenario-based design evaluation.
With an effective resilience assessment method, the following logical step is to
guide the research towards an advanced system design methodology. However, at
this point one could question whether the traditional design methods can be adequate
for accommodating resilience as a design objective. One may wonder for instance,
how the traditional GAP analysis and design space exploration should be modified
to account for the highly dynamic and uncertain nature of the problem. A great un-
certainty is also apparent regarding all possible design changes that must be applied
(technology addition, system architecture modification, etc.) at each design cycle in
order to achieve the performance targets. Finally, to reach the goal of delivering a
complete design methodology that is objective and repeatable for any set of initial
stakeholder requirements, all possible and applicable decision making techniques need
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to be investigated, ensuring their effectiveness on highly dynamic and complex sys-
tems. Along the path of investigating and building the building blocks for the method
development, the following research opportunities have been identified:
• Design space exploration with resilience analysis
• Investigate and model technologies for enhancing system resilience
• Include control system design as a possible adaptability enabler
• Resilient concept development and selection
Some of the key disciplines and research areas that one could potentially be rele-
vant to the previous directions are control theory (nonlinear, adaptive and robust con-
trol for enabling adaptability and intelligence), safety engineering and survivability-
based methods (risk and survivability assessment, limit analysis, safety oriented tech-
nologies), as well as damage modeling, health modeling and uncertainty modeling
7.4.1 Design space exploration with resilience analysis
With the above model augmentations underway, it will be possible to explore the
architecture design space, in conjunction to the control design space. The main
proposed design exploration tool for system resilience is the Mission-Health trajectory
plot. However, to bring more emphasis on the resilience aspect and have an additional
layer of detail, a 3D plot of resilience function representations can be constructed.
With the resilient behavior assumed to be expressed through the other three functions,
”adapt”, ”absorb” and ”restore”. To narrow this scheme further down, ”absorb” is
more representative of the system’s robustness levels. ”Restore” is more of an outcome
that can depend on both ”absorb” and ”adapt” functional capabilities. Thus, the
function that reflects better the system’s resilience and can be the distinguishing
factor is hypothesized to be the ”adapt” function. The aforementioned 3D plot, will
not only be used a design utility, but also as a means of investigating the relationship
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between system restorability and its ability to absorb the effects of change and adapt
to change respectively.
7.4.2 Investigate and model technologies for enhancing system resilience
At the point that the resilience assessment framework is complete, along with the
assessment method, one can investigate what reconfiguration strategies in combina-
tion with what selected design configuration can return a design that is more resilient
to a set of threat scenarios. Using the canonical problem to illustrate this objec-
tive, what combination of springs and dampers would be required, with what count
of redundant switchable springs and what reconfiguration strategies (algorithms for
enabling redundant springs) is the equivalent problem statement. The naval system
investigation would include combinations of smart valves, regular valves and control
algorithms.
7.4.3 Resilient concept development and selection
At a later stage of this research task, decision making techniques in conjunction with
Monte Carlo simulation should provide the basis of extending the resilience assessment
technique to a methodology for designing more resilient systems.
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APPENDIX A
INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
A.1 Defining system effectiveness
The importance of system effectiveness in systems engineering has been underlined
through military doctrine. Given that a mission can be defined as the ”ultimate out-
put of a system” [138], military doctrine describes the qualities of a military system,
in order to be able to accomplish multiple missions successfully in a multiple threat
environment. Figure 183 lists key doctrine highlights towards system effectiveness.
Except for military doctrine, the definition of a system in engineering also hints on
system effectiveness. For instance, a definition for an engineering system is focusing
on its operating functions, which are the key elements for mission effectiveness [218]:
”A system may be considered as constituting a nucleus of elements combined in such
a manner as to accomplish a function in response to an identified need. A system
must have a functional purpose, may include a mix of products and processes, and
may be contained within some form of hierarchy.”
To better understand the concept of system effectiveness, the literature has re-
vealed a great diversity in definitions and applications. Soban and Mavris [218] have
acknowledged that system effectiveness holds different meanings for different com-
munities and applications. In most cases, definitions are based on domain-specific
terminology, including system-dependent effectiveness metrics. A common key char-
acteristic across applications, indicates that effectiveness is linked to basic system
objectives and mission requirements. Mission requirements are indicative of overall
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Figure 183: Doctrine of the U.S. Military forces
first authors to provide a definition for system effectiveness, simply stating that:
”effectiveness is the criterion by which solutions will be judged proposed solutions,
solutions under test, or solutions in being”
Other definitions of effectiveness in different domains are presented in Figure 184.
Goode and Machol also developed a set of desired characteristics that lead to the
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). At the same time, several researchers and orga-
nizations have attempted to introduce a set of standard measures for system effec-
tiveness that could be applicable across multiple engineering domains. A standard
definition is expressing effectiveness as the product of three probabilities [97]:
Effectiveness = pAvailability · pDependability · pCapability (79)
Availability is a measure of the system condition at the start of a mission and
is a function of the relationship among hardware, personnel and procedures [97].
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Figure 186: Capability breakdown [97]
Dependability is a measure if the system condition at one or more points during
the mission. In most definitions, dependability can be broken down to survivability,
reliability, maintainability, operability (readiness) and repairability [97], as shown in
Figure 185. Capability is a measure of the ability of a system to achieve the mission
objectives [97], and can be further broken down into other related ”-ilities” as shown
in Figure 186.
A.2 Observations on system effectiveness
Further exploration of system effectiveness for different application, has lead to a
number of facts, which are outlined in Figure 187, and discussed in the following
sections.
A.2.1 System effectiveness is a probabilistic measure
With threats that could emerge under highly uncertain system operating conditions in
the mission environment, along with the changing system requirements, a probabilis-
tic approach is necessary for addressing mission uncertainty in system effectiveness
estimations [155]. Such observation was originally made by the 1964 Weapon System
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Figure 187: Observations for System Effectiveness
of systems effectiveness [200]. The WSEIAC introduced a definition, which opened
the way for probabilistic methods as enablers for system effectiveness evaluation.
Most effectiveness definitions focus on how successfully a system can achieve its
mission requirements [94], [105]. With mission uncertainty being a critical factor
on system effectiveness, most formulations are probabilistic, in order to account for
operational risk [138]. Based on Rudwick’s literature review, Ackoff has also been
suggesting that system-of-systems (SoS) effectiveness is also evaluated through prob-
abilistic approaches [3].
A.2.2 System effectiveness is assessed against goals for successful mission
completion
Given that a mission is defined according to a set of objectives, system effectiveness is
assessed through metrics that compare time dependent responses to goals set by the
mission objectives. Under this direction, the Military Operations Research Society’s
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(MORS) has performed a set of studies for quantifying mission goals and measures
for system effectiveness [94]. Similar efforts have been documented by the WSEIAC
committee.
A.2.3 System effectiveness strongly depends on changing environmental
and mission conditions
As McManus et. al indicate, a system is required to operate under varying external
or internal conditions, which could induce endogenous (generated and propagated
within the system inner structure), or exogenous (generated or caused by external
factors) changes on the system [155]. Changing environmental conditions (context)
are strictly exogenous, while physical system changes are typically endogenous.
Based on the earlier observation, McManus et al. have viewed system effectiveness
or ultimate success in relation to three primary factors [155]:
• System expectations (Needs): Changes in needs may include increased ex-
pectations on the system (a demand for higher levels of the same service) or
changes in the metrics of success (some new function is demanded of the system).
Changes in expectation can be either endogenous (system reconfiguration) or
exogenous (stakeholder requirements).
• Development and operational environment (Context): Changes in con-
text are usually external constraints on the system: it must operate successfully
in the new context. Context related changes are strictly exogenous.
• System form (System): Changes in the system form may include subsystem
reconfiguration or component deterioration, malfunction, partial operation or
total failure/activation. Further identification of inner system limitations that
can trigger system form changes can be based on system partitioning, introduced
and thoroughly discussed by [97]. This latter type of change strictly belongs in
the endogenous changes grouping.
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A.2.4 All systems demonstrate a certain capability for performing their
mission
While being aware of possible changes in needs and context, designers cannot accu-
rately predict what changes will occur and at what timing on a system’s life cycle.
Change in mission expectations and in environmental conditions is a major source of
operational uncertainty, on which a designer has no influence. System designers typ-
ically only have influence over the system’s design, which determines its performance
and its capability is optimized, subject to assumed levels of operational uncertainty
[198].
Recent efforts in systems engineering have advanced the state of the art in capability-
based design. Capability-based design is pre-defining the system performance effect
(or system capability) and investigates the solution by generating all possible design
alternatives and selecting the optimal (subject to the particular problem constraints
and requirements) that can deliver the same capability [24]. However, similar ap-
proaches can ensure that the system has the desired built-in capability for performing
multiple missions and tasks, assuming that it can always withstand threats emerging
in its operational environment. Thus, a capable system is an effective system, in the
sense that its built-in capability is maintained, while experiencing threats, attacks or
other possible mishaps during its mission.
A.2.5 Several formulations available for quantifying system effectiveness
One of the most prominent approaches for analyzing system effectiveness, is the
method proposed by the Weapon System Effectiveness Industry Advisory Commit-
tee (WSIEAC) in 1965 [21]. The WSIEAC model is based on the enumeration of
the significant system states over the entire mission. By system states, it is implied
that there are discernible conditions of the system which result from events occurring
prior to and during the mission. A state at high level can consist of combinations of
states at a lower level. For instance, a state can be the condition at which a system
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is available and operable, namely a state in availability and a state in operability can
comprise a state at the system level.
A system can transition through different states during a mission. According to
Equation 79 that defines system effectiveness, the structure of the equation with the
possible states can be expressed as:
E = [A] · [D] · [C] (80)
where [A] is the availability row matrix, [D] is the n× n matrix of dependability
and [C] is the capability column matrix. It follows that equation 81 becomes:
E =
[
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Each element ai, dij and cj represents the corresponding figure of merit for every
element j at each availability state i. These figures of merit can be calculated by
the metrics of the MORS framework. There are different approaches in the selected
sets of metrics for describing effectiveness, strongly depending on the system point of
view. System effectiveness at the mission or the campaign level is typically measured
by numbers or percentages of systems killed/survived in battle. At the system level,
the focus shifts towards individual events and characteristics such as type of system,
type of attack, vulnerability, casualties, and recovery time.
Hootman [112] has conducted an extensive literature survey on the subject of
Measures of Merit (MOMs). The latest and most prominent effort for a a single,
consistent description of a MOMs system, is attributed to the WSEIAC initiative
[21] by the MORS society. System effectiveness is being broken down in sets of
contributing metrics that reflect the behavior of the architecture at different and
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Figure 188: System Boundary Levels [94]
The MORS approach work concerning the measures of effectiveness is summarized
below:
• Dimensional Parameters (DP): The properties or characteristics of the
physical entities whose values determine system behavior and the structure
under consideration [94].
• Measures of Performance (MOP): MOPs are non-probabilistic measures
of performance [112], related to inherent parameters (physical and structural)
and measure attributes of system behavior [94].
• Measures of Effectiveness (MOE): MOEs are a measure of how the sys-
tem performs its functions within an operational environment [94]. MOEs are
metrics that measure the degree of effectiveness attained in a achieving a re-
quirement [105].
• Measures of Force Effectiveness (MOFE): MOFEs are a measure of how
the system, and the force of which it is a part, performs its missions [94]. MOFEs
347
may also be referred to as measures of system effectiveness (MOSEs), or as an
overall measure of effectiveness (OMOE).
• Measures of Merit (MOM): MOMs refer to all measures that characterize
a system, incorporating all measures that characterize a system [94]. As the
definitions indicate, MOMs develop in a very hierarchical manner.
The effectiveness equation can be transformed to a reduced form according to the
type and mission of the system under study. For instance, concerning a non-military
system with a certain capability level, aspects like readiness or reliability become
more important than survivability or stealthiness, therefore Equation 79 is reduced
to include only reliability and operability under dependability. All other terms are
fixed and do not contribute in the variability of system effectiveness. An example of a
reduced version of Equation 79 has been given by Lee et al., where system effectiveness
is defined as a combined measure of availability Av(t) and reliability R(t) at each task
arrival time [138]. It is mathematically given by:
SE(t) = R(t) · Av(t) (82)
Equation 82 is introducing time t as another important factor in the effectiveness
measure, thus implying that several changes can occur within the operational envi-
ronment of the system, threat or non-threat related. A system is required to perform
several tasks which arrive randomly during the fixed mission duration, while having
only two states of operation, either remaining ”on” or ”off”. Additionally, successive
times in the on-state and in the off-state are statistically independent. Another as-
sumption refers to the correlation between the components of system effectiveness.
In a complicated or complex system, it is expected that reliability and availability
are correlated, and the same can be argued for capability. For equation 82, it has
been assumed that there is no correlation between reliability and availability. In
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general however, it is not always the case that system effectiveness is determined by
independent events and contributions.
Switching to an alternative formulation of measuring effectiveness, the Air force
Research Laboratory (AFRL) have introduced a probabilistic approach for this pur-
pose. It relies on performance-based measures, taking into account the mission objec-
tives and probability of success criteria, as well as system performance under damage
propagation that is estimated through companion damage and fail prediction models.
System effectiveness SE in this context is given by:
SE = P (SE) · (Consequence) = [PA · (1− [PI · PN ])] · C (83)
where PA, PI and PN are the probabilities of attack, interruption and neutralization,
and C is a measure of the impact of damage or fail consequence on the system.
The U.S. Navy has developed their own framework for evaluating system effec-
tiveness. A good discussion of this framework is provided by Hanifan et al., through
the naval system effectiveness manual NAVMAT P3941-B [101]. As Habayeb also ar-
gues, system effectiveness is broken down in availability, dependability and capability.
Effectiveness for naval systems is measured by the Index of navy defense effectiveness
Ed. It is expressed by:
Ed =
W · Es
Et · (Ca + Co)
(84)
where Es is the system effectiveness, Et is the index of time effectiveness (system
degradation over time), W is the military worth of the system’s mission, Ca are the
acquisition costs, and Co are the mission and system operating costs. It must be re-
marked that is the analysis refers to multi-year multi-mission operations, then military
effectiveness and costs should be estimated on a year basis per mission assignment.
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where Es is calculated based on the premise that success may be attributed to perfor-
mance less than demand levels, f(y) is the probability density function of performance
level being y, and u(y|x) a utility metric indicating the performance level of y when




As part of the research benchmarking process, it is necessary to qualitatively evaluate
the SoA approaches that have been identified through the literature search. Findings
include definitions, methods and techniques across multiple scientific and engineering
domains, returning a diverse collection of technical approaches. However, for the cur-
rent dissertation, two types of safety management approaches are of interest, design
methods for safety and survivability, as well as assessment techniques.
A set of criteria for evaluation and comparison of SoA methods for each type of
method is suggested. The purpose of this exercise is to identify the strengths of the
techniques and investigate the contribution potential to current open challenges in
safety engineering. The evaluation criteria for method and technique features are
based on practices and comments found on the relevant literature resources. They
are grouped under three basic themes, namely method fundamentals, method features
and method applicability, and are summarized in Figure 189.
B.1 Fundamentals
As discussed earlier, the three fundamental method ingredients are the metrics and
evaluation framework, the assessment methods and the enhancement strategies, all
defined as follows:
• Metrics and evaluation framework. To design for safety or survivability,
the method must provide the framework for evaluating a configuration against
the design requirements. In most cases, the step that is assessing survivability
is the part where this evaluation occurs. However, to execute the assessment,
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Fundamentals













Figure 189: Evaluation criteria for Survivability-based design methods
it is necessary to have the theoretical framework of metrics and relationships
for the calculations defined. Despite the fact that each one of the methods
follows their own approach with a specific set of metrics, one would observe
that processes and metrics are similar or equivalent. For instance, power system
engineers often refer to ”operability” [225], while naval engineers use the Quality
of Service (QoS) [65], two survivability related metrics that are pretty similar.
• Assessment methods. Safety or Survivability assessment for the types of
methods discussed is the equivalent of testing and verification, or the design
phase, when a current design configuration is evaluated against the minimum
safety requirements. It is the essential core of any survivability engineering
approach, as a separate method evaluation session is conducted and presented
in the following section. Literature is abundant on assessment techniques, yet
there is a common subset of steps and procedures for SoA techniques, as it has
been observed.
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• Design enhancement strategies. The results of the assessment often reveals
design weaknesses and safety gaps. Engineers then closely examine the short-
comings of the design, and try to understand what needs to be improved. As
the literature search demonstrated, there are several strategies in the form of
design techniques or technologies for improving survivability.
B.2 Features
Moving on with the method features, this is a set of criteria that underline additional
strengths and benefits of the method, which sometimes become mandatory according
to the nature of the system or the problem. For instance, if the system is expected in
a highly uncertain environment, the design method must then account for operational
uncertainty. If the system is an unconventional design where no historical data could
be reliable for the assessment, then possibly a physics-based modeling approach would
offer more realistic insight. Last, advanced design methods seek for the robust, rather
than the optimal solution, and given the possibility of improving survivability through
resilience, which to some extent is equivalent to robustness, then the latter is another
favorable criterion for the method. The following criteria are thus considered for the
methods:
• Risk and uncertainty considerations. Due to the inherent operational
and design uncertainty, the system’s mission capability and survivability, are
changing and usually do not match the design expectations. Methods for sys-
tem acquisition must address this critical issue, by ensuring that a design will
perform within a frame of expected behavior for given range of mission and
environmental uncertainty. Safety and survivability engineering regulations are
heavily concerned on operational risk du to the presence of this uncertainty
(e.g. SOLAS criteria, JTCG/AS, OPNAV P-86-4-99). Certain probabilistic
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and stochastic approaches and formulations can assist in identification of un-
certainty sources and risk.
• Modeling fidelity. Most current design practices make use of legacy codes or
trusted computational models to run computational experiments, without the
burden of expensive and time consuming prototype testing, at least in early
conceptual design phases. In some cases, unconventional concepts could require
high fidelity experimentation for increased modeling accuracy to reduce the un-
certainty on a configuration that has never been tested or maintained before.
Historical data, even if available would certainly not offer accurate insight on
a revolutionary concept. Physics-based Modeling and Simulation (M&S) is be-
coming a standard in industry and academia, for developing simulation tools
for analyzing and evaluating innovative design solutions and architectures.
• Solution robustness. In the conceptual design phase, a robust solution refers
to a system design configuration that has been optimized to be more insensitive,
in terms of its response to either expected or unexpected disruptions during
its typical design mission [154]. In a traditional feasibility study, robustness
would be considered by including noise factors in the optimization problem
[153] and seeking for the solution that is less affected by disruption related
noise. Other ways to naturally improve solution robustness is by adding more
mission scenarios, to cover more possible cases that the system is expected to
be able to anticipate. In short, this particular criterion involves the ability of
the method to return a robust solution.
B.3 Applicability
Applicability of method is the last group of criteria for method characterization.
Even if correct in theory, not every method is 100% capable of delivering on what
is promised for practical problems. Just as the acquisition of a system requires a
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minimum number of design cycles to meet the requirements and the objective tar-
gets, similarly a method also requires a minimum time period of being validated with
several applications, for becoming more effective in practice as well. Other factors
that could affect method applicability is the cost of applying the method, either on
time or expendable resources, and possible access limitations in tools or data that are
pertinent to executing the method. Criteria for method applicability are:
• Method maturity. Method maturity refers to the robustness and effective-
ness of a method itself. In other words, it is a measure of how well it can deliver
a design that will satisfy the prescribed requirements during its entire lifecycle.
An incomplete or immature method could potentially result in designs that in
practice are not as good they turned out to be on paper. Within method ma-
turity one could include how seamlessly the steps of the method are integrated,
as well as the breadth of method applicability.
• Cost of application. All methods require some requirements analysis, some
modeling and computational analysis and last the investigation of alternative
solutions and decision making for the most fit solution. All these steps require
plenty of man hours, multiple entities working in parallel and the consumption
of resources that may be very expensive to provide. Common issues that ad-
dress cost of development involve the selected fidelity of the modeling process,
prototype testing and validation, as well as plenty of overhead that is allocated
on corrections, adjustments and retrofitting.
• Access and info availability. Even if all previous criteria are well satisfied,
there is still the possibility that stakeholders or involved entities may not have
full access to all benefits and functionality of a method, due to regulations,
political, social or economical that apply and usually have nothing to with
the engineering project itself. For instance, nationality of an associate could
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become an obstacle in obtaining full access to a set of data or a model that is
proprietary and is of high national security concern. Even if a method is trusted
or recognized for its effectiveness, it might still not be as practically beneficial
when certain restrictions apply and full access is not authorized.
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APPENDIX C
SURVIVABILITY DEFINITIONS IN ENGINEERING
DOMAINS
As a complement to the definitions survey on system survivability, this section in-
cludes additional discussion for different classes of systems. Excluding military(aerospace,
naval) systems, for which survivability has been covered in the main text, the current
survey will cover civil transport systems (aerospace, maritime, ground transporta-
tion), biological, power and energy systems, as well as communication systems and
networks.
C.1 Civil Transportation Systems
Under the category of civil transportation systems, all means of civil or merchant,
non-military related, transportation is considered, on land, in sea and in air. Despite
the fact that this is a very broad classification involving physically heterogeneous sys-
tems, it can be argued that all systems that fall under this class have common mission
objectives, operate in similar environments in terms of threats and hazards and are
subject to similar human safety requirements and regulations by the associated or-
ganizations and administrations. Air transportation involves civil transport aircraft,
commissioned by airline companies for passenger transport, by parcel and cargo de-
livery services for cargo and merchant transport and by general aviation companies
for private flights. Sea transportation includes passenger cruise ships and ferry boats,
merchant/tanker ships for cargo transport and private yachts. Land transportation
is mainly represented by automotive and locomotive systems, utilized either for pas-
senger or cargo transport.
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Civil transport aircraft survivability can be defined in the same way as for military
systems. Ball’s definition [16] is applicable, yet taking into account that the operating
environment is less hostile than that of military systems. Emphasis is given towards
safety, since the most noticeable threats usually involve the operability of the inner
system components, mainly affected by reliability, maintenance scheduling and overall
dependability. The most severe external threats that a civil transport can experience
have to do with terrorist attacks (bombing, sabotaging, highjacking etc.), false or
incomplete operational instructions at some point during the mission (machine or
human induced, causing collisions, accidents, subsystem damage or fire, etc.) and
weather or natural external effects (severe weather, extreme ambient conditions, etc.).
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has developed definitions and proce-
dures for civilian aircraft survivability similar to the safety and combat survivability
disciplines. In the context of their Aircraft Hardening Program [81] have formulated
an alternative survivability definition. According to FAA [82], survivability is defined
as ”the absence of a Class I failure after an encounter with the threat”, while FAA
Class I failures include immediate, delayed or landing loss of the vehicle, preventing
continued safe flight and landing (Catastrophic failure). FAA safety certification of
civilian transport aircraft requires that no Hazard Class I or Class II conditions for
single system component failures are acceptable. Class II failures (Hazard Level)
consists of failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the airplane or the
ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there
would be a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities [82], [16]. A
civil transport aircraft loss to a hostile threat (kill) is defined as the ”inability of
the aircraft to continue controlled flight or achieve a survivable landing” [16]. Three
loss categories are associated with a Class I Failure: immediate loss, delayed or while
airborne loss, and landing loss [16].
Civil transport susceptibility and vulnerability is defined identically to military
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aircraft survivability. Susceptibility can be reduced by preventing hazardous devices
from being entered onboard, as well as using weapon (SAMs, AAMs, etc.) or elec-
tronic detection systems to prevent external attacks. Vulnerability can be reduced by
designing the aircraft to withstand the effects of any hit or detonation, either external
or internal [16]. Surviving an accident is the result of many factors. Cabin structural
integrity, seat belts, seat design, child restraint systems, and brace positions can all
increase the likelihood of surviving an impact. Of particular concern is the ability
of the cargo area and luggage containers to withstand an internal detonation. Fire
retardancy, exit design, aircraft configuration, and evacuation procedures can assist
escape efforts after an accident [166].
Despite the differences in operating and threat environments for military and civil
aircraft, it has been discussed earlier how some common principles can be applied to
assess and improve survivability and safety. The same observation holds for naval sur-
face combatants and passenger cruise ships. For both engineering systems, they have
to survive against a threat, attack or damage, yet under quite different constraints,
types of threats and environmental conditions. Not unlike to naval ships, the two
most common threats for passenger ships are flooding and fire [173]. Flooding can
occur due to ship-to-ship collision or contact, ship grounding. Fire can be initiated by
explosion, terrorist act, material failure or human error. Specific to this observation,
a definition of survivability for passenger ships has been given by [173] claiming that:
”Survivability is the capability of a passenger ship to continue to carry out its mission
in a threat environment that can lead to flood and fire.” [173].
Susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability definitions, while essentially similar to
the ones applicable to naval ships, can be adopted for passenger ships, taking into ac-
count the peculiar threat and operational environment. While survivability equations
can be applied to the assessment process of a passenger ship design, recent efforts have
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provided alternative formulations and frameworks for the same purpose. The Inter-
national Maritime Organization (IMO) back in the early 1960 had organized a series
of conventions, known as the Safety Of Life At Sea International Conventions (SO-
LAS), in an attempt to formulate and establish safety and survivability requirements
and survivability assessment procedures for passenger and merchant ships [119]. The
SOLAS amendments provide regulations on safety and survivability (e.g. regulation
A.265 (VIII)), concerning the impact of flooding and fire on ship stability and mobility
and furthermore on mission effectiveness and killability. Between damage condition
and the total loss/kill of a ship there are many intermediate stages. Based on a naval
combatant ship, a hierarchical functional top-down breakdown of the intermediate
stages has been outlined by Papanikolaou et al. [173]:
• Total Kill, when the ship is either completely lost due to foundering or com-
pletely damaged by fire.
• Mobility Kill, if loss of ship mobility or controllability occurs.
• Mission Area Kill, if a mission related capability is considered lost.
• Primary or Combat System Kill, when one or more vital systems of the ship
are damaged.
• Hull, Machinery or Electrical (HM&E) Support System Kill, if one or more
components supporting a primary/combat system of the ship are damaged.
This hierarchical approach essentially implies that a combat/auxiliary system kill
can lead to a mission area kill or a mobility kill or furthermore a total kill. Damage
extent can also propagate in the opposite direction, for instance, a mobility kill can
be reduced to a mission area kill, or to a combat system kill. Equivalently, in a case
of a passenger ship, loss of stability due to damage can cause by loss of floatability
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(by flooding or foundering), leading to loss of power and ultimately to loss of mobility
[173].
C.2 Ground vehicles
Ground transportation systems primarily involve automotive and locomotive systems.
Survivability concepts however, in the form that have been earlier defined are effec-
tively represented by safety engineering requirements and enhancement approaches.
While one could argue that such systems do not have to encounter threats in a mil-
itary context, they still experience safety threatening situations and hazards of non-
military nature. Combat related threats, such as missile or torpedo attacks, bombing
explosions, loss of power could have equivalents for non-combat systems in the form
of traffic hazards, natural disasters, sabotaging etc.. It is obvious that combat and
ground system threats cannot be compared directly , however, they constitute hazards
of similar impact within their own domains.
Susceptibility and vulnerability might not be directly defined for this particular
systems type, equivalent measures however exist in the form of crash avoidance and
crash worthiness. Crash Avoidance can be defined as a probability of detecting road
hazards and being able to avoid a resulting impact (with external vehicle, body,
or obstacle). Kill status for a ground vehicle can occur either after experiencing a
direct impact or collision or by catching fire. Crashworthiness is the probability of
withstanding an external impact or collision, with the vehicle structure maintaining
the minimum required volume and space for the occupants to survive the accident.
Subsequently, an equivalent survivability measure could be defined based on the two
latter metrics, in similar fashion as with naval and aerospace systems.
Crash avoidance in ground transportation vehicles is implemented through moni-
toring systems for increased situational awareness along with improved dynamics for
enforcing active safety. Future automobiles will feature even more safety systems,
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including both active and passive sensors for enhanced threat detection and alerting
drivers to impending collision situations [235]. Indeed, the National Highway Trans-
portation Safety Administration (NHTSA) [164], [235] concludes that 70% of rear-end
collisions were caused primarily by driver inattention, bringing this threat at the top
of the list of hazards on the road. Human-machine interface and ergonomics are also
big contributors, in the sense that driver reaction time is critical for understanding the
warnings that are provided by the situational awareness systems and complementing
the chances of a avoiding impacts or collisions [235].
Crashworthiness on the other hand is closely related to the design and the overall
built of the vehicle. Main objective is to preserve a sufficient volume for the occu-
pants to survive the collision without being crushed, or launched outside the vehicle.
Structural strength is a key property for maintaining a sufficient survival volume,
contributing to a sufficiently strong occupant compartment. Limiting the forces and
decelerations the occupants are experiencing to acceptable levels of human tolerance
is another significant objective, given that abruptly induced human body motions
can be a significant cause of fatality. The resulting effect should be a combination
of structural crashworthiness improvements, that would allow portions of the vehicle
to crush in a predetermined manner and thus limiting the decelerations of the vehi-
cle. Crash energy management approaches for ground transportation vehicle are very
common nowadays for allowing structural crushing to be distributed throughout the
entire vehicle, in an attempt to control the behavior of the entire vehicle during the
collision [236]. To conclude, this overall collision behavior will determine the vehicle
crashworthiness.
C.3 Biological Systems
Survivability in biological systems might have significantly different implications as
compared to survivability in engineering systems. According to Darwin’s definition,
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as provided by his classic text ”On the origin of species” (1859), survivability is the
”evolutionary longevity of species to natural selection” [56]. Alternative definitions
describe survivability as the ”environmental fitness of organisms” [191]. It appears
that survivability in biological species and organisms should require evaluation within
large time scales, including complete life cycles or generations.
Organisms have to withstand threats of biological or extinctive nature and typi-
cally live inside a changing environment. Thus, susceptibility and vulnerability can
still be applicable concepts to complement survivability, given that organisms might
employ the same environmental awareness and defense mechanisms. Threats against
the long term survival of species can be virus spreadings, pandemic or genocide.
Vulnerability is strongly linked to the immunity of organisms to biological threats
and in most cases there can be the possibility of recovery, also giving substance to
recoverability as third component of the organism’s survival.
C.4 Energy Systems
Energy systems is broad category that includes any type of power generation and
distribution system, ranging from heavy duty industrial power plants that supply
power to cities, manufacturing plants, buildings, to smaller scale systems for supplying
power to cars, trains, ships, aircraft and space systems. While size and power output
scales form a very large spectrum, fundamentally all types of power system types
share something in common: Their basic mission is to be able to convert one form of
energy to another (mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, chemical, etc.), thus providing
continuous and sufficient power to a network of service loads that serve the mission
objectives of the engineering systems that they supply. However, not unlike other
engineering systems, they are assigned to deliver these tasks, under the presence of
environmental changes and the risk of threats. Thus, survivability in energy systems
is critical for the uninterrupted and adequate power delivery. Poroseva has defined
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survivability for power systems as [180]
”Ability to provide power to consumers/loads in spite of multiple simultaneous faults
caused by natural or hostile disruptions.”
Great emphasis is given to the possibility of faults within the system, or power
delivery disruptions, given that such incidents can cause a total power outage. Similar
factors have contributed towards massive power blackouts, such as the 2003 North-
eastern blackout that was discussed in earlier sections. One fundamental difference
of a power system as compared to other mobility-driven engineering systems, is that
it requires a network of subsystems for power distribution and can thus occupy more
space, either in terms of area or volume for accommodating this network. Moreover,
it becomes subject to additional threats and hazards that can be common to network
or information distribution systems.
Susceptibility and vulnerability are the two main elements of power system surviv-
ability, with the former to collect most of the research focus, given the network aspect
of the system and the increased demand for more effective situational awareness. to
illustrate this point, one should recall that a naval power system is contained within
the vessel, occupying space that at worst does not exceed the ship’s volume and can
benefit from the ship’s hardened and shielded external boundaries. On the contrary,
an industrial power plant that distributes power to a small town, is not necessarily
constrained within the space that the generating unit is occupying. It extends to the
entire town through a network of components that can be exposed to several threats
and risks. One can understand how the susceptibility of the naval power system is
due to its default design lower than for the power generation plant and its distribution
system. Thus, to some extent systems are susceptible or vulnerable, based on their
default design architecture.
The kill function has a slightly altered implication for an energy system. While
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kill for an aircraft is a total system failure (with no recovery option), for a ship ”kill”
is not always a total ship failure (e.g. foundering) but maybe mission kill, it appears
that for a power system ”kill” is not a system disaster most of the time but probably
failure to deliver power. The dual nature of a power system as an engineering system,
but also as a network of distributed subsystems, can interpret a ”kill” as a local kill
in most cases, that contributes to power delivery irregularities. Unless there are cases
of warfare, where an entire power generation and distribution system gets bombed,
”kill” cannot destroy the system. As a result, recoverability makes a lot of sense as
well, with a heavily supported role in this case for achieving survivable power systems.
Sudhoff (2004) [225] has introduced two additional concepts, operability and de-
pendability, evaluated with respect to given events. The interface of a power system to
systems that consume the generated power consists of service loads, which are tasked
to perform functions that supports the mission of the end user engineering system
(e.g. a propulsion motor, lighting, radar, weapon systems, etc.) [225]. Operability is
calculated based on the operational status of a load, representing three operational
conditions, full, partial or no operation. The input to a load operability can be as-
signed either by a controller (human operated or automated), or by secondary or
side external effects (e.g. high temperature rise in the physical proximity of load
that impedes is functionality). Weighting schemes can assign strategic importance
ranking to the power system components, defining a relative contribution to system
dependability per load. A collective consideration of service load operabilities under
a certain weighting scheme (determined usually by mission scenarios) can return a
measure for system dependability, thus being an implicit avenue for evaluating system
survivability.
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C.5 Communications and Networks
Network and communication systems can be classified under engineering systems,
however they raise different concerns when it comes to survivability. While they con-
sist of certain engineering subsystems, system connectivity and interdependency can
bring a new understanding in survivability. Systems are not confined in a reserved
fixed space, on the contrary there is a spatial distribution of subsystems, adding
variability in the threat types a network can encounter based on local environmen-
tal conditions. Inner faults or disruptions might pose higher risks for survivability
reduction or total mission kill, especially when they can be triggered by natural or
emergent disturbances.
From a network theory perspective [6], survivability in a communications channel
is defined as the:
”probability of retaining connection between representative pairs of nodes.” Survivability
is framed around system connectivity in this version, hinting that disrupted connec-
tions may be the most common threats against the propagation of energy or infor-
mation through a network. The Federal Communications Standard 1037C brings a
detailed definition [233]
”Survivability is a property of a system, subsystem, equipment, process, or procedure
that provides a defined degree of assurance that the named entity will continue to
function during and after a natural or man-made disturbance.”
While the essence of the definition is not nay different than earlier ones, there is an
indication that natural disturbances play more significant roles in affecting networked
system operations. Baran may have the most inclusive definition, including the aspect
of physical attacks, the multitude of engineering systems connected through a network
and the importance of maintaining connectivity:
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”Survivability is the percentage of stations both surviving the physical attack and re-
maining in electrical connection with the largest single group of surviving stations.”
Shifting towards an information technology systems network perspective, Deutsch [61]
defined survivability as ”the degree to which essential functions are still available even
though some part of the system is down”, giving emphasis in function value delivery,
possibly due to the fact that the main objective of a computing system is to deliver
an outcome through a returned value. The kill mode in this case would not be a
totally destroyed system, nor its operator or controller, but failure to deliver a value.
Ellison et. al provided another suitable definition [72]:
”Survivability is the ability of a network computing system to provide essential services
in the presence of attacks and failures, and recover full services in a timely manner.”
essentially shedding more light on the issue of ”function/service value delivery”, the
types of attacks possibly encountered and bringing in the aspect of time constrained
recoverability. Recoverability might be desired for assuring that the system will keep
functioning and delivering, however at some point the quality of service will be ques-
tioned by stakeholders or service recipients, therefore bringing the system closer to
its original performance condition is the ultimate requirement for a survivable and
resilient system.
Ellison et al. [72] extended their definition by describing survivable systems
through providing specification for survivable systems. This includes:
1. A precise description of the operating environment
2. The functions that the system must provide.
3. A preferred order of provision of the functions.
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4. Probability distributions to describe the uncertainty regarding the system’s op-
erating conditions, function and function prioritization.
Knight et al. [134] has adopted a similar specification approach to defining sur-
vivability and extended it to include customer values and expectation and repackaged
all information in a state vector, also known as the survivability specification vector :
S = [E,R, P,M ] (87)
where S is the survivability specification state vector, E represents the assumed
operating environment, R describes the services that the system must provide, P
is a probability distribution across the set of specifications R. and M is a system
representation [S, s0, V, T] with s0 as the initial or preferred state for the machine,
V is finite set of customer values and T a state transition matrix.
Network systems do include survivability associated metrics that are equivalent
to susceptibility and vulnerability. The kill state in this domain is referred to as fault.
As Knight (2000) remarks, ”the informal notion of an event that causes damage
which we have used is referred to formally as a fault” [134]. Fault tolerance is the
systems property to withstand and survive the effects of the fault, namely representing
the same concept as system vulnerability for engineering systems. Fault avoidance
similarly links to susceptibility, in terms of how prepared or equipped the system is
to avoid the fault.
As explained in Chapter 1, survivability is a dependability property for networks.
Survivability according to Knight ”is not synonymous with fault tolerance”. Fault
tolerance is a mechanism that can be used to achieve certain dependability properties.
If one imagines fault tolerance as resilience, a similar association holds with regard to
survivability. Resilience is philosophy that can be enabled by survivability and deliver
more dependable systems. With increased dependability, ”a system can be considered
reliable, available, secure, safe, survivable etc.” [134]. Describing a system as fault
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tolerant is really a statement about the system’s design, not its dependability. To
complete this survey, the concepts of fault elimination and fault forecasting directly
match to recoverability and situational awareness. As Knight [134] adds, improve-





Development of metrics has been a key exercise for the resilience assessment frame-
work. Given that resilience engineering is an emerging discipline, with few quantita-
tive formulations available from current literature, a clean sheet approach has been
necessary. Metrics are necessary enablers for the practice of engineering discipline,
and a tool for evaluating performance in engineering. The development of the appro-
priate metrics must be anticipated as a disciplined science itself, rather than an Ad
Hoc exercise. Therefore, a number of metric development approaches were discovered
and evaluated. The choice of method for this crucial methodological step, was the
G-Q-M, or Goal-Question-Metric technique, suggested by the INCOSE [261].
According to the G-Q-M guide, a metric is a standard of measurement. A typical
lifecycle for a metric is formed by the following steps:
1. Define measurement goals.
2. Collect and validate metric data.
3. Analyze metric data.
4. Derive metric knowledge.
5. Improve product process operating procedures and decision making.
There are four main categories under which every metric can be classified. Ac-
cording to its mathematical description, a metric can be at least one of the following:
• Ratio: Division of one quantity over the other, with the numerator and denom-
inator being mutually exclusive.
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• Proportion: Division of one quantity over another, with the numerator and
denominator not being mutually exclusive and the numerator is part of the
denominator.
• Percentage: A conversion of a proportion in terms of -per hundred- units.
• Rate: A rate represents the dynamic rate of change of the phenomena of interest
over time.
A good metric must be characterized by accuracy, precision, validity and correct-
ness. Accuracy is the degree of agreement of individual or average measurements with
an accepted reference value or level, while precision is the degree of mutual agree-
ment among individual measurements made under prescribed conditions, or simply
how well identically performed measurements agree with each other. Validity is the
degree at which the metric really measures what it is intended to measure, for instance
the extent to which an empirical metric reflects the real concept under consideration.
Last, correctness infers that the data was collected according to the exact rules defined
in the metric, e.g. conditions at which data were collected for metric evaluation.
As an illustrative example, it is assumed that a goal imposed by a stakeholder
is to ”increase product reliability”. As a consequence, a relevant question can be
formulated as follows: ”What is the current fault removal rate compared to earlier
releases of this product”? One metric that answers to the previous question is the
current percent and number of faults removed by lifecycle phase and fault severity
for this product release. Another possible metric is the previous percent and number
of faults removed by lifecycle phase and fault severity for earlier releases.
Linking this simple example to the resilience framework and to system capability,
there can be at least two metrics of interest derived. Following the G-Q-M approach,
the two goals for the system are:
• G1: Improve ability to minimize capability loss.
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• G2: Improve ability to meet critical thresholds.
Two questions can be formulated as an attempt to explore possible metrics for
the measuring of the system’s ability to satisfy the two previous goals:
• G1-Q1.1: What is the capability loss due to performance degradation?
• G1-Q1.2: What is a time dependent average measure of the capability loss due
to performance degradation?
• G2-Q2: To what extent is the threshold satisfied, even after significant perfor-
mance degradation?
At this point, metrics can be formulated as possible answers to the goals and ques-
tions:
• G1-Q1.1-M1.1: The capability loss due to performance degradation can be ex-
pressed as:
MCL = MC0 − M̄CT (88)
• G1-Q1.2-M1.2: The time weighted average capability can provide a cumulative






with as the time-averaged capability loss
• G2-Q2-M2: Threshold availability AT , where, TAT is the total Time Above
Threshold:
AT = TAT/T (90)
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APPENDIX E
CHARACTERIZATION OF A THREAT ENVIRONMENT
A military system that has to operate under several external threats, safety risks and
other types of disturbances. In order to explore the options for improving the effec-
tiveness of a military system by design, a complete understanding and investigation
of the threat environment is critical. Figure 190 contains some of the basic criteria
for describing a threat.
E.1 Origin and direction
The threat characterization criteria have been conceived by thinking of a threat as a
physical entity that can change the value of some of the properties of its surrounding
environment[109]. Space time are the first properties of a threat that can come in
mind. A threat starts from a certain location and propagates towards one or multiple
other locations. Thus, a threat can be described by its origin and its direction, not
unlike a vector in 3-dimensional space. The threat may then propagate towards a
single or multiple direction. In the single direction case, the threat can be viewed as a
vector. For instance, a Surface-to-Air (SAM) missile system, will launch a missile on
a single path that follows the adversary single target. In the multiple direction case,
the threat propagates in two or infinite number of directions, effectively creating a
field where mass, momentum and energy is propagated. A bomb explosion, a disease
transmitted through a virus or a force field are examples for multi-spread threats.
E.2 Environmental morphology
A significant factor on how a threat will be deployed, is the morphology of the en-
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Figure 190: Criteria for threat characterization
electromagnetic wave, this would correspond to the mean that the wave travels in.
Aside from the standard forms of matter, namely solids, liquids or gases, at a higher
level the distinction will include land, sea or air. The threat environment may also
involve multiple terrains. A good example of the latter is a land-air based theater
of operations [16]. A Surface-to-Air gun system or missile launcher (SAMs) can be
a land or sea based threat for adversary aircraft. Other alternatives are Air-to-Air
gun systems or missile launchers. or Air-to-Surface aircraft installed gun systems
or missile launcher for targeting land or sea based strategic fixed or mobile targets.
Last, another feature of the threat environment is the uniformity of the terrain. Land
can be flat (uniform) or bumpy (non-uniform). Similarly, liquids or gases may have
constant or varying density. The frequency of transitions from one terrain to another
is another factor that makes the environment highly non-uniform.
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E.3 Topological distribution
Returning to the threat propagation itself, another criterion is the environmental
space that it occupies. To better illustrate this feature, an analogy is drawn from
structural dynamics. As part of a larger structure, a beam column is designed to
support a maximum amount of load, and in many cases the load distribution shape
is constrained. There can be an unlimited range of load distribution shapes, yet uni-
form, triangular (linear) or quadratic (nonlinear) are the most common ones. Highly
non-linear and dynamic load distributions require more sophisticated computational
techniques (e.g finite element methods) to determine the design of the beam. If the
load distribution on a beam can be visualized as a ”threat” that will cause the beam
to translate, rotate or bend, then a threat can be topologically described as a load dis-
tribution. In other words, a threat is characterized by a shape function, implemented
as a normalized mathematical functions of space f(x, y, z). At each point (x,y,z) a
magnitude m(x, y, z) that describes the possible impact of the threat on that loca-
tion. The bounded area or volume that any possible threat impact is defined within,
defines the total occupation of the threat.
E.4 Dynamic Behavior
A threat is characterized by its dynamic behavior. Except for the cases where a
threat is manifested by an impulse, namely an act of a finite amplitude in a infinites-
imally small time, in most cases a threat propagates for certain time period with a
finite duration. If the threat is conceptualized as a time-varying signal, it can either
be a continuous or discrete signal. A disease that geographically spreads with an
increasing impact intensity is described by a continuous signal that varies in space
(x, y, z) and time t. On the other hand, a series of bombing attacks that occur at
different time instances and possibly at different locations are described by a discrete
signal, representing a chain of discrete events. In either case, both signal types are
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characterized by their amplitude A(t), namely the magnitude of the disturbance as
it varies with time. The periodicity of the signal indicates how often discrete events
occur, or when the continuous signal reaches its maxima, or minima. For a pure
periodic behavior, the frequency of the signal ω is defined for either signal type. For
continuous signals, a rate of change for the amplitude is defined, and along the same
lines, a gradient vector is defined for the spatial propagation of the threat
E.5 Threat deployment:Intent and propagation methods
In a less quantitative characterization criterion, threats are assessed from a strategic
and causal perspective. A threat occurs due to the objectives or intents of a certain
party that seeks to accomplish a particular goal. A nation’s military force in a bat-
tlefield, a terrorist group’s unexpected action against a country, or the disease that
spreads itself to survive are all examples of entities that spread a threat, in order
to achieve a goal. Thus, every threat contains an intent, that typically depends on
the nature of the end goal. Threats can be natural and furthermore, spontaneous
or emergent. A natural threat implies that there is no human interference that con-
tributes to its manifestation. Natural effects due to weather or climate change are
good examples of natural threats. Hurricane Katrina [132] is a recent example of a
natural event that spontaneously occurred and became a threat to the entire infras-
tructure of the city of New Orleans, and eventually triggered a large scale disaster.
On the other hand, the 2003 Northeastern Blackout is another example of a natural
threat that was initiated by a small scale fault (spontaneous threat), but the inherent
interdependencies of the power distribution system allowed for a series of emergent
events that resulted in a another large-scale disaster.
Non-natural threats are usually intelligent human-induced threats that end up
being malevolent for the systems or groups that they target. Force projection against
the enemy in the battlefield is an intelligent threat. To elaborate further, there can
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be many different styles or methods on how the force projection is executed. The
deployment method is a contributing factor on intense this threat is going to be for
the enemy target. For instance, the Navy doctrine on warfare, dictates two basic styles
of naval warfare at sea, attrition and maneuvering [163]. With attrition, the objective
is to wear down the enemy in a direct one-to-one type of conflict. While attrition is
a direct method of force projection, maneuvering is an indirect warfighting style that
employs a higher pace of tactics and responses towards the enemy is adopted.
Military related threats are usually expected threats. Terrorism is another form
of intelligent threat with malevolent intentions. A great variety of weapons are used,
from bombing equipment, to chemical or biological weapons [23]. As part of their
method of deployment, acts of terrorism are unexpected in terms of their location and
timing of occurrence. Targets of terrorism are beyond military systems, it appears
that civilian transportation, power generation or communications systems are also
common strategic targets that terrorists prefer. Where military systems are designed
with their greater exposure to threats in mind, civilian targets are not designed with
reduced susceptibility and vulnerability requirements as a first priority. To illustrate
this point, one can consider two historic terrorist attacks, such as the U.S.S. Cole [90]
bombing and the Pan Am flight 103 Boeing 747 Jumbo jet bombing [172]. While
they both suffered a similar initial blast as the primary effect, the civilian system
experienced a total catastrophic failure, while the military system managed to protect
itself from catastrophe by not allowing the blast damage to propagate throughout the
rest the system.
In a more systematic investigation of threat impact, threats can be tabulated
against system types, resulting to a threat-system matrix classification. This is a
useful approach to distinguish the most dangerous types of threats that need to be
avoided and can be instrumental for visualizing the threat overlaps across different
types of systems. Table 8 contains a set of basic system types against possible threats
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that they can encounter, classified according to their individual characteristics.
Table 8: Threat classification for various system types
Types Intelligent Natural
Military Fighter a/c Enemy threat Heavy weather
and Rotorcraft Terrorism Workplace hazards
Defense Systems Naval ships Chemical/Bio Grounding
UAV Collisions
Civil Passenger aircraft Terrorism Heavy weather
Transportation Passenger ships (Ferries) Chemical/Bio Workplace hazards
Systems Merchant ships Attack Operational errors
Ground transportation Hijacking Collisions
Energy Power distribution Enemy threat Capacity overload
Systems Intelligent power grids Terrorism Component damage
Nuclear plants Chemical/Bio Extreme weather
Networks and Communications Terrorism Capacity overload
Communications IT support networks Hijacking Component damage
The purpose of including a thorough threat analysis in the present section aims
at making the case that a system design may not be effective in a real life application
or mission, if the possible threats expected to be encountered are not going to be
taken into account during the design process. In theory, a system design may contain
the capability to perform as expected, but its design must imply that it contains the
additional capacity of absorbing the effects of a threat, either through safety margins,
system survivability and robustness. A threat analysis supports a threat assessment
procedure that is necessary to collect information on the impact that a threat may
have on a particular system design. It can further help reveal other subsequent modes
of failure after the initial damage (e.g bombing blast). Damage propagation and re-
sulting effects (e.g. catastrophic failure or disaster) are dependent on how vulnerable
systems are or if and how they could recover from this situation. With this infor-
mation, system designers car investigate possible remedy actions towards increasing
vulnerability and recoverability. However, it appears that only until recently, there
have been efforts aiming to address vulnerability design issues as part of the early
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conceptual design process. While such efforts have mainly been initiated by the mili-
tary systems design community, the benefits can become obvious for civil applications
as well.
It is one of the objectives of this research to establish the need for addressing the
same mission uncertainty and risk concerns for any other type of engineering system,
e.g. civil transport aircraft, passenger/merchant ships, ground transportation system,
power generation and distribution network infrastructures, etc. one of the visions,
pertinent to this work is that all systems can be expected to operate under threats
against their mission. While understanding that threat uncertainty and risk is not
the same for all systems, there must still be an initiative for improving the design for
improving the inherent ability of withstanding the resulting effects of a threat and
protecting the system’s physical integrity and human operators.
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APPENDIX F
CANONICAL PROBLEM: DESCRIPTION AND
MODELING APPROACH
In order to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed metrics, a small scale canon-
ical problem has been constructed. The purpose of the particular pilot problem is to
be a flexible and easy to understand platform, where the basic steps for the resilience
assessment analysis, and the effectiveness of the metrics can be demonstrated. The
model for the canonical problem has been constructed in a way that it carries the
minimum required behavioral characteristics of a larger scale complex system. At the
same time, the system configuration must scalable and modular, so that the model
can be easily revised and adjusted to the problem requirements, e.g. for performing
uncertainty analysis, control design, etc. Last, it must be an efficient implementation
that allows for rapid parametric analysis and exploration.
F.1 Introduction
A spring-mass-damper system (SMD) with a multi-spring configuration has been
selected and implemented as the canonical model for method development. At the
baseline configuration, the SMD system consists of a mass m that can move along
the x direction, essentially being a single degree of freedom system (SDOF). The
mass is bounded on both sides, by two walls, which are at a distance of xult from the
equilibrium point x0 = 0.
The experimental setup also includes a damper of damping ratio ζ and an array of
8 main springs. The springs are equally distributed in either side of the mass, having




























Figure 191: Canonical problem configuration
1..8, while this stiffness is the initial stiffness that spring has by design. Also, springs
are allowed to degrade at an exponential rate λi, when the force Fspringi on a spring
i reaches a critical threshold Fcriti . In other words, the variation of the stiffness for
spring i is expressed as:
ki =

k0i if Fspring < Fcriti
k0i · exp(−λi · t) if Fcriti ≤ Fspring ≤ Fulti
0 if Fspring > Fulti
(91)
The system is losing its stiffness, when it breaks after reaching the ultimate force
threshold Fult. Stiffness information is a given input to the system in the form of a
user defined input file. Similarly, stiffness critical values can be passed on the system,
which depend on the material the springs are assumed to be made of. A schematic
of how the SMD system is configured, is given with Figure 191.
The basic mission of the system is to vibrate around its equilibrium point, but
ensure that it will not get out of the designated bounds. For its normal operating
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conditions, a nominal constant force p= p0 is applied on the mass, in order to maintain
a stable oscillation. However a second external, time-dependent load distribution
applies on the mass unexpectedly, thus adding more energy on the system. In some
cases, the system may be able to compensate the impact of the additional force by
itself. In some other cases through, it fails to completely neutralize these effects,
thus experiencing increasing displacements and accelerations, and eventually become
destabilized.
As part of its mission, the system must be capable of withstanding an instanta-
neous impulse or loading d(x, t) that is dynamically acting over a certain period of
time τ . A general form of the disturbance input is:
d(x, t) = d0 ∗ f1d(x) ∗ f2d(t) (92)
assuming that spatial and temporal contribution can be independent. The magnitude
d0 is expressed as a force (kN). The factors f1d(x) and f2d(t) are normalized functions
that describe the disturbance spatial distribution on the layout and the amplitude
respectively. For the particular experiment, the spatial distribution is uniform, im-
plying that the load can act at ny location. The temporal part however, is selected
by the user, and can either be a step function, or sine signal input. There is no limi-
tation on the input signals, but the latter two are the ones considered for the current
experiment.
Along these lines, the system must remain within bounds, while in terms of its
integrity, it must take the appropriate actions, in order to protect as many springs
as it can, preventing them from reaching the breaking limit. In other words, sys-
tem health is determined by the collective ”health” status of all the main springs.
Moreover, it is also expected to recover from temporary effects that unexpected time-
dependent disturbance loading has induced, maintaining as much of its structural
health as possible. This implies that a certain level of damage control is required.
a rule based, feedback controller is included for this layout, which is responsible for
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Figure 192: Simple two-parallel spring configuration
sensing the stiffness of each spring, and furthermore manage total system stiffness,
by enabling/disabling main or a range of redundant springs accordingly. An array
of four additional springs is included, which can be selectively enabled through an
actuator, that is controlled by the rule-based controller.
F.2 Modeling approach
For implementing the model, some basic ideas must be clarified as part of the modeling
approach. The springs are configured in parallel, in groups of four. Figure 192
contains a simple example, with two springs that are connected to a mass in parallel.
The other end for each spring is attached on a fixed wall, while k1 and k2 are the
spring constants. A displacement of the mass by a distance x results in the first spring
lengthening by a distance x1, while the second spring is compressed by a distance x2.
Starting from force balancing for the diagram of Figure 192, the governing equation
for the system is given by Equation 93
mẍ = −k1x− k2x = −(k1 + k2)x (93)
which returns:
ẍ = −((k1 + k2)/m)x (94)
The effective total stiffness of the system is:


















Figure 193: Simple two-parallel SMD configuration
while the natural frequency is calculated as:
ω = sqrt((k1 + k2)/m) (96)
Figure 193 expands on the previous simple parallel spring model, to include the
damper, along with a redundant spring for recoverability. Following the same ap-
proach and starting from the free body diagram, the governing equation is:
mẍ = f(t)− k1x− k2x− cẋ (97)
assuming an input force f(t), and x0 = 0. The total stiffness is identical to that of
Equation 95, as well as the natural frequency being identical to Equation 96.
F.3 MATLAB/Simulink implementation
The computational model for reconfigurable multi-spring SMD model has been im-
plemented in MATLAB/Simulink. While earlier sections offered a short introduction
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Figure 194: Computational model implementation layout
to the basics of the modeling approach, this section will elaborate on the features
of this particular architecture, as the key layers of the model are discussed. Figure
194 offers an overview of the simulation model topology. It includes the input mod-
ules, through which one can select the magnitudes and signal shapes for the mission
and disturbance inputs, the main SMD simulation, the blocks with the spring arrays,
properly connected to the system, along with the damper. Last, the rule based con-
troller is another significant component, for allowing the system to reconfigure itself
and restore its mission responses, while the last model is an inclusive data collection
and processing module, for storing the experimental data outputs.
The core of the simulation is the second order solver, which returns the solutions
for the displacement x(t), the velocity ẋ, and the acceleration ẍ. An overview of
the implementation is shown in Figure 195. The spring plant contains the topology
implementation for the springs, while the total stiffness is aggregated for forming the
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Figure 195: Second order SMD solver
corresponding terms of the governing equation. The same plant also provides real
time information on the status of each spring based on its actual contribution. This
information is collected by the information acquisition, as well as by the controller.
The spring plant consists of two smaller plants of parallel connected springs in
groups of 4, along with a third block that contains two smaller blocks of two backup
springs each. The model allows for a user input on the spring’s status, a feature
that allows for experiments where the spring could randomly break, regardless of its
nominal health status and operating conditions. The output of this block is the total
spring force, along with the vector that contains the time histories of the spring health
status. Figure 196 provides a view of the spring block.
The reconfiguration block is the part of the simulation that contains the rule based
controller, along with the actuator. The role of the controller, is to collect the status
of the springs in real time, along with system capability information (e.g. how well it
satisfying its operational constraints). From a practical standpoint, the controller is
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Figure 196: Spring plant block
Figure 197: Reconfigurator block
387
comparing system capability real time data to the critical thresholds. Based on the
system’s position, namely, the zone of thresholds that its value lies between, it selects
the appropriate reconfiguration strategy that corresponds to the zone, and returns a
signal with spring operating commands, which is propagated to the spring plant.
The last block is the information collection block. It is the block responsible for
processing the simulation response x(t), in order to obtain MC(t) time histories,
as well as for converting spring stiffness data to a measure for total system health
SH(t).
388
Figure 198: Information collection block
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